VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3511 2710604
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 270333Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ZEN/AMEMBASSY BELMOPAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 2276-2279
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 7881-7884
ZEN/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 4778-4781
ZEN/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI NIACT IMMEDIATE 9314-9317
ZEN/AMEMBASSY RIGA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0612-0615
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 5844-5847
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE 4024-4027
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 6405-6408
ZEN/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
ZEN/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
ZEN/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
ZEN/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
ZEN/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0745-0748

S E C R E T STATE 103511

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O PY (TEXT)



E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018
TAGS: EWWT MOPS PREL PHSA XA SO RS LG BH UP
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF AFFECTED STATES: HIJACKING OF BELIZE-FLAGGED
CARGO SHIP M/V FAINA, IMO NUMBER 9419377

¶1. (SBU) This message is NIACT due to potential fast-breaking
events, and urgent action is required from action addressees.

¶2. (U) Classified by Acting DAS James Knight, Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
¶3. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 4-7.

OBJECTIVES
----------

¶4. (S/Rel to Ukraine) For Embassy Kyiv, please approach host-country
officials to pursue the objectives set out below. In discussing these
points, please emphasize that at this stage we are only gathering
information, including the views of interested parties. While we
believe
it is extremely important to ensure the cargo of the FAINA is not
offloaded in Somalia, we are eager to consult with the flag and crew
states prior to taking action to prevent that scenario. Our contact
is therefore meant to inform our decisions about how to proceed in
this matter.

-- Convey the United States' sympathy and concern for the safety
and well-being of the crew member nationals on board the FAINA.

-- Explain that the nature of the vessel's cargo and its potential
diversion by terrorists pose a grave threat to security in the region.

-- Note that among the available options for preventing this scenario
would be to disable and/or board the vessel.

-- Ask for Ukraine's views with respect to possible United States
military action to prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's
cargo into Somalia. Such intervention could include disabling fire
against
the vessel or equipment being used to offload ("lighterage")
it,
or boarding the vessel. Emphasize that we would only consider such
actions as a last resort to prevent the cargo from being taken ashore
by
the pirates or other malafides. If the pirates simply hold the vessel
for ransom, as they have in the past, we would not intervene in this
manner. Thus, we are consulting with Ukraine now regarding the
possible range of options open to us.

-- Note, however, that the United States reserves the right to take
urgent action if necessary.

-- We are of course aware that the opposed boarding of any vessel
creates
a risk to the lives of the crewmembers, so we are especially
interested
in Ukraine's views regarding such measures, should that situation
arise.
-- Request information on the ship specifications, including draft.

-- Inquire into host nation's authorities, willingness,
and ability to
assist the U.S. in bringing
the pirates aboard the FAINA
to justice
consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1816. Seek information
on
any conditions precedent or particular procedural requirements that
would
enable the host government to accept custody of, investigate,
and prosecute
any persons apprehended in conjunction
with the piracy
of the FAINA.

¶5. (S/Rel to Russia, Latvia) For Embassies Moscow and Riga, please
approach host-country officials to pursue the following objectives:

-- Convey the United States' sympathy and concern for the safety and
well-being of the crew member nationals on board the FAINA.

-- Explain that the nature of the vessel's cargo and its potential
diversion by terrorists pose a grave threat to security in the region.

-- Note that among the available options for preventing this scenario
would be to disable and/or board the vessel.

-- Ask for Russia's/Latvia's views with respect to possible
United States
military action to prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's
cargo into Somalia. Such intervention could include disabling fire
against the vessel or equipment being used to offload ("lighterage")
it,
or boarding the vessel. Emphasize that we would only consider such
actions as a last resort to prevent the cargo from being taken ashore
by
the pirates or other malafides. If the pirates simply hold the vessel
for ransom, as they have in the past, we would not intervene in this
manner. Thus, we are consulting with Russia/Latvia now regarding the
possible range of options open to us.

-- Note, however, that the United States reserves the right to take
urgent action if necessary.

-- We are of course aware that the opposed boarding of any vessel
create
a risk to the lives of the crewmembers, so we are especially
interested
in Russia's/Latvia's views regarding such measures, should that
situation arise.

-- Inquire into host nation's authorities, willingness,
and ability to
assist the U.S. in bringing the pirates aboard the FAINA to justice
consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1816. Seek information
on
any conditions precedent or particular procedural requirements that
would
enable the host government to accept custody of, investigate,
and
prosecute any persons apprehended in conjunction with
the piracy of the FAINA.

-- Note that we are aware that a Russian navy vessel is en route
to the area,
apparently in response to these events, and inquire as to Russia's
intentions with respect to this vessel. Urge Russia to coordinate
any planned actions with the United States.

