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Viewing cable 06KABUL3719, PAG MAKES FIRST RECOMMENDATIONS TO PRESIDENT KARZAI
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06KABUL3719 | 2006-08-21 10:10 | 2011-01-23 19:07 | SECRET | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO5681
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #3719/01 2331018
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211018Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2019
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2761
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2909
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6239
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1588
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 003719
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: PAG MAKES FIRST RECOMMENDATIONS TO PRESIDENT KARZAI
REF: A. KABUL 3566
¶B. KABUL 3304
¶C. KABUL 3088
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
¶1. (S) Summary: The security situation in the south remains
fragile, with an increasingly determined enemy operating
freely in key areas according to a joint CFC, ISAF, GOA brief
to President Karzai in a Policy Action Group (PAG) meeting on
August 16. Wardak said that the enemy is succeeding in
propaganda efforts that have convinced locals the GOA and
ISAF are losing their will to fight. It was acknowledged
that Operation Mountain Thrust had eliminated many
insurgents, but these are primarily low-level recruits.
Enemy strength is estimated at 7,000, vice a presence of
9,000 ISAF and 4,300 ANSF in the south. To address this
situation, the PAG approved ISAF's basic Afghan Development
Zone (ADZ) concept combining ISAF and ANSF security with new
development projects.
¶2. (S) The ADZ concept remains vague and will take time to
launch depending on how long it will take to achieve a level
of security sufficient for development projects to be
executed in the provinces, and on how long it will take
development money to flow. ISAF predicts development
activity will begin in late August in Qalat, late September
in Helmand and Uruzgan, and October in Kandahar. ISAF has
committed to keeping key district centers secure even though
they are outside the zones, and has promised to take the
initiative in offensives against insurgent positions outside
the zones. ISAF's concept depends on donors rapidly
completing new development projects, but there is
considerable skepticism about delivery before early 2007.
Ambassador Neumann proposed that the GOA contribute
unallocated funds in tandem with donors to show its resolve.
The GOA responded by asking for a loosening of international
procurement restrictions. President Karzai instructed that
no one talk publicly about ADZ's either in Afghanistan or
foreign capitals for now.
¶3. (S) All agreed that &auxiliary8 police forces could be
used if clearly within the MOI chain of command. There is no
donor commitment to fund the equipping of such forces.
Karzai stated that the first priority must go to funding the
training and equipping of the regular forces. More study of
&auxiliary8 forces is ongoing. President Karzai said he
would find the money himself within the GOA if necessary.
End Summary.
Worrisome Security Assessment in South
--------------------------------------
¶4. (S) At the first PAG presentation to President Karzai, on
August 16, Minister of Defense Wardak presented a blunt
security assessment developed by the Policy Action Group's
(PAG's) Security Operations Group (full text of report
follows at end of cable). (Note: The text was coordinated
among MOD, MOI, NDS, ISAF, CFC-A, CSTC-A, relevant Embassies,
and the four southern governors. End note.) The security
situation in the south remains fragile. Operation Mountain
Thrust inflicted significant losses on insurgents, but
primarily against low-level, easily replaced recruits. The
Taliban campaign in outlying areas has convinced significant
portions of the local population the GOA cannot deliver
governance and that ISAF and international resolve are
withering.
¶5. (S) The tempo of enemy operations has fallen since
KABUL 00003719 002 OF 006
mid-July with the exception of Kandahar, but ISAF and ANSF
forces remain under attack, inhibiting efforts to improve
governance and start new development activities. The
analysis estimated that up to 7,000 Taliban fighters are
active in the South. (Note: the number of hard-core Taliban
is probably lower. End Note.) The quality and quantity of
IED attacks has risen. The Taliban are becoming increasingly
willing to defend key terrain with large sophisticated,
well-armed groups of fighters. The Taliban have developed
significant positions in Kandahar Province's Panjway, Zherai
and Arghandab districts, as well as Northern and Southern
Helmand Province. (Note: not all anti-government activity in
the area is associated with the Taliban. Some is related to
crime, drugs and warlords. End Note.)
