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DE RUEHEGA #1417 1341423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZUI RUEWMCF7023 1341432
R 141423Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC0000
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001417 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NSC FOR WATERS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT 

REF: A. CAIRO 671 
¶B. CAIRO 974 
¶C. 2006 CAIRO 2010 

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE, 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IS 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS. DESPITE 
INCESSANT WHISPERED DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY 
CERTAINTY ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED MUBARAK, OR HOW THE 
SUCCESSION WILL HAPPEN. MUBARAK HIMSELF SEEMS TO BE TRUSTING 
TO GOD AND THE INERTIA OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY 
SERVICES TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION. IN THE CURRENT 
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, THE MOST LIKELY CONTENDERS ARE 
PRESIDENTIAL SON GAMAL MUBARAK (WHOSE PROFILE IS 
EVER-INCREASING AT THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY), 
EGIS CHIEF OMAR SOLIMAN, DARK HORSE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY 
GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA, OR AN AS-YET UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICER. 
WHOEVER ENDS UP AS EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT LIKELY WILL BE 
POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK. ONCE MUBARAK'S SUCCESSOR 
HAS ASSUMED THE POST, HIS FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO BUILD 
POPULAR SUPPORT. WE THUS EXPECT THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL 
LIKELY ADOPT AN ANTI-AMERICAN TONE IN HIS INITIAL PUBLIC 
RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO 
THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND MAY POSSIBLY EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH 
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN 
PRESIDENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. END SUMMARY. 

------------------------------ 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESSION 
------------------------------ 

¶2. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FOND OF OBSERVING THAT NO ONE 
SHOULD HAVE ANY QUALMS REGARDING HIS SUCCESSION, SINCE 
EGYPT'S CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A DETAILED GUIDE FOR HOW A 
SUCCESSION SHOULD PROCEED. AMONG THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS WAS A NOTABLE CHANGE TO THE ARTICLE DETERMINING 
WHICH OFFICIAL ASSUMES POWER IN THE EVENT OF THE TEMPORARY 
INCAPACITATION OF THE PRESIDENT. ARTICLE 82, WHICH 
PREVIOUSLY DELINEATED THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHOULD ASSUME 
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS "IF ON ACCOUNT OF ANY TEMPORARY OBSTACLE 
THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES," HAS BEEN 
AMENDED SO THAT, IF THERE IS NO VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRIME 
MINISTER IS ASSIGNED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. ARTICLE 84 READS, 
"IN CASE OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OR THE 
PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT," THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY (PA) OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SHOULD TEMPORARILY ASSUME THE 
PRESIDENCY. NEITHER WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE ALLOWED TO 
NOMINATE HIMSELF FOR THE PRESIDENCY; THERE IS NO SUCH 
STIPULATION AGAINST THE PM RUNNING FOR THE OFFICE. ARTICLE 
84 GOES ON TO STIPULATE THAT, "THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
SHALL BE CHOSEN WITHIN A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE 
DAY OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENCY." 

¶3. (C) CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 76, WHICH PREVIOUSLY WIRED THE 
EGYPTIAN ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK TO GUARANTEE THE PRESIDENCY TO 
THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP), WAS ALSO AMONG 
THE ARTICLES AMENDED IN APRIL (REF A). THE CHANGE WILL 
OSTENSIBLY FACILITATE MORE COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS, WHILE STILL PROTECTING AGAINST ANY SERIOUS 
CHALLENGE TO THE NDP CANDIDATE. UNDER THE REVISIONS TO 
ARTICLE 76, FOR AN INTERIM 10-YEAR PERIOD (I.E. UNTIL 2017), 
LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH HOLD AN ELECTED SEAT IN THE 
PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OR SHURA COUNCIL CAN NOMINATE A 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (CURRENTLY, ONLY FOUR PARTIES MEET 
THIS REQUIREMENT - THE NDP, AL GHAD, AL WAFD, AND TAGGAMU). 
FOLLOWING THE INTERIM PERIOD, IN ORDER TO RUN A PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATE: 

-- A PARTY HAS TO HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS 
PRIOR TO THE ELECTION; 

-- ITS CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE HIGHEST 
LEADERSHIP BODY OF THE PARTY FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR; AND, 

-- THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HOLD AT LEAST 3% OF THE SEATS IN 
BOTH PARLIAMENTARY HOUSES (I.E., 14 SEATS IN THE PEOPLE'S 
ASSEMBLY, AND 6 SEATS IN THE SHURA COUNCIL), OR 6% OF THE 
SEATS 
IN EITHER THE PA OR SHURA COUNCIL). 

