Currently released so far... 5422 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AE
AJ
ASEC
AMGT
AR
AU
AG
AS
AM
AORC
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
AGMT
CH
CASC
CA
CD
CV
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CU
CBW
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CDG
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
EPET
EINV
ECON
ENRG
EAID
ETRD
EG
ETTC
EFIN
EU
EAGR
ELAB
EIND
EUN
EAIR
ER
ECIN
ECPS
EFIS
EI
EINT
EZ
EMIN
ET
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ES
ECA
ELN
EN
EFTA
EWWT
ELTN
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ENVI
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INTERPOL
IPR
IN
INRB
IAEA
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IV
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KZ
KDEM
KN
KNNP
KPAL
KU
KWBG
KCRM
KE
KISL
KAWK
KSCA
KS
KSPR
KJUS
KFRD
KTIP
KPAO
KTFN
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KGHG
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KDRG
KIRF
KIRC
KBIO
KHLS
KG
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMC
KTLA
KCFC
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MTCRE
MX
MCAP
MO
MNUC
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
ODIP
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OEXC
OPRC
OFDP
OPDC
OTRA
OSCE
OAS
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PINR
PREL
PTER
PK
PHUM
PE
PARM
PBIO
PINS
PREF
PSOE
PBTS
PL
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PROP
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
POGOV
PINL
SCUL
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SU
SW
SOCI
SL
SG
SMIG
SO
SF
SR
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
SNARCS
STEINBERG
TX
TW
TU
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TS
TBIO
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UG
UP
UV
US
UN
UNSC
UNGA
USEU
USUN
UY
UZ
UNO
UNMIK
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08BERN443, FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND "DIPLOMATIC \
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BERN443.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08BERN443 | 2008-08-28 15:03 | 2011-02-18 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bern |
Appears in these articles: www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers |
VZCZCXRO4059
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK
O 281509Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136
167757 2008-08-28 15:09:00 167757 2008-08-28 15:09:00 08BERN443 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO4059\
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\
DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK\
O 281509Z AUG 08\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286\
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575\
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049\
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226\
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112\
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014\
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERN 000443 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
DEPT FOR P (R.RANGASWAMY), EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE), EB, AND \
NEA/IR (H.WOOSTER) \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 \
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ
SUBJECT: FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND "DIPLOMATIC \
ENGINEERING" ARE CHIEF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS \
\
BERN 00000443 001.2 OF 003 \
\
\
Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reason 1.4(d). \
\
¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 25 address to senior Swiss \
diplomats, FM Calmy-Rey extolled dialogue and facilitation as \
chief Swiss foreign policy instruments. She used the term \
"diplomatic engineering" in describing her vision of \
Switzerland facilitating dialogue on difficult subjects. A \
rhetorical question Calmy-Rey posed in the course of her \
speech was incorrectly spun in some international and Swiss \
press as allegedly advocating dialogue with Usama bin Laden. \
In response to these reports, the Department of Foreign \
Affairs (DFA) released a press statement emphasizing that \
Calmy-Rey did not propose or support such a dialogue. At \
several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey sought to \
justify the approach she has taken to the Iran nuclear \
problem. She claimed that the "freeze for freeze" concept \
was a suggestion made by Switzerland to "find a way to get \
the blocked talks between Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear \
and into substantive political negotiations." She once again \
argued that the EGL gas deal is in Switzerland's national \
interest and said that it "hardly would have been possible" \
without the diplomatic contacts the DFA had developed with \
Iran in the course of its "dialogue" on the nuclear issue. \
Though she remains very popular with the Swiss Left, \
Calmy-Rey has faced a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of \
the Swiss press this year, not least because of her very \
damaging trip to Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. \
Calmy-Rey also has felt pressure to clarify her stance on the \
Iran/nuclear issue in the wake of an August 20 press \
conference in which Swiss President Couchepin stated that the \
Federal Council supports the P5 1 initiative and had decided \
that Switzerland will not undertake its own initiatives in \
this area. End Summary. \
\
------------------------------------------ \
Annual Gathering of Senior Swiss Diplomats \
------------------------------------------ \
\
¶2. (SBU) In an August 25 address to 170 senior Swiss \
diplomats gathered in Bern for the Department of Foreign \