¶6. (S) Wardak concluded that our aim must be to prevent the
Taliban from achieving their objectives. He called for ISAF
and the GOA to take the initiative, warning that weak
maneuverability prevents ISAF and the ANSF from attacking
enemy positions. COMISAF, LTG Richards, noted that,
although bleak, this report was the combined opinion of
experts, with no doubt as to its accuracy. He said ISAF had
been looking for a plan to take back the initiative, and that
the Afghan Development Zone concept was their solution.
ADZ Concept
-----------
¶7. (S) ISAF's Afghan Development Zone (ADZ) concept (see
reftels) is designed to address several key challenges in
bringing security and development to the South: the people
feel disenfranchised; there is a dissatisfaction with
governance and the pace of development; the Taliban are
exploiting this frustration by convincing the public the GOA
and International Community (IC) cannot deliver; and, limited
military, police and development resources preclude doing
everything required everywhere at once. ISAF and the GOA are
therefore prioritizing their actions in certain geographical
areas of the south that have key populations, economic
development and necessary infrastructure. (Note: regular
assessment of these priorities will continue for months. End
Note.)
¶8. (S) The ADZ solution attempts to unify security and
development efforts from the GOA and IC to provide a robust
level of security in key areas of the south and allow for
rapid roll-out of new reconstruction and development
projects. ISAF and ANSF forces will provide a security
shield based in the priority regional centers and support
maneuver teams patrolling outlying areas. The zones are not
static and should expand to encompass ever widening
territories.
¶9. (S) The ADZ concept was approved in principle by Karzai
and the international community at the PAG meeting. Many
issues and problems remain and whether ADZs will be different
from current operations is not clear. (Note: The
Coalition's Mountain series of operations successively
focuses on certain geographical areas with kinetic and
non-kinetic means, in a not-too dissimilar way as is proposed
by the ADZ concept. End Note.) ISAF must take on further
offensive operations before launching any ADZs. General
Richards predicted the ADZ in Qalat could be functional by
late August, Helmand and Uruzgan the second or third week of
September, and Kandahar would probably take until October due
to the problem of needing to clear insurgents out of Panjway
district. In a smaller meeting the evening before, August
15, Karzai stressed to ISAF LTG Richards that our first
objective should be to retake all of Helmand. In Kandahar
KABUL 00003719 003 OF 006
province, we should also retake the district of Panjway, he
said, hinting darkly that other factors besides the Taliban
may be at work there. He said districts that were in our
hands must be won back.
¶10. (S) At the PAG, Karzai insisted that no one talk about
ADZs publicly; the IC strongly agreed. (Note: it is equally
important ADZs are not discussed publicly in Washington.)
Discussion of this idea is fraught with problems. Karzai was
worried that people might perceive the creation of the zones
as a sign government control was shrinking, reminding them of
the Soviet strategy of hunkering down in key cities and
towns, and retreating. There was also concern that those
outside the zones might feel vulnerable. Defining the zones
may lead to attacks before security is in place. Richards
promised that ISAF would not abandon any key regional centers
when the zones were established. He stressed that ADZs are
not a defensive concept, and that ISAF will carry on
offensive operations to drive the Taliban out of their
strongholds.
¶11. (S) The development portion of the ADZ concept is
predicated on drawing additional funds that can be delivered
immediately following the necessary security &clean up8 in
certain areas. It is not now clear how much will be
available; most will be implementation of previously planned
work by the Coalition and NGOs. Ambassador Neumann asked
that the GOA also move money from programs where funds have
not been spent to show GOA support and buy-in. Minister of
Finance Ahady said money was available, but procurement rules
required by donors prevented its quick usage. President
Karzai asked that the donor community lessen strictures for
the use of funds transferred to the GOA. He also requested
that more funds go to Afghan contractors and companies for
smaller projects.
