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DE RUEHSJ #1856/01 2892140
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 162140Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9040
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4131
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 1003
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 1566
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SAN JOSE 001856 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC, EEB AND H 
PLEASE PASS TO USTR: AMALITO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ETRD CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICAN REFERENDUM RATIFIES CAFTA 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  In their first-ever national referendum, 
Costa Ricans voted for ratification of CAFTA, 51.6% to 48.4%, 
a margin of 49,400 votes with 98% of the vote tallied. 
Turnout (nearly 60%) was well above the threshold to make the 
referendum binding.  The "Yes" vote won in four of seven 
provinces, and in 48 of 81 cantones nationwide.  In general, 
it was not upper-middle class, university-educated voters 
that voted against CAFTA in the largest percentages, but 
voters in poorer, outlying areas.  Final results await the 
mandatory manual count, which should be completed before 
October 20.  Referendum day itself was a typically "Tico" 
celebration of democracy, with no serious problems observed 
or reported.   Our preliminary assessment suggests that five 
factors were key to the outcome:  1) the "Yes" advantage in 
mobilizing their vote; 2) timely and effective USTR and White 
House statements; 3) the perception that opposition leader 
Otton Solis had overplayed his hand by drawing U.S. Congress 
Members into the debate, and by taking a position which might 
generate friction with the United States; 4)  the last-minute 
media push by the "Yes" campaign (featuring the USG 
statements); and 5) the generally volatile atmosphere, 
especially in the Central Valley, which magnified the impact 
of (in this case, pro-CAFTA) media statements and popular 
perceptions.  Polling data, showing the "Yes" trailing days 
before the vote, helped galvanize the pro-CAFTA campaign.  By 
approving a free trade agreement via referendum, Costa Rica 
has made history, sending a clear signal around the region in 
the process.   The hardest challenge remains, however; 
meeting the March 1, 2008 EIF deadline.  END SUMMARY 
 
=========================================== 
YES VOTE WINS IN CELEBRATION OF DEMOCRACY 
=========================================== 
 
¶2.  (U) Costa Ricans went to the polls on October 7 in the 
first-ever national referendum and voted for ratification of 
CAFTA.  According to the Supreme Election Tribunal,s (TSE) 
preliminary results, the "Yes" vote won by 51.6% to 48.4%, a 
3.2% margin (approximately 49,400 votes).  Turnout (nearly 
60%) was lower than in the 2006 presidential elections, but 
well above the 40% threshold to make the referendum binding. 
Over 1.57 million voters participated.  (For comparison, 2.55 
million voters, or 65%, voted in 2006, with the margin of 
victory for President Oscar Arias 19,169 votes or 1.1%.) 
 
¶3. (U) The "Yes" vote won in four of seven provinces, and in 
48 of 81 cantones nationwide.  Cartago (home to "No leader 
Eugenio Trejos) was the only province in which "Yes" won in 
all cantones, probably fueled by the support of 
export-dependent farmers.  This same province also produced 
the widest "Yes" margin both in actual count (over 25,000 
votes) and in relative terms (13%).  In Limon province, where 
Costa Rica's major port depends on trade, the "Yes" carried 
the day in all cantones but one -- isolated, 
mostly-indigenous Talamanca.  Alajuela produced the widest 
"No" margin (over 6,100 votes).  However, on a percentage 
basis, Pacific coast Guanacaste posted the widest "No" margin 
(over 5%).  Perez Zeledon, a canton within the province of 
San Jose and the home of opposition PAC leader Otton Solis, 
voted strongly "No" (63.5%). 
 
¶4. (U) Referendum day was a typically Tico celebration of 
democracy.  Families voted together after attending Sunday 
mass, caravans (for both sides) circulated through 
neighborhoods waving flags and honking horns, and there were 
no serious problems.  Embassy staff reporting from around the 
Central Valley and participating in the OAS Observer Mission 
noted no irregularities.  The only incident involved 
flag-burning by an anti-CAFTA group of University of Costa 
Rica students, after the results were announced election 
night.  Despite the high emotions which sometimes 
characterized the campaign, by the next day it was calmly 
back to business as usual around the country. 
 
======================= 
POOR STATE, RICH STATE? 
======================= 
 
¶5.  (U)  In general, it was not upper-middle class, 
university-educated voters that voted against CAFTA in the 
largest percentages, as suggested in pre-referendum polling, 
but voters in poorer, outlying areas around the country, 
especially in Guanacaste, Alajuela and southern Puntarenas 
provinces.  Based on UN poverty data, seven of the 10 poorest 
cantones voted "No."   Not surprisingly, nine of the 10 
wealthiest cantones, mostly in the Central Valley around San 
Jose, voted "Yes."8  On the other hand, the strongest "Yes" 
and "No" percentages were both from rural areas (Siquirres in 
Limon voted 67.6% yes; San Ramon in Alajuela voted 72.2% no). 
 Of note, the six Pacific Coast cantones most dependent on 
tourism split, with "Yes" and "No" each winning in three.  In 
contrast to some pre-referendum analysis, higher 
abstentionism did not always mean a higher "No" vote.  Limon 
had the lowest voter participation rate (45.3%), but the 
province voted "Yes".  Alajuela had a high participation rate 
(62.6%), but voted "No". 
 
¶6. (U) The results reflect 98% of the votes counted.  The 
final tally awaits the mandatory manual count, which has been 
proceeding smoothly since starting on October 9, and which 
should be completed before October 20, according to the TSE. 
 The manual count is not expected to change the preliminary 
results, and the Comptroller and the Supreme Court's 
Constitutional Chamber (Sala IV) have endorsed the way the 
referendum was conducted.  Even PAC party leader Solis has 
conceded publicly that the margin of victory was too large to 
have been the result of manipulation.   (The PAC and other 
CAFTA opponents have filed a number of procedural complaints 
with the TSE, however.)  Once the results are final, the TSE 
will return CAFTA-DR to the Asamblea (national legislature) 
for routine publication in the official Gazeta.  Once 
gazetted, CAFTA becomes law in Costa Rica. 
 