Affairs (DFA) annual ambassadors/CGs conference, FM Calmy-Rey \
extolled dialogue and facilitation ("diplomatic engineering") \
as chief Swiss foreign policy instruments. Calmy-Rey \
appeared to use the occasion to rebut continuing criticism -- \
primarily from Swiss conservatives -- of her often \
high-profile approach to sensitive issues. While conceding \
some limits to the prospects for dialogue, she argued that \
Switzerland's willingness to talk, for example, with \
Hizballah, Hamas, FARC, and the LTTE, was intended to draw \
them into political solutions without legitimizing such \
groups' terrorist methods that Switzerland condemns. \
\
-------------------------------------------- \
Press Flap over Reference to Usama bin Laden \
-------------------------------------------- \
\
¶3. (U) In her opening remarks, Calmy-Rey asserted that Swiss \
domestic press commentary seems dominated by "moralists" \
advocating strict isolation of problematic state and \
non-state actors. She asked rhetorically, "should we listen \
to these moralists? And, if not, should we seek dialogue \
without discrimination, even if that means sitting at a table \
with Usama bin Laden?" Calmy-Rey did not answer the question \
explicitly in the course of her speech, but instead argued \
that in each case the prospects for dialogue need to be \
carefully reviewed. She maintained that dialogue most of the \
time is better than isolation, but does not mean "accepting \
the unacceptable." \
\
¶4. (U) French daily "Le Monde" subsequently incorrectly \
reported that Calmy-Rey had advocated dialogue with Usama bin \
Laden, prompting a brief frenzy of criticism in the Swiss \
media and an August 26 press release by the DFA emphasizing \
that Calmy-Rey's question was rhetorical, that she had not \
promoted nor proposed dialogue with bin Laden, and that "in \
practice there is no question of the DFA proposing a dialogue \
with Usama bin Laden." Swiss press commentators generally \
accepted the clarification, but some argued that the Foreign \
Minister unnecessarily had risked creating misunderstanding \
on a very sensitive topic. \
\
---------------------- \
\
BERN 00000443 002 OF 003 \
\
\
Diplomatic Engineering \
---------------------- \
\
¶5. (SBU) Calmy-Rey used the term "diplomatic engineering" in \
describing her vision of Switzerland facilitating dialogue on \
difficult subjects with ideas, in addition to logistical and \
other material support. She claimed that the "freeze for \
freeze" concept in the context of the P5 1 offer to Iran was \
a result of just this kind of engagement. Even while lauding \
Swiss diplomacy, Calmy-Rey said more needs to be done to \
develop Swiss competencies with a view to making and managing \
"diplomatic engineering" as a Swiss "trademark." At the same \
time, she assessed that Switzerland's lack of EU membership \
and the Swiss form of government -- which lacks a unitary \
Executive -- make Swiss international engagement more \
difficult. \
\
-------------------------------- \
Iran, P5 1, and the EGL Gas Deal \
-------------------------------- \
\
¶6. (C) At several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey \
sought to justify the approach she has taken to the Iran \
nuclear problem. In this context, she said that Switzerland \
"is in close contact with the P5 1 and other important actors \
and had calibrated suggestions that made possible for all \
sides to come closer together and to save face." She claimed \
that the "freeze for freeze" concept was a suggestion made by \
Switzerland to "find a way to get the blocked talks between \
Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear and into substantive \
political negotiations." Calmy-Rey claimed that "we were \
always transparent with all partners and have in no case \
undermined agreed international measures -- to the contrary." \
\
¶7. (C) Calmy-Rey also used this opportunity to seek to defend \
her support for the Swiss firm EGL's billion dollar gas deal \
with Iran. She once again argued that the deal is in \
Switzerland's national interest and something that "hardly \
would have been possible" without the diplomatic contacts the \
DFA had developed with Iran in the course of its "dialogue" \
on the nuclear issue. Referring to criticism that her \
support for the deal had damaged Swiss-U.S. relations, \
Calmy-Rey said that "the United States questioned our support \
for the gas delivery agreement signed by EGL, but we have \
good and constructive relations with the United States -- \
contacts were never so numerous as now." \
\
-------------------- \
Calmy-Rey on Defense \
-------------------- \
\
¶8. (C) Though she remains very popular in her Swiss Socialist \
Party and with others on the Swiss Left, Calmy-Rey has faced \
a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of the Swiss press \
this year, not least because of her very damaging trip to \
Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. More recently, \
allegations by Colombian officials that a DFA envoy acted \
sympathetically to the FARC have kept her on the defensive, \
as has, to a lesser degree, criticism that the ongoing crisis \
in Georgia is a "boomerang effect" of recognizing Kosovo \
independence, which Calmy-Rey strongly advocated. The \
rightist Swiss People's Party (SVP), having gone into \
parliamentary opposition and no longer feeling bound by Swiss \
government tradition of "collegiality", has maintained the \
most vociferous criticism. That said, the SVP is by no means \
alone, with commentators from the Swiss political middle \
frequently lamenting Calmy-Rey's often high-profile approach \
to sensitive issues. Responding to such critics, Calmy-Rey \
asserted in her August 25 speech that "we were never a land \
of courtly secret diplomacy -- transparency and \