¶12. (S) Comment: The GOA recognizes they need to win both on
the ground and in people's minds. The creation of the PAG
was the GOA's first effort to come towards a solution. The
ADZ concept remains vague. The GOA, ISAF and the rest of the
international community have signed on for now. ISAF has
promised to not only beef up security within the zones, but
hold on to key villages and launch offensive strikes. The
Brits, Dutch, Canadians and Australians argue that they can
provide the security and roll out new projects to bring
governance and development throughout the south. We will
support as we can. Problems remain, and the details are not
fully developed. Doubts linger about tangible development
results from ISAF being possible quickly. Criticism of the
zones, and the projects that will be planned for their
clearly defined areas, is likely to hearken back to the
Soviets barricading down. For these reasons neither the GOA
nor the international community will announce or discuss the
project, allowing any results to speak for themselves. (It
is important that ADZs not be discussed publicly in
Washington either.) End Comment.
Police
------
¶13. (S) It was agreed that police rebalancing may not move
fast enough to solve the short-term problem of providing
sufficient police forces at the local level where they are
needed now. In a private briefing that included Ambassador
Neumann and President Karzai the evening before (August 15),
Intelligence Chief designate Amerullah Saleh stressed that
the GOA is losing Pashtun manpower in Afghan security forces.
He said it must either become more active in recruiting
KABUL 00003719 004 OF 006
locally into National forces or make far more use of the
tribes. He pointed out that police brought from outside the
area - specifically from Kunduz - have all deserted. He said
that rebalancing the police is simply not working and not
producing the forces needed in time. The weakness of the
police forces is also reducing intelligence gathering
ability. Saleh said the GOA was losing access to
intelligence because police from outside are deserting and
police from inside are no longer in contact with local
villagers so they are getting less information.
¶14. (S) At the PAG meeting, President Karzai opened the
discussion of police forces by expressing strong displeasure
at reports from Ghazni that indicate 1042 police are on the
payroll, while far fewer actually exist. He was certain
fraud exists throughout the country. Karzai decided ANP
priorities are to determine actual numbers of police, then
recruit to the ceiling and then see if additional numbers of
regular police are needed. However, he clearly wants to move
forward on auxiliaries so there is not a clear &do all the
police first8 prioritization.
¶15. (S) Minister of Interior Zarar outlined a GOA plan to
recruit &auxiliary8 police in border regions and areas of
high security threats. (Note: The proper nomenclature for
these forces is a work in progress. End note.) The first
group would be trained and given a one-year contract. The
requirements for hiring will be similar to the ANP, with
background checks, and following the same procedures. They
would be under the command of the local police chiefs, and
would receive one month of training in police procedures.
(Comment: Zarar did not say that the GOA would want to use
the Police Regional Training Centers for this purpose but it
probably will. End comment.) The &auxiliaries8 would also
require equipment: weapons, communications and
transportation. Zarar explained the MOI does not have the
needed equipment and would need IC help.
¶16. (S) International representatives accepted
&auxiliaries8 could be used if clearly within the MOI chain
of command. Details and numbers need to be worked out. The
IC has no commitment to pay or equip.
¶17. (S) President Karzai jumped in, saying that, &finally,
today everyone speaks my mind and what I've been saying for a
year and a half. We need to re-empower traditional and
trusted forms of authority.8 (At the previous night's
meeting, Karzai had enthusiastically, if gloomily, spoke
about how we are losing the population. He intimated that
much of the trouble has come from premature removal of key
tribal figures (while he did not say so, this seemed to refer
to the former Governors of Uruzgan and Helmand). Karzai said
we have systematically disempowered the locals. They are
hostile to us as a result, and therefore we must go back to
more local government.
¶18. (S) The internationals backed a U.S. suggestion that the
auxiliary police be paid and controlled directly by the MOI
rather than governors. Ambassador Neumann urged a more
detailed plan - who, where and how many. Karzai responded
that we should have started this program a year ago, and that
the IC should help with auxiliary police and strengthening
communities, but if not he would find the money somehow.
¶19. (S) Comment: The issue of police numbers is more
challenging, with the GOA planning to move ahead with an
&auxiliary8 police program, but asking for international
support in money and equipment. The GOA still doesn't have a
concrete plan, and though we support the idea, neither we nor
KABUL 00003719 005 OF 006
anyone else in the international community has committed to
fund it. End Comment.
Southern Afghanistan Security Assessment (Full Text)
--------------------------------------------- -------
(S) Begin Text:
This assessment has been produced by the Security Operations
Group and reflects the combined views of the Ministries,
organizations and Embassies represented. It has also been
shown to members of the Implementation and Coordination Team
and their comments incorporated.
