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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005526 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016 
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: REPORT ON ARMS SURRENDERED BY THE PARAMILITARIES 


Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 

------- 
Summary 
------- 

¶1.  (C) The ratio of weapons turned in per demobilized 
paramilitary could be as high as one-to-one, according to 
MAPP/OAS and GOC experts, if half the demobilizing 
paramilitaries were not combat troops.  However, experts 
remain concerned about diversion of paramilitary weapons to 
criminals.  End summary. 

------------------------------------------- 
1 to 1 Ratio of People to Arms...or 2 to 1? 
------------------------------------------- 

¶2.  (C) The Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia 
(MAPP/OAS) analysts told poloff it was possible that only 
15,000 of the 30,000 demobilized were part of the armed wing 
of the AUC (the others part of the support network, such as 
cooks and drivers).  In that scenario, the ratio of the 
15,000 weapons handed over per paramilitary would be close to 
one-to-one.  Even if all 30,000 demobilized were military 
personnel (which is unlikely), the ratio of weapons turned in 
per paramilitary would be closer to two-to-one, about average 
for peace processes in other countries. 

¶3.  (C) Nevertheless, MAPP/OAS analysts expressed concern 
with regard to specific AUC blocs that appear to have kept a 
large portion of their weapons.  For example, the North Bloc 
had a person-to-weapons ratio of 3:1 (4,760 former combatants 
demobilized and only 1,458 arms surrendered).  Other blocs 
with similar statistics included AutodefensasCampesinas de 
Puerto Boyaca and Central Bolivar Bloc of south Bolivar, for 
whom the ratio was 4:1. 

¶4.  (C) Analysts from the the GOC's Antiterrorist Analysis 
Interinstitutional Group (GIAT)--responsible for receiving 
the arms turned over by paramilitaries and for registering 
the weapons--estimated that over 4,000 weapons were not 
turned in.  They explained their estimate is based on tracing 
back to detected shipments of weapons that entered the 
country illegally.  For example, in 2003, a Bulgarian company 
(ARSENAL SA) sold the AUC 7,640 AK-47 rifles; of these the 
AUC has only handed over 2,333. 

----------------------- 
Paramilitary Structures 
----------------------- 

¶5.  (C) GIAT analysts argued that paramilitary economic and 
political structures remain active.  They said structures 
could regroup if the GOC failed to provide security in key 
regions.  According to military intelligence, five caches of 
rifles have been detected in the Departments of Cordoba (2), 
Bolivar (2), and Casanare (1).  GIAT analysts said some of 
the weapons found in these caches were being sold to 
narcotraffickers in northern Valle del Cauca Department. 

-------------------------------- 
Tracing Origins and Destinations 
-------------------------------- 

¶5.  (C) GIAT analysts explained that between November 2004
and April 2006, paramilitaries turned over 9,521 rifles and 
195 machine guns (the balance of the 15,000 weapons were 
handed over outside this period).  Of these, 1,877 were made 
in the United States and brought into Colombia by trafficking 
rings.  Most of the rifles were made in the former Soviet 
Union (3,547), Bulgaria (2,333), North Korea (1,764), and 
Poland (47).  The machine guns were made in Romania (75), 
Russia (60), Germany (37), Colombia (20), and Venezuela (3).
The majority of the weapons originated from Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, and Honduras, acquired legally during Central 
America's internal conflicts in the 1980s and later were sent 
illegally to Colombia via air and sea. (A more detailed 
breakdown of the origins has been sent to WHA/AND.)  GIAT 
analysts noted arms confiscations had increased periodically 
during 2002, 2003, and 2004; however, since the paramilitary 
demobilization and exploratory talks between the GOC and ELN, 
this number has decreased in the last two years. 

--------------------- 
Venezuela Connections 
--------------------- 

¶6.  (C) The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (ATF) works closely with GIAT to assist the GOC to 
trace weapons.  In ATF's records, the 30,944 demobilized 
paramilitaries have handed over 17,540 weapons, most of which 
were in good condition.  Very few serial numbers were erased 
compared to previous illegal armed groups demobilizations. 
Some of the weapons and magazines were made in Colombia. 
Surprisingly, some rifles had the Venezuelan Armed Forces 
shield inscribed on them, which suggests that not only the 
FARC benefits from Venezuelan arms trafficking.  Moreover, 
some GLOCK pistols handed over by the paramilitaries can be 
traced to a Venezuelan company called CAVIM.  Other materials 
of Venezuelan origin are rifle grenades model M60P1 that were 
fabricated in the former Yugoslavia.  ATF and other U.S.
government agencies are investigating the parties who sold 
brokered sales from U.S. manufacturors, Vulcan House and 
Krincks, to the paramilitaries.

WOOD