predictability of our foreign policy are the core of our \
credibility." \
\
¶9. (C) Regarding the Iran/nuclear issue, Calmy-Rey also has \
felt renewed pressure to clarify her stance in the wake of an \
August 20 press conference in which Swiss President Couchepin \
said that Switzerland supports the P5 1 initiative and added \
that the Federal Council had decided that Switzerland will \
not undertake its own initiatives in this area. In an \
interview with the "Neue Zuercher Zeitung" published August \
23, Calmy-Rey was asked about Couchepin's comments and \
responded that Switzerland had not launched its own \
\
BERN 00000443 003.2 OF 003 \
\
\
initiative, but had offered "diplomatic engineering" \
(including the idea of "freeze for freeze") that had resulted \
in the July "Geneva Talks" that the P5 1 and Iran had asked \
the Swiss to host. She further said that the Federal Council \
"had good reason to be cautious," since Switzerland seldom is \
engaged in international security policy matters of such high \
importance. Calmy-Rey added that the Federal Council had \
feared that Swiss involvement in the issue could damage Swiss \
relations with other states, but argued that the "Geneva \
Talks" had "shown that not to be the case." \
CARTER \ Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO4059\
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\
DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK\
O 281509Z AUG 08\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286\
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575\
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049\
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226\
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112\
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014\
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERN 000443 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
DEPT FOR P (R.RANGASWAMY), EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE), EB, AND \
NEA/IR (H.WOOSTER) \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 \
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ
SUBJECT: FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND "DIPLOMATIC \
ENGINEERING" ARE CHIEF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS \
\
BERN 00000443 001.2 OF 003 \
\
\
Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reason 1.4(d). \
\
¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 25 address to senior Swiss \
diplomats, FM Calmy-Rey extolled dialogue and facilitation as \
chief Swiss foreign policy instruments. She used the term \
"diplomatic engineering" in describing her vision of \
Switzerland facilitating dialogue on difficult subjects. A \
rhetorical question Calmy-Rey posed in the course of her \
speech was incorrectly spun in some international and Swiss \
press as allegedly advocating dialogue with Usama bin Laden. \
In response to these reports, the Department of Foreign \
Affairs (DFA) released a press statement emphasizing that \
Calmy-Rey did not propose or support such a dialogue. At \
several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey sought to \
justify the approach she has taken to the Iran nuclear \
problem. She claimed that the "freeze for freeze" concept \
was a suggestion made by Switzerland to "find a way to get \
the blocked talks between Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear \
and into substantive political negotiations." She once again \
argued that the EGL gas deal is in Switzerland's national \
interest and said that it "hardly would have been possible" \
without the diplomatic contacts the DFA had developed with \
Iran in the course of its "dialogue" on the nuclear issue. \
Though she remains very popular with the Swiss Left, \
Calmy-Rey has faced a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of \
the Swiss press this year, not least because of her very \
damaging trip to Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. \
Calmy-Rey also has felt pressure to clarify her stance on the \
Iran/nuclear issue in the wake of an August 20 press \
conference in which Swiss President Couchepin stated that the \
Federal Council supports the P5 1 initiative and had decided \
that Switzerland will not undertake its own initiatives in \
this area. End Summary. \
\
------------------------------------------ \
Annual Gathering of Senior Swiss Diplomats \
------------------------------------------ \
\
¶2. (SBU) In an August 25 address to 170 senior Swiss \
diplomats gathered in Bern for the Department of Foreign \
Affairs (DFA) annual ambassadors/CGs conference, FM Calmy-Rey \
extolled dialogue and facilitation ("diplomatic engineering") \
as chief Swiss foreign policy instruments. Calmy-Rey \
appeared to use the occasion to rebut continuing criticism -- \
primarily from Swiss conservatives -- of her often \
high-profile approach to sensitive issues. While conceding \
some limits to the prospects for dialogue, she argued that \
Switzerland's willingness to talk, for example, with \
Hizballah, Hamas, FARC, and the LTTE, was intended to draw \
them into political solutions without legitimizing such \
groups' terrorist methods that Switzerland condemns. \
\
-------------------------------------------- \
Press Flap over Reference to Usama bin Laden \
-------------------------------------------- \
\
¶3. (U) In her opening remarks, Calmy-Rey asserted that Swiss \
domestic press commentary seems dominated by "moralists" \
advocating strict isolation of problematic state and \
non-state actors. She asked rhetorically, "should we listen \
to these moralists? And, if not, should we seek dialogue \
without discrimination, even if that means sitting at a table \
with Usama bin Laden?" Calmy-Rey did not answer the question \
explicitly in the course of her speech, but instead argued \
