VZCZCXRO0073
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1670/01 2261920
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141920Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6339
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 5585
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3880
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4193
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 3384
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0282
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 4772
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3120
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 6400
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0980
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 0130
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1931
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 5679
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 5275
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 2658
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 7728
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0155
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0032
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 001670 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL UNSC BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL NONCOMMITTAL ON PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. GOB officials responded in a noncommittal fashion to visiting S/P Director Krasner's presentation on the Partnership for Democratic Governance (PDG). During an August 4 meeting at the Foreign Ministry, GOB officials expressed concerns about the PDG's relationship, if any, to UN programs, and said Brazil prefers to work within established international organizations rather than new ones. FM Undersecretary Patriota also raised UNSC reform, arguing strongly for Security Council enlargement. In the discussion of regional topics, Patriota expressed deep concern about Lebanon and support for a UN-authorized force in Lebanon; noted that Brazil has named an ambassador to Baghdad; and said the GoB believes the time has come for a UN-authorized force to replace Australia in East Timor. Brazil wants to retain command of MINUSTAH forces in Haiti. U/S Patriota accepted S/P Krasner's invitation for broader policy planning talks, and continued discussions on the PDG, in Washington. Krasner also briefed the PDG to Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia during a separate meeting. Garcia reviewed the history of popular participation in Brazil's budget process as an example of GOB experience with public/private partnerships. End summary. 

------------------------------------- PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE ------------------------------------- 

¶2. (SBU) Dr. Stephen Krasner, Director of Policy Planning, provided a briefing on the Partnership for Democratic Governance (PDG) initiative in a meeting at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry on August 4. A discussion of UN reform and regional issues followed. In his opening remarks, Antonio Patriota, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, noted the good relationship between Presidents Lula and Bush, which he said illustrates the maturity, competency, and trust of the bilateral relationship. (Full participant list is in para. 21) 

¶3. (SBU) Krasner told Patriota that the USG is discussing the PDG with a number of countries, with the goal of establishing a group of some 20-25 supporting countries, based largely on government capacity, Freedom House indicators, and geographic diversity. He suggested that we might be able to have preliminary meetings this fall leading to an agreement on the form of the PDG by the end of the year. Krasner said the PDG is aimed to provide support where democratic elections have been held but institutions are weak and newly elected governments confront difficulties governing and building institutions. Krasner said we do not see the PDG as a replacement for anything else we are doing, or for the work of the Peace Building Commission (PBC). He emphasized that the PDG initiative will require the involvement and approval of leaders from inside the beneficiary governments, not outside. 

--------------------------------------------- ------- SEEING HOW THE PDG FITS INTO A MULTILATERAL PARADIGM --------------------------------------------- ------- 

¶4. (SBU) Patriota said his reaction was a very preliminary one. He indicated that Brazil needs more time to prepare its response, but that he had mentioned the PDG to Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and Vice FM Samuel Guimaraes. Patriota said Krasner's description of the initiative was reassuring because Brazil had some initial concerns. Brazil views democracy as a means to end: development, harmony, and opportunity. A one-size fits all approach is wrong since there are more and less mature democracies. Patriota said Brazil prefers to work with multilateral institutions, and Brazil invests its energies in improving and strengthening 

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those that already exist. 

¶5. (SBU) Patriota said above all Brazil's priorities are the UN and the WTO. He said multilateral organizations should not be confused with groups of like-minded countries, which nonetheless can be useful (he cited the India, Brazil, and South Africa group, known as IBSA). He said he was pleased that Krasner mentioned the PBC since Brazil recognized in the 1990s the lacuna in the UN system that the PBC has filled. He also noted that the UN system had not always been able to deal with situations such as Rwanda and Haiti because as soon as the security crisis had passed, there was no mechanism to deal with the aftermath. 

¶6. (SBU) Donor conferences, Patiota noted, suffer from too much north-south dynamic, and conditionalities imposed by donors could scuttle the work if the recipient lapsed. For this reason, Brazil is committed to making the PBC work. Patriota said Brazil is also hesitant to embrace the PDG because it could weaken the UN restructuring effort. He suggested that the PDG might be integrated in to the work of the PBC and Community of Democracies. Finally, Patriota said the upcoming Brazilian elections place a natural brake on Brazil's ability to take on new initiatives, particularly since Brazil is very involved in the India-Brazil-South Africa initiative. 

¶7. (SBU) Krasner agreed that we cannot work without the multilateral system, adding that he believes the PDG would bring diversity and legitimacy that would help transcend north-south divisions. The PDG could be a part of UN work. The USG does not see it necessarily as something distinct, but does not view it as an initiative that would become universal because its success could hinge on its sponsorship by high capacity, geographically diverse democracies that are truly committed to its overall objectives. This would necessarily limit the partnership. 

¶8. (SBU) Patriota said he was reassured by this because Brazil had concerns about how the PDG would fit in the UN system. 

¶9. (SBU) At a separate meeting with Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, Krasner reviewed the thinking behind the PDG, emphasizing the need to look at problems of democratic participation in a new light. After a lengthy review of Brazil's experience reintroducing democracy following the 1964-1985 dictatorship, Garcia reviewed recent experiences in drawing the public into the government's budgetary process. Krasner said citizen involvement in the budget process was a great idea. 

¶10. (SBU) In follow-up conversations between Ambassador Sobel and U/S Patriota, and between the Embassy Political Counselor and Marcel Biato, the president's deputy foreign policy advisor, the Brazilians stressed that they were not rejecting the PDG and it was not an unwelcome initiative. Both said they were interested in further discussion of the PDG and wanted to follow up with Embassy officers. 