¶4. (C) GENUINELY INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FACE AN ALMOST 
IMPOSSIBLE BAR TO ENTER THE RACE. TO COMPETE IN THE NEXT 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ARTICLE 76 STATES THAT AN 
"INDEPENDENT" MUST OBTAIN ENDORSEMENTS FROM 250 ELECTED 
MEMBERS OF EGYPT'S NATIONAL AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES, 
OF WHICH THERE MUST BE A MINIMUM OF 65 ENDORSEMENTS FROM 
MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, 25 FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL, 
AND 10 FROM LOCAL COUNCILS IN AT LEAST 14 GOVERNORATES. THIS 
WOULD BE A NEAR UNATTAINABLE FEAT FOR A NON-NDP CANDIDATE TO 
ACHIEVE, GIVEN THE RULING PARTY'S DOMINATION OF ALL EGYPTIAN 
ELECTED BODIES. IN EFFECT, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 76 
ACCOMPLISH TWO OBJECTIVES REGARDING INDEPENDENTS: THE RULING 
PARTY CAN BLOCK THE EMERGENCE OF ANY GENUINELY "INDEPENDENT" 
CANDIDATE, WHILE IT COULD THEORETICALLY REACH BEYOND THE 
NDP'S TOP LEADERSHIP TO SELECT AN "INDEPENDENT" WHOM THE 
RULING ELITE JUDGES WILL BEST PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS, 
PROVIDED THE NDP RETAINS PARTY DISCIPLINE. 

-------------------- 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES 
-------------------- 

¶5. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO BEGAN HIS FIFTH 6-YEAR TERM IN 
SEPTEMBER 2005, RECENTLY TURNED 79. THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION IS DUE TO BE HELD IN 2011. BY THE TIME MUBARAK 
SERVES HIS FULL TERM, THERE MAY BE OTHER CANDIDATES IN THE 
WINGS, OR MUBARAK HIMSELF COULD CHOOSE TO RUN AGAIN FOR THE 
PRESIDENCY. HE IS ON RECORD AS SAYING, IN A NOVEMBER 2006 
SPEECH, THAT HE PLANNED TO REMAIN PRESIDENT "AS LONG AS I 
HAVE A HEART THAT BEATS, AND BREATH IN MY BODY." BUT IF THE 
SUCCESSION HAPPENED TOMORROW, EGYPTIAN PARLOR SPECULATION 
FOCUSES ON THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS. 

GAMAL MUBARAK 
------------- 

¶6. (C) CAIRENE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT GAMAL WANTS THE 
JOB, DESPITE HIS REPEATED DENIALS TO THE CONTRARY (REF B). 
THE MOST RECENT SUCH ABJURATION WAS ON MAY 2, DURING AN 
INTERVIEW WITH THE ORBIT SATELLITE TV CHANNEL, WHEN GAMAL 
STATED THAT, "I DO NOT HAVE THE INTENTION AND AMBITION TO RUN 
FOR PRESIDENT ... WHATEVER THE PARTY SAYS DOES NOT MATTER. I 
AM NOT LOOKING FOR ANY EXECUTIVE POST." SUCH COY DEMURRALS 
RING HOLLOW IN THE FACE OF HIS INCREASINGLY ROBUST ROLE 
WITHIN THE NDP (FAR EXCEEDING THAT OF HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE 
PARTY HIERARCHY), HIS APPARENTLY CENTRAL ROLE IN CREATING NEW 
LEGISLATION, AND HIS RECENT TOURS TO VARIOUS GOVERNORATES 
FEATURING MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGES. IT IS HARD TO ARGUE THAT 
GAMAL IS NOT BEING GROOMED FOR THE PRESIDENCY. 