============================================= ==== 
MULTIPLE FACTORS, INCLUDING USG STATEMENTS, HELP 
============================================= ==== 
 
¶7.  (SBU) What went right?  Why did the "Yes" win when the 
picture (and polling) seemed tilted against CAFTA until the 
last days before the referendum?  Our preliminary assessment, 
early soundings with some key players on both sides, and 
their comments to the media, suggest five key factors: 
 
-- First, the "Yes" side had a clear advantage in mobilizing 
their vote.  Campaign Director Alfredo Volio saw this as a 
decisive comparative advantage.  Embassy observers agreed. 
Although "No" supporters seemed to be present and active in 
and near polling stations early in the day,  by the 
afternoon, the clearly-marked "Si" convoys were bringing a 
steady stream of voters to the polls; 
 
-- Second, the USTR and White House statements, slamming the 
door on a re-negotiated CAFTA, were timely and effective, 
according to Volio, GOCR Ambassador to the US Tomas Duenas, 
local diplomatic colleagues and PAC legislator Francisco 
Molina, who candidly acknowledged their impact in a meeting 
with Pol/C on October 12; 
 
-- Third, according to Volio, voters perceived that 
opposition leader Solis had overplayed his hand by drawing 
U.S. Congress Members into the Costa Rican debate, and, as 
suggested by the USG statements, by taking a position which 
might generate friction with the United States if CAFTA were 
not ratified, friction the conservative, mostly pro-US Costa 
Rican electorate did not want to risk; 
 
-- Fourth, the last-minute media push by the "Yes" campaign. 
Volio believes this was especially effective in the 
media-saturated Central Valley, where 26 of 31 cantones (and 
over 518,000 voters) supported ratification.  Again, this was 
helped by the last-minute USG statements.  The GOCR generated 
coverage simply by pointing to, or commenting on the 
statements.  The PAC's Molina, like Solis and other "No" 
supporters, argue that this coverage and the attendant 
interviews with GOCR officials violated TSE prohibitions on 
campaigning in the final 48 hours before the referendum. 
(COMMENT:  The TSE rules were actually fairly loose, 
permitting media interviews in the days immediately prior to 
the referendum.  Both sides took advantage of this 
flexibility.  END COMMENT.) 
 
-- Fifth, the pre-referendum atmosphere was volatile, as 
noted by political commentator Constantino Urcuyo and others. 
 This magnified the impact of any development, including of 
the factors outlined above, although the specific difference 
they made would be difficult to quantify. 
 
====================== 
WHAT ABOUT THE POLLS? 
====================== 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Was the polling wrong?  What explains a swing from 
as much as 12 points behind days before the referendum to a 
3.2 point victory?  Given the clear margin of victory for the 
"Yes" and Solis, deciding not to challenge the results, the 
debate over the accuracy of the pre-referendum polling has 
been far less contentious than the debate over survey data 
before the 2006 national elections.  In an Op-ed on October 
10 , CID Gallup director Carlos Denton claimed that his data, 
published in late July (and showing  a 44-38 lead for "Yes," 
with 18% undecided and a 3% margin of error)  generally held 
true throughout the campaign, despite the apparent ups and 
downs of the final weeks.  Some media reports speculated that 
Costa Ricans, notoriously misleading in their responses to 
pollsters, especially on highly controversial issues such as 
CAFTA, may have masked their support for "Yes" to avoid 
reprisals from more argumentative "No" voters. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) La Nacion Managing Director Alejandro Urbina, who 
commissioned the series of UNIMER polls which showed a sharp 
drop for the "Yes"  vote before the referendum, stands by his 
data and analysis.  He told Pol/C and PAO on October 5 that 
the UNIMER data (showing the "Yes" trailing), plus the USTR 
statement on October 4, plus superior logistical planning and 
capabilities should galvanize the pro-CAFTA vote and make the 
difference in the end.  Even so, less than 48 hours before 
the polls opened, Urbina was not certain of the outcome.  The 
internal UNIMER numbers at that time (not released to the 
media) suggested a "Yes" vote between 42.5 and 49.5% and a 
"No" vote between 50 and 57%.  The key, he said, would lie in 
the 13% of those surveyed who had consistently not indicated 
to UNIMER how they would vote. 
 
====================================== 
COMMENT:  SO WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN? 
====================================== 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Hyperbole aside, this was an historic event, 
replete with drama and irony.  Costa Rica has now done 
something no other country has done; approve a free trade 
agreement by referendum.  In so doing, Costa Rica sent a 
clear signal around the region.   It is significant that 
almost 800,000 voted in favor of CAFTA, an outright majority 
of those participating, and that turnout was 50% higher than 
required for the vote to be binding.  The drama was in the 
close count (or the expectation of same) up until the very 
end.  Ticos with us on election night were visibly worried 
until just before the TSE started to release results.  By the 
time President Arias arrived at the Casa Presidencial to 
watch the returns, however, the backslapping, applause and 
broad grins signaled a likely win for "Yes," even though the 
official TSE announcement was an hour away.  The irony came 
from the pre-referendum visit by two anti-CAFTA Members of 
Congress, which (unintentionally) generated a series of 
letters and statements in Washington ultimately helping the 
"Yes" vote.  Now, the hardest challenge remains; to enact the 
relevant legislation and implement the required regulations 
to meet the March 1, 2008 EIF deadline (septel). 

BRENNAN