-------------------------- UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM -------------------------- 

¶11. (SBU) Patriota said UN reform would not be complete without UNSC reform. He said there is now a majority in the General Assembly favoring an expansion of the UNSC to include both permanent and non-permanent members, developed countries, and developing countries. Patriota said he had discussed this with Secretary Rice and U/S Burns, and he did 

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not interpret the U.S. position as placing any restrictions on Brazilian UNSC aspirations. He also said the U.S. is the only country that supports adding only Japan. He asked whether Krasner had any new ideas. 

¶12. (SBU) Krasner said the USG remains very committed to UN reform, but noted the difficulty of charting a way forward. Patriota said the issue would not go away, and there is a growing awareness of the democracy deficit in the UNSC. He said the G-8's decision to include developing countries in its meetings is proof of that, and it is a positive development that the G-8 has expanded its agenda to include political issues, non-proliferation and others. He also said that Brazil must be engaged on UNSC reform; in view of its size, geographical location, and other reasons, it will be seen as running away from the issue if it does not engage. 

¶13. (SBU) Patriota added that a recent blue ribbon panel convened by Kofi Annan pointed to two possible reform models, one of which has broad support in among member states: expanding the UNSC in both categories, but without veto privileges. Patriota also said China might accept a non-veto wielding Japan, but that China's behavior in the developing world has so far blocked reform. He predicted that if current trends continue the UNGA will become ever closer to accepting the G-4 platform, and that Brazil might present a resolution to the UNGA before the end of the year on UNSC reform. 

-------------------- MIDDLE EAST: LEBANON -------------------- 

¶14. (SBU) Krasner said the components of the current crisis are clear: there must be a way to expand the authority of the government of Lebanon right up the borders with Israel and Syria. Since Hizballah is not going to disarm, the big challenge is to get an agreement by making trade-offs such as rules of engagement vs. the capacity of Hizballah. If Hizballah's capacity is not reduced, an agreement will be impossible. The USG wants an end to the fighting as soon as possible, and a robust force must be put together to strengthen the legitimacy and sovereignty of the GOL, he said. 

¶15. (SBU) Patriota said that President Lula wrote to the P-5 members plus the two Latin American Security Council members, Peru and Argentina, on August 3, expressing Brazil's concern and consternation over the situation in Lebanon. Brazil's position is that there has been a disproportionate response, an excessive use of force. Brazil, he stressed, condemns the use of terrorism by whoever uses it, and Brazil calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. 

¶16. (SBU) Brazil supports a force authorized by the UNSC, and Brazil would have to consider carefully whether it could participate. Patriota said Brazil has taken note of our position that we cannot go back to the status quo ante. He reiterated that Brazil's main concern is to strengthen the GOL and Lebanese sovereignty. 

----------------- MIDDLE EAST: IRAQ ----------------- 

¶17. (SBU) Krasner said we are guardedly hopeful, but we cannot say with high confidence that we will have the result we hoped for. Patriota said Brazil has established an office in Amman to handle its affairs in Iraq, and has named a career ambassador to Baghdad. He will go there when conditions permit. Brazil remains disheartened over the 

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turbulence and loss of life. 

---------- EAST TIMOR ---------- 

¶18. (SBU) Brazil is waiting for Kofi Annan's report on E. Timor. The crisis took Brazil by surprise, and Brazil, as a lusophone country, has a strong commitment to E. Timor, Patriota said. Brazil views with concern the longstanding military presence of any country or group of countries without UN oversight. Patriota acknowledged that Australia had gone to E. Timor invited by the Timorese, but said Brazil prefers a multinational force under UN supervision. He agreed with Krasner that under the circumstances it was probably the only option to have Australians enter quickly, but said now it is time for something different. 

----- HAITI ----- 

¶19. (SBU) Patriota noted that the MINUSTAH agreement is about to lapse, and said Brazil is interested in retaining command because its leadership seems to have been a positive factor. He asked for USG support to retain the Haitian command. Krasner expressed our appreciation for Brazil's contribution in Haiti. He pointed to Haiti as the kind of situation where the PDG could make a real contribution. For example, he said we might consider bringing in international judges but we need a situation in which Haitians will see them as a technical detail, not an international infringement on sovereignty. Patriota said Brazil does not oppose this, but bringing them under the auspices of an untested organization will not do that. Krasner replied the PDG could stipulate that UN auspices would be the best way, and perhaps France might be the best participant, but the most important matter is that Preval make the decision, and that the decision must empower the GOH. Patriota said Brazil would continue to think about it. 

--------------------------------------------- PATRIOTA ACCEPTS OUR INVITATION TO WASHINGTON --------------------------------------------- 

¶20. (SBU) Patriota accepted Krasner's invitation to continue discussions on the PDG in Washington. No date was discussed for those talks. 

¶21. (SBU) The meeting took place on August 4, 2006 at the Foreign Ministry. Brazilian participants: Antonio Patriota, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Glivania Maria Oliveira, United Nations Division chief Antonio Salgado, Chief of Staff to Mr. Patriota Ana Cabral, Human Rights Division chief Achilles Zaluar, United Nations Division Joao Tabajara, U.S. and Canada Division chief Igor Kipman, Central America and Caribbean Division chief Jorge Tavares, U.S. and Canada Division (notetaker) U.S. participants: Stephen Krasner, Director of Policy Planning (S/P) Ambassador Clifford Sobel William McIlhenny, Member, Secretary's Policy planning Staff (S/P) Greg Manuel, Member, Secretary's Policy Planning Staff (S/P) Mark Kennon, Embassy Brasilia 

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Dale Prince, Embassy Brasilia (notetaker) 

Sobel