¶7. (C) MANY IN THE EGYPTIAN ELITE SEE HIS SUCCESSION AS 
POSITIVE, AS HIS LIKELY CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT STATUS 
QUO WOULD SERVE THEIR BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS. 
GIVEN THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDACY, AND WEAK 
OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE CURRENTLY FEW OTHER EGYPTIAN 
PERSONALITIES WITH THE NATIONAL STATURE AND POLITICAL CAPITAL 
TO SERIOUSLY CONTEND FOR THE PRESIDENCY. LIKEWISE, DUE TO 
THE PARANOIA OF THE EGYPTIAN DICTATORSHIP, NO OTHER NAME CAN 
SAFELY OR RESPECTFULLY BE BRUITED AS A CONTENDER. WHILE THE 
PRESIDENT'S SON IS VULNERABLE TO OPEN CRITICISM FOR HIS 
PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT WHOSE TOTAL 
LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO TAKEN FOR GRANTED, SO HIS IS THE 
ONLY NAME THAT CAN POSSIBLY BE BANDIED ABOUT. 

¶8. (C) A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK FOR A GAMAL CANDIDACY COULD BE 
THE MILITARY. EACH OF EGYPT'S FOUR PRESIDENTS SINCE 1952 
AROSE FROM THE OFFICER CORPS, AND THE MILITARY HAS 
HISTORICALLY BEEN THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
RULE. GAMAL DID NOT SERVE AS A MILITARY OFFICER, AND WE 
BELIEVE HE DID NOT COMPLETE HIS COMPULSORY SERVICE. MANY 
OBSERVERS OPINE THAT TIMING IS THE CRUCIAL FACTOR FOR A 
POTENTIAL GAMAL PRESIDENCY - HIS POWER BASE IS HIS FATHER, 
AND SO WHILE HE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO 
MUBARAK'S DEATH, THE TASK WOULD BECOME FAR MORE DIFFICULT, 
ALTHOUGH NOT INSURMOUNTABLE, ONCE THE PHARAOH HAS DEPARTED 
THE SCENE, AND PERSONAL LOYALTIES TO HIM ARE IN THE PAST. 
ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD POPULAR ANIMUS AGAINST A GAMAL 
CANDIDACY, WITH MANY EGYPTIANS OPINING PROUDLY THAT, "WE ARE 
NOT SYRIA OR SAUDI!", THE NDP MACHINERY COULD LIKELY STAGE AN 
ELECTORAL VICTORY, BASED ON POOR VOTER TURNOUT, SLOPPY VOTER 
LISTS, AND STATE CONTROL OF THE ELECTION APPARATUS. 

OMAR SOLIMAN 
------------- 

¶9. (C) EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND MUBARAK CONSIGLIERE, 
IN PAST YEARS SOLIMAN WAS OFTEN CITED AS LIKELY TO BE NAMED 
TO THE LONG-VACANT VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POST. IN THE PAST TWO 
YEARS, SOLIMAN HAS STEPPED OUT OF THE SHADOWS, AND ALLOWED 
HIMSELF TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED, AND HIS MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN 
LEADERS REPORTED. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT SOLIMAN, 
BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, WOULD AT THE LEAST HAVE 
TO FIGURE IN ANY SUCCESSION SCENARIO FOR GAMAL, POSSIBLY AS A 
TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. SOLIMAN HIMSELF ADAMANTLY DENIES ANY 
PERSONAL AMBITIONS, BUT HIS INTEREST AND DEDICATION TO 
NATIONAL SERVICE IS OBVIOUS. HIS LOYALTY TO MUBARAK SEEMS 
ROCK-SOLID. AT AGE 71, HE COULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE RULING 
APPARATUS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE AS A RELIABLE FIGURE 
UNLIKELY TO HARBOR AMBITIONS FOR ANOTHER MULTI-DECADE 
PRESIDENCY. A KEY UNANSWERED QUESTION IS HOW HE WOULD 
RESPOND TO A GAMAL PRESIDENCY ONCE MUBARAK IS DEAD. AN 
ALLEGED PERSONAL FRIEND OF SOLIMAN TELLS US THAT SOLIMAN 
"DETESTS" THE IDEA OF GAMAL AS PRESIDENT, AND THAT HE ALSO 
WAS "DEEPLY PERSONALLY HURT" BY MUBARAK, WHO PROMISED TO NAME 
HIM VICE-PRESIDENT SEVERAL YEARS AGO, BUT THEN RENEGED. 