that in each case the prospects for dialogue need to be \
carefully reviewed. She maintained that dialogue most of the \
time is better than isolation, but does not mean "accepting \
the unacceptable." \
\
¶4. (U) French daily "Le Monde" subsequently incorrectly \
reported that Calmy-Rey had advocated dialogue with Usama bin \
Laden, prompting a brief frenzy of criticism in the Swiss \
media and an August 26 press release by the DFA emphasizing \
that Calmy-Rey's question was rhetorical, that she had not \
promoted nor proposed dialogue with bin Laden, and that "in \
practice there is no question of the DFA proposing a dialogue \
with Usama bin Laden." Swiss press commentators generally \
accepted the clarification, but some argued that the Foreign \
Minister unnecessarily had risked creating misunderstanding \
on a very sensitive topic. \
\
---------------------- \
\
BERN 00000443 002 OF 003 \
\
\
Diplomatic Engineering \
---------------------- \
\
¶5. (SBU) Calmy-Rey used the term "diplomatic engineering" in \
describing her vision of Switzerland facilitating dialogue on \
difficult subjects with ideas, in addition to logistical and \
other material support. She claimed that the "freeze for \
freeze" concept in the context of the P5 1 offer to Iran was \
a result of just this kind of engagement. Even while lauding \
Swiss diplomacy, Calmy-Rey said more needs to be done to \
develop Swiss competencies with a view to making and managing \
"diplomatic engineering" as a Swiss "trademark." At the same \
time, she assessed that Switzerland's lack of EU membership \
and the Swiss form of government -- which lacks a unitary \
Executive -- make Swiss international engagement more \
difficult. \
\
-------------------------------- \
Iran, P5 1, and the EGL Gas Deal \
-------------------------------- \
\
¶6. (C) At several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey \
sought to justify the approach she has taken to the Iran \
nuclear problem. In this context, she said that Switzerland \
"is in close contact with the P5 1 and other important actors \
and had calibrated suggestions that made possible for all \
sides to come closer together and to save face." She claimed \
that the "freeze for freeze" concept was a suggestion made by \
Switzerland to "find a way to get the blocked talks between \
Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear and into substantive \
political negotiations." Calmy-Rey claimed that "we were \
always transparent with all partners and have in no case \
undermined agreed international measures -- to the contrary." \
\
¶7. (C) Calmy-Rey also used this opportunity to seek to defend \
her support for the Swiss firm EGL's billion dollar gas deal \
with Iran. She once again argued that the deal is in \
Switzerland's national interest and something that "hardly \
would have been possible" without the diplomatic contacts the \
DFA had developed with Iran in the course of its "dialogue" \
on the nuclear issue. Referring to criticism that her \
support for the deal had damaged Swiss-U.S. relations, \
Calmy-Rey said that "the United States questioned our support \
for the gas delivery agreement signed by EGL, but we have \
good and constructive relations with the United States -- \
contacts were never so numerous as now." \
\
-------------------- \
Calmy-Rey on Defense \
-------------------- \
\
¶8. (C) Though she remains very popular in her Swiss Socialist \
Party and with others on the Swiss Left, Calmy-Rey has faced \
a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of the Swiss press \
this year, not least because of her very damaging trip to \
Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. More recently, \
allegations by Colombian officials that a DFA envoy acted \
sympathetically to the FARC have kept her on the defensive, \
as has, to a lesser degree, criticism that the ongoing crisis \
in Georgia is a "boomerang effect" of recognizing Kosovo \
independence, which Calmy-Rey strongly advocated. The \
rightist Swiss People's Party (SVP), having gone into \
parliamentary opposition and no longer feeling bound by Swiss \
government tradition of "collegiality", has maintained the \
most vociferous criticism. That said, the SVP is by no means \
alone, with commentators from the Swiss political middle \
frequently lamenting Calmy-Rey's often high-profile approach \
to sensitive issues. Responding to such critics, Calmy-Rey \
asserted in her August 25 speech that "we were never a land \
of courtly secret diplomacy -- transparency and \
predictability of our foreign policy are the core of our \
credibility." \
\
¶9. (C) Regarding the Iran/nuclear issue, Calmy-Rey also has \
felt renewed pressure to clarify her stance in the wake of an \
August 20 press conference in which Swiss President Couchepin \
said that Switzerland supports the P5 1 initiative and added \
that the Federal Council had decided that Switzerland will \
not undertake its own initiatives in this area. In an \
interview with the "Neue Zuercher Zeitung" published August \
23, Calmy-Rey was asked about Couchepin's comments and \
responded that Switzerland had not launched its own \
\
BERN 00000443 003.2 OF 003 \
\
\
initiative, but had offered "diplomatic engineering" \
(including the idea of "freeze for freeze") that had resulted \
in the July "Geneva Talks" that the P5 1 and Iran had asked \
the Swiss to host. She further said that the Federal Council \
"had good reason to be cautious," since Switzerland seldom is \
engaged in international security policy matters of such high \
importance. Calmy-Rey added that the Federal Council had \
feared that Swiss involvement in the issue could damage Swiss \
relations with other states, but argued that the "Geneva \
Talks" had "shown that not to be the case." \
CARTER \