¶6. (S/Rel to Belize) For Embassy Belize, please approach host-country
officials to pursue the following objectives:

-- Convey the United States' sympathy and concern for the safety and
well-being of the crew members on board the
Belize-flagged roll on-roll
off cargo ship FAINA, IMO number 7419377.

-- Explain that the nature of the vessel's cargo and its potential
diversion by terrorists pose a grave threat to security in the region.

-- Note that among the available options for preventing this scenario
would be to disable and/or board the vessel.

-- Ask for Belize's views with respect to possible United States
military
action to prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's cargo into
Somalia. Such intervention could include disabling fire against
the vessel
or equipment being used to offload ("lighterage") it, or boarding
the vessel. Emphasize that we would only consider such actions
as a last
resort to prevent the cargo from being taken ashore by pirates or
other
malafides. If the pirates simply hold the vessel for ransom, as they
have in the past, we would not intervene in this manner. Thus, we are
consulting with Belize now regarding the possible range of options
open to us.

-- Ask for concurrence with possible United States military action to
prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's cargo into Somalia.
Such intervention
would include disabling fire or borardingv the vessel and
would only be used as a last resort to prevent the cargo from being
taken ashore by the pirates or other malafides.

-- Note, however, that the United States reserves the right to take
urgent action if necessary.

--Request information on the ship specifications, including draft.

-- Inquire into host nation's authorities, willingness,
and ability to
assist the U.S. in bringing the pirates aboard the FAINA to
justice
consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1816. Seek
information on
any
conditions precedent or particular procedural requirements that
would
enable the host government to accept custody of, investigate, and
prosecute
any persons apprehended in conjunction with the piracy of the
FAINA.

¶7. (S/Rel to Kenya) For Embassy Nairobi, please approach host-country
officials to pursue the following objectives:
-- Convey the United States' sympathy and concern for the safety and
well-being of the crew members on board the FAINA.

-- Explain that the nature of the vessel's cargo and its potential
diversion by terrorists pose a grave threat to security in the region.

-- Note that among the available options for preventing this scenario
would be to disable and/or board the vessel.

-- Ask for Kenya's views with respect to possible United States
military
action to prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's cargo
into
Somalia. Such intervention could include disabling fire against the
vessel or equipment being used to offload ("lighterage") it,
or boarding
the vessel. Emphasize that we would only consider such actions
as a last
resort to prevent the cargo from being taken ashore by pirates or
other
malafides. If the pirates simply hold the vessel for ransom, as they
have in the past, we would not intervene in this manner. Thus, we are
consulting with Kenya now regarding the possible range of options
open to us.

-- Note, however, that the United States reserves the right to take
urgent action if necessary.

-- Inquire into host nation's authorities, willingness,
and ability to
assist the U.S. in bringing the pirates aboard the FAINA
to justice
consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1816. Seek information
on any conditions precedent or particular procedural requirements
that would
enable the host government to accept custody of, investigate,
and
prosecute any persons apprehended in conjunction with
the piracy
of the
FAINA.
-- Indicate that we will seek--but cannot guarantee--that these
weapons
will be resent on their original route to Kenya for onward delivery,
if recovered.



BACKGROUND
----------

¶8. (S) The Belize-flagged roll on-roll off cargo ship FAINA was
hijacked
on September 25 while en route to Mombasa, Kenya and was last reported
approximately 280 NM ENE of Mogadishu. FAINA departed Nikolayev,
Ukraine on September 1. One Latvian, three Russian, and 17 Ukrainian
crewmembers are on board.

¶9. (S) As part of a contract signed between Ukraine and the Sudanese
People's Liberation Movement/Army in December 2006, the vessel is
believed to be carrying the following cargo intended for transshipment
to southern Sudan:

-- 33 T-72 tanks, with spare parts
-- 42 ZPU-4 rolling anti-aircraft guns
-- 36 RPG-7v
-- 6 BM-27 Self propelled multiple rocket launchers
-- 13,000 125mm rounds of ammunition (T-72)

¶10. (C) The Department is deeply concerned that the armaments
may fall
into al-Shabaab's hands if off-loaded from the vessel in Somalia.

¶11. (C) The USS Howard has been dispatched to intercept and take up a
position from which to monitor the FAINA.

REPORTING DEADLINE
------------------

¶12. (U) The Department greatly appreciates posts' continued support
and assistance. Department requests action addressees report results
Of efforts via front-channel cable by
September 29 to AF/RSA Jun Bando,
PM/ISO CAPT Jeff Frederick, and the appropriate regional bureau.

POINTS OF CONTACT
----------

¶13. (U) Please contact AF/RSA Jun Bando at (202) 647-5781 or PM/ISO
CAPT Jeff Frederick at at (202) 647-0886 or via email for
for any necessary
further background information or supporting argumentation to meet
demarche objectives.
RICE