AMRE MOUSSA 
----------- 

¶10. (C) THE CHARISMATIC ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL 
PRUDENTLY HAS NEVER INDICATED INTENTION OR AMBITION TO ENTER 
INTO EGYPTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRAY, AND HAS NO EGYPTIAN 
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SPRING. 
HOWEVER, AS THE HIGH-PROFILE ELDER STATESMAN OF ARAB CAUSES, 
HE ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE STREET CREDIBILITY, POPULARITY, AND 
PERCEIVED GRAVITAS. IT IS FAR-FETCHED BUT CONCEIVABLE THAT, 
IN A LEADERSHIP CRISIS FOLLOWING MUBARAK'S DEATH, MOUSSA 
COULD EMERGE AS A PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER, PROVIDED THAT HE IS 
AN NDP MEMBER, OR IF THE NDP WERE TO PROMOTE HIM UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ALLOWED FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES. 

MILITARY OFFICER 
---------------- 

¶11. (C) CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO OBVIOUS CONTENDER FROM AMONG 
THE OFFICER CORPS, EGYPT'S TRADITIONAL PRESIDENTIAL 
RECRUITMENT GROUNDS. MINISTER OF DEFENSE TANTAWI, A 
CONTEMPORARY OF MUBARAK'S, APPEARS TO HARBOR NO POLITICAL 
AMBITIONS. LIKE SOLIMAN, HE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN CLEARING 
THE WAY FOR GAMAL, IF HE CALCULATES THAT IS IN THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY; CONVERSELY, HE COULD ALSO BE A KEY 
PLAYER IN PREVENTING GAMALS ASCENDANCE. WE HAVE HEARD SOME 
LIMITED REPORTS OF TANTAWIS INCREASING FRUSTRATION AND 
DISENCHANTMENT WITH GAMAL (REF B). IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL 
LEADERSHIP CRISIS, IT IS NEAR INCONCEIVABLE THAT GIVEN 
MUBARAK'S PERSONAL MANIPULATION OF THE OFFICE CORPS, THAT 
ANOTHER MILITARY OFFICER COULD EMERGE FROM OBSCURITY TO 
ASSERT HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. BUT TANTAWI AND HIS SENIOR 
COTERIE ARE NOT NECESSARILY POPULAR AT MID AND LOWER RANKS, 
SO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MID-20TH CENTURY STYLE COUP OF 
COLONELS CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DISCOUNTED. 

OPPOSITION MEMBER 
----------------- 

¶12. (C) OF THE 10 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS IN 2005, 
SECOND-PLACE AL GHAD PARTY LEADER AYMAN NOUR IS CURRENTLY 
SERVING A SEVEN-YEAR JAIL TERM, AND ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN 
LAW, WILL BE BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL 
LIFE FOR SEVERAL YEARS FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE. THE 
THIRD-PLACE FINISHER, AL WAFD PARTY CANDIDATE NO'MAN GOMAA, 
LOST HIS PARTY POSITION FOLLOWING A VIOLENT AND 
SCANDAL-RIDDEN LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE. THE OTHER EIGHT 
CANDIDATES, MARGINAL FIGURES TO BEGIN WITH, HAVE FADED BACK 
INTO TOTAL OBSCURITY. CURRENT AL WAFD LEADER MAHMOUD ABAZA 
IS A TALENTED POLITICIAN, BUT AT THIS POINT, DOES NOT APPEAR 
TO HAVE NATIONAL APPEAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY TO MOUNT A 
SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT THE PRESIDENCY. 

DARK HORSE AND ALSO RANS 
------------------------ 

¶13. (C) POPULAR REFORMIST MINISTER OF TRADE RACHID IS A 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE, THOUGH A DISTINCT DARK HORSE. 
NONETHELESS, HE COMES FROM AN OLD AND RESPECTED FAMILY AND IS 
SEEN BY MANY AS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR EGYPT'S IMPRESSIVE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS. INTERESTINGLY, THE 
HEAD OF CAIRO'S LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL AMCHAM, WHO KNOWS 
RACHID WELL, TOLD US THAT, AFTER NEGOTIATING THE 
CONTROVERSIAL QIZ PROGRAM, THE MINISTER "REALLY NEEDS 
MOVEMENT ON THE FTA FOR POLITICAL COVER," RAISING THE 
QUESTION: POLITICAL COVER FOR WHAT? WHILE IT IS HIGHLY 
UNLIKELY RACHID WOULD TAKE ON GAMAL HEAD-TO-HEAD, WE CANNOT 
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILLPLAY A ROLE IN A 
CARETAKER GOVERNMENT, AND MAY EENTUALLY EMERGE AS A LEADER. 