The situation in the south remains very fragile. Operation
Mountain Thrust inflicted significant losses on the
insurgents, especially in Uruzgan and Northern Helmand, but
most are assessed to have been among their lower-level,
short-term or peripheral fighters, who are easily
replaceable.
We assess that the Taliban campaign to drive Government
elements from outlying areas, convince the people that the
Government cannot deliver and undermine the resolve of ISAF
and the international community will continue. Some fighting
is motivated by tribal or criminal factors and not directly
related to the Taliban insurgency, and instability is
exacerbated by the negative influence of former Governors and
Police Chiefs, especially in Helmand and Uruzgan.
Except in Kandahar, the past month has seen a reduction in
the tempo of enemy operations compared with mid-July.
However, ISAF and ANSF units remain under threat of attack in
large parts of the region, making it extremely difficult to
deliver effective governance and development. The threat
from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) continues to
increase in both quality and quantity.
Recent engagements show that we are facing an increasingly
determined and sophisticated enemy prepared to defend key
terrain in large groups (100-plus fighters) in developed
defensive positions and to use these as a base for ambushes
against key lines of communication. There are reliable
reports of a significant Taliban build-up in the Panjway,
Zherai and Helmand, and that planning has been conducted for
an offensive.
Taliban operations in the vicinity of the Highway 1 corridor,
particularly near Kandahar City, Lashkar Gah and Qalat, are
judged to pose the greatest risk to security in the near term.
Zabol: The Romanian Task Force completed its relieve in
place with Task Force Warrior. The largest engagement since
they arrived took place on 8 August in south-eastern Qalat,
and there are indications of increasing insurgent activity in
the province. The Governor's key concerns are highway
security and the district of Seorai.
Uruzgan: Dutch Task Force continued its deployment and
conducted security patrols around Tarin Kowt and Dehrawud.
They intend to facilitate a major shura to reinforce the
Governor's authority. The districts of Charchina (Shahidi
Hassas) and Gizab are particular areas of security concern,
largely outside the control of government authorities.
Helmand: Major operation conducted to relieve and reinforce
Musa Qaleh district center. Northern and Southern parts of
the province remain of concern due to high levels of
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insurgent activity. Significant UK forces remain fixed
defending static locations in the north of the province.
Kandahar: Heavy fighting in Panjway and Zherai districts,
which remain a key Taliban focus. Taliban have established
strong defensive positions and fought with determination.
Continued enemy activity in the Arghandab district is likely
in order to maintain their line of communication to Uruzgan.
ENEMY FORCES/FRIENDLY FORCES
Though hard to assess accurately, there are estimated to be
up to 7,000 active Taliban fighters across the south. This
compares with 4,300 ANA, over 7,000 ANP (on paper; in
practice far fewer present for duty and effective) and about
9,000 ISAF personnel in Regional Command South.
Lack of capacity, including protected mobility and firepower,
hinders ANSF ability to conduct offensive operations against
the enemy. Corruption, poor leadership and misuse of police
resources remain widespread. Work continues to address these
issues and to improve the sometimes poor co-ordination
between provincial authorities, ANSF and ISAF.
In the weeks following transfer of authority, ISAF will
continue to demonstrate to local officials and the people its
will and ability to conduct robust and effective security
operations across the region. Current and forthcoming ISAF
operations to relieve units in place (ongoing for Canadian,
Romanian and Dutch Forces, September for UK Forces) will have
a short-term impact on their combat capability.
CONCLUSION
Our aim must be to prevent the Taliban achieving their
objectives in any forthcoming offensive while positioning
ourselves to take the initiative and provide effective
security in support of development and governance. The
current lack of maneuver capability hinders ISAF and ANSF
ability to threaten the enemy in their strongholds.
We need to wrest the initiative from the enemy. I believe
the Development Zone Concept, which the Security Operations
Group and the other inter-Agency Groups have helped to
develop, has the potential to play an important role in
helping us do so. I will now give the floor to LTG Richards
to describe the status of his work.
End Text.
NEUMANN