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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SARAJEVO103, BOSNIA - GOOD BOSNIAKS, BAD BOSNIAKS, GOOD
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SARAJEVO103 | 2009-01-27 09:09 | 2010-12-09 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sarajevo |
VZCZCXRO2610
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0103/01 0270934
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 270934Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9586
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000103
SIPDIS
EUR/SCE FOR FOOKS, STINCHCOMB, HYLAND; NSC FOR HELGERSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - GOOD BOSNIAKS, BAD BOSNIAKS, GOOD
MUSLIMS, BAD MUSLIMS
SARAJEVO 00000103 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Amid resurgence over the past two years of
politics dogged by nationalist rhetoric, some Bosniak
(Muslim) political actors have sought to portray themselves
as more capable of protecting Bosniak interests than their
opponents. One aspect of this tussle is an
increasingly-visible rift in the Bosniak community that
centers on what it means to be a "good" or "bad" Bosniak.
"Good Bosniaks," according to this sentiment, are those who
espouse conservative political and religious ideals. More
moderate and secular ideals are, by implication, held by "bad
Bosniaks." Statements from the Islamic Community,
particularly its leader, Reis Ceric, that label those who
criticize Islamic Community as "Islamophobic" have sharpened
this polarization among Bosniaks. Bosnia's
largest-circulation and most influential pro-Bosniak daily,
Dnevni Avaz, has also increasingly championed "good Bosniak"
causes and unscrupulously attacked Bosniaks and Bosniak
institutions (including a rival, more secular Bosniak daily)
that disagree with it. This press war, sparked largely by
Avaz's business interests, has helped the intra-Bosniak
debate gain traction more quickly and more broadly than it
might otherwise. Depending on the path the debate takes, it
has the potential, over the longer-term, to steer Bosniak
politics in a more conservative direction, which would
complicate efforts to forge the compromises among Bosniaks,
Serbs, and Croats necessary to secure Bosnia's future. END
SUMMARY.
Protectors of Bosniak
---------------------
¶2. (C) In a time of international reluctance to engage
heavily in Bosnia -- coupled with Bosnian Serb and Croat
attempts to establish maximal autonomy for themselves --
Bosniak fears of isolation and abandonment have escalated.
The perception of the risks to the Bosniak community among
average Bosniaks is genuine, grounded largely in the fact
that Bosniaks were the most aggrieved ethnic group during the
1992-95 war and that their plight was ignored by the
international community. Reflecting these fears, many
Bosniak political leaders over the past two years have
campaigned on the idea that they are better able to protect
Bosniak interests than their rivals. At the same time, they
have framed debate on specific policies within their Bosniak
constituency in existential terms. Bosniak member of the
Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic has been the Bosniak political
leader most willing to appeal to these fears -- in fact, he
has often deliberately stoked them -) but others, including
Party for Democratic Action President Sulejman Tihic and
Social Democratic Party leader Zlatko Lagumdzija at times
have also done so.
Reis Ceric Helps Mold Bosniak Identity
--------------------------------------
¶3. (C) At the same time, the Head of the Islamic Community,
Reis Ceric, has sought to promote a Bosniak political
identity rooted in "victimization." He has regularly
reminded Bosniaks that they are victims of genocide and that
they suffered more than any other group in the 1992-95 war.
In a Hayat TV interview on January 11, the Reis claimed that
following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnian Muslims
had been variously subjected to "phobias" against Turkey,
Islam, and Bosnia itself. He also alleged that media
coverage of the alleged threat of Islamic terrorism in Bosnia
is, itself, motivated by "Islamophobic" media and "is, in a
way, a preparation for a new genocide on Bosniaks." The Reis
has, by all accounts, succumbed to the political fray,
criticizing or praising Bosniak leaders as he feels
appropriate. His public comments about Bosniak identity and
Bosniak suffering have clearly been aimed at shaping Bosniak
political discourse as well as the positions adopted by the
country's leading Bosniak political parties.
¶4. (C) The Reis has also sought to define Bosniak identity in
religious terms and has publicly implied that to be a "good
Bosniak" one must be a "good Muslim." He has supported
policies that are controversial among more secular Bosniaks,
such as introducing religious education into kindergarten
classes. Ceric has also made use of his public profile and
media access to attack critics of his agenda, often implying
that his position places him above criticism. In one
SARAJEVO 00000103 002.3 OF 003
interview, Ceric claimed that while he personally welcomed
constructive criticism, criticism of Islam itself was
impermissible. (Note: Ceric clearly intends to be the sole
judge of when criticism of him or his administration becomes
a criticism of Islam. His past responses to other critics
inside and outside the Islamic Community suggest as much.
End Note.)