¶14. (C) SAFWAT ELSHERIF (NDP SECRETARY GENERAL AND SHURA 
COUNCIL PEAKER), MUFEED SHEHAB (NDP ASSISTANT SYG, AND 
MINISTER OF STATE FOR LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, AND 
ZAKARIA AZMY (NDP ASSISTANT SYG AND MUBARA'S DE FACTO CHIEF 
OF STAFF) ALL, AS SENIOR LEADES OF THE NDP, MEET THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA T RUN FOR OFFICE. NONE OF THESE 
GRIZZLED NDP VETERANS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED PRESIDENTIAL 
ASPIRATONS, NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO POSSESS ANY CAPABILITIE 
TO GOVERN, NOR PERSONAL CONSTITUENCIES. HOWEVE, WHILE 
UNLIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, ONCE MUBAAK PERE IS OUT OF 
THE PICTURE, ONE OF THEM COULD EMERGE IN AN ANTI-GAMAL PARTY 
PUTSCH. FURTHERMORE. MOST ANALYSTS HERE BELIEVE THAT ANY 
GOVERNOR PUSHING FOR THE PRESIDENCY IS A FAR-FETCHED 
POSSIBILITY - THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GOVERNORS ARE 
FORMER SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS CHOSEN FOR THEIR 
LOYALTY, FAR FROM THE CRITICAL POLITICAL FRAY IN CAIRO, AND 
WITH NO POWER BASES. 

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
------------------ 

¶15. (C) WHILE THE SPECTER OF AN MB PRESIDENCY HAUNTS SECULAR 
EGYPTIANS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE 
POST-MUBARAK PERIOD. UNDER THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE 
MB HAS NO ABILITY TO PUT FORWARD A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN 
THE EVENT OF AN ELECTION. THE ORGANIZATION DOES NOT APPEAR 
TO HAVE THE ORGANIZED MILITARY WING NECESSARY SHOULD IT WISH 
TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE PRESIDENCY BY FORCE. CONSTANT 
OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMED FORCES AIMED AT ROOTING OUT POTENTIAL 
ISLAMIST SYMPATHIZERS MEANS THAT FEW LIKELY REMAIN, ALTHOUGH 
THE POSSIBILITY DOES EXIST THAT SOME CLOSE-MOUTHED MB-LEANING 
OFFICERS ARE PRESENT. OVERALL, IN THE VIEW OF MOST EGYPTIAN 
ANALYSTS, THE GROUP'S APPROACH SEEMS TO BE ONE OF PATIENCE 
AND GRASS ROOTS BUILDING OF SUPPORT, WAITING FOR THE DAY WHEN 
IT MIGHT COME TO POWER THROUGH POPULAR ELECTION, OR BY 
POPULAR DEMAND AFTER A GAMAL PRESIDENCY HAS FOUNDERED. 

------------------------ 
POST-SUCCESSION DYNAMICS 
------------------------ 

¶16. (C) WHOEVER EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT IS, HE WILL INEVITABLY 
BE POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK, AND ONCE HE HAS ASSUMED 
THE POST, AMONG HIS FIRST PRIORITIES WILL BE TO CEMENT HIS 
POSITION AND BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT. WE CAN THUS ANTICIPATE 
THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MAY SOUND AN INITIAL ANTI-AMERICAN 
TONE IN HIS PUBLIC RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS 
NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND DISTANCE 
HIMSELF FROM MUBARAK'S POLICIES. IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, WE 
CAN ALSO EXPECT THE NEW PRESIDENT TO EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH 
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, ANWAR 
EL SADAT, AND MUBARAK EARLY IN ALL OF THEIR TERMS, IN AN 
EFFORT TO CO-OPT POTENTIAL OPPOSITION, AND BOOST POPULARITY. 
RICCIARDONE