"Islamophobes" are Everywhere
-----------------------------
¶5. (C) The Islamic Community has increasingly condemned
attacks against itself as anti-Islamic, and as undermining
Bosniaks in Bosnia. A November op-ed in the Sarajevo-based
daily Oslobodjenje touched on some controversial projects
undertaken by the Islamic Community, particularly the Reis'
new offices -- now under construction -- which are rumored to
be extremely costly. The article also criticized the Reis,
as the head of the Islamic Community. In response, the
Islamic Community was quick to demonize its critics and imply
that their opposition made them "bad Bosniaks." An Islamic
Community statement declared the paper's stance to be,
"...nothing but a continuation of the genocidal politics
designed to wipe the BiH Muslim off the face of the Earth...
the Reis' office is very much surprised by the Islamophobic
editorial policy of Oslobodjenje." (Note: Ceric and the
Islamic Community may be using the "heavy artillery" of
insinuating Islamophobia to defend a weak spot, specifically,
the widespread perception that his administration has been
fiscally irresponsible. End Note.)
Santa Claus Didn't Come to Town
-------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Even Bosniak children are not immune to political
efforts to shape the Bosniak identity. There has been a push
to introduce Islamic religious education in all
kindergartens, a move that one respected professor (known to
be an outspoken critic of the Reis) from the Faculty of
Islamic Sciences defined as a "crime against children."
Similarly, the director of Sarajevo's state-funded preschools
attempted to ban Djeda Mraz (Grandfather Frost) in 2007,
arguing that Sarajevo is predominantly Muslim and that Djeda
Mraz is not part of the Muslim tradition. (Note: Modeled on
Santa Claus, Djeda Mraz emerged in Yugoslavia after World War
II as a secular figure who gave gifts to children of all
religions. End Note) Secular-minded Sarajevo citizens saw the
snubbing of Djeda Mraz as an attempt to define for children
what it means to be "good" Muslims and organized protests and
petitions against the proposed ban. The outrage of Sarajevo
citizens was best captured in the editorial comment of FTV's
news program 60 Minutes. The show's host, Bakir
Hadziomerovic, characterized the director of the public
institution "Children of Sarajevo," Razija Mahmutovic, as the
fiercest opponent of Djeda Mraz. Taking on an ironic tone,
Hadziomerovic sarcastically proposed that Mahmutovic
introduce the figure of "Santa Alija," in reference to the
elder Izetbegovic. In both cases mentioned here (early
religious education and banning of Djeda Mraz), the secular
position lost out.
Popular Paper Religiously Pursues Bosniak Interests
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶7. (SBU) The definition of a "good Bosniak" as one who is
politically and religiously conservative has also been
increasingly propagated by the country's largest-circulation,
pro-Bosniak daily, Dnevni Avaz. Over the past several
months, Fahrud Radoncic, owner of Avaz and its associated
businesses, has engaged in a crusade to "protect Bosniak
interests," primarily as part of an effort to undercut its
opponent, the more secular Oslobodjenje. While Avaz and
Oslobodjenje have had a long-running rivalry centered more on
business competition than ideology, Radoncic's recent
statements represent a clear raising of the stakes. In a TV
interview on November 30, Radoncic accused his opponents --
including a number of media outlets -- of "destroying
Bosniaks" through attacks on, as he put it, the three key
pillars of Muslim faith in Bosnia: the Islamic Community and
Reis Ceric; the memory of Alija Izetbegovic, as personified
by his son Bakir; and Avaz itself. On December 30, Avaz
labeled Ceric a true representative of the Bosniak people,
adding "...those who attack Reis Ceric would like to see a
situation like before, when the state was appointing the Reis
SARAJEVO 00000103 003.2 OF 003
so that he would listen to the state, thus destroying the
institution of Islam and the Islamic Community."
¶8. (C) Radoncic has also not shied away from exploiting his
position as owner to influence how Avaz presents issues. The
December 29 edition of Avaz carried a front page article that
slammed those who opposed the construction of a new
administrative building for the Islamic Community and
accusing them of seeking to put the Islamic Community under
their political control, to diminish its power, or to destroy
it. Avaz plainly misrepresented facts related to the
project, and made use of extensive purple prose in negatively
characterizing opposition to the project. The following day,
Avaz continued its offensive against "the enemies of Islam"
with a full-page interview with Enver Imamovic, a professor
of history at the Philosophy Faculty in Sarajevo. Imamovic
condemned public attacks against the Islamic Community and
Reis Ceric, declaring, "Let us not forget what the Islamic
Community meant to our people in the past war. This was the
institution around which Bosniak people gathered."
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) In an atmosphere of pessimism, created and fueled by a
lack of political or economic progress in the country,
insisting on the importance of being a proper Bosniak is
gaining momentum as a political tool. Lending credence to,
and most likely feeding, this discourse is increasingly
audacious nationalism among Bosnian Serbs and, to a lesser
extent, Bosnian Croats. A growing fear of isolation appears
to be providing fodder for political actors, which they can
exploit to urge Bosniaks to rally around their leadership and
agenda, which some politicians, the Reis and the opportunist
Radoncic, have sought to define in conservative and more
religious terms. Depending on how this debate plays out,
Bosniaks politics could take an increasingly conservative
political trajectory. The outcome of this intra-Bosniak
debate will likely take considerable time to play out, but
its outcome will almost certainly shape public perceptions of
who is fit to lead and to speak for Bosniaks, an ethnic group
whose sense of identity is still in flux. With all three
sides of the ethnic divide retreating to ethnic-based
politics, the prospects of compromises necessary for Bosnia's
future become much dimmer.
ENGLISH