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Viewing cable 09REYKJAVIK41, REYKJAVIK SEPQ RESPONSE - SPRING 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09REYKJAVIK41 2009-02-26 15:03 2011-01-13 05:05 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Reykjavik
R 261501Z FEB 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3993
INFO CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
FBI WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T REYKJAVIK 000041 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR DS/TIA/ITA AND DS/IP/EUR AND EUR/NB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: REYKJAVIK SEPQ RESPONSE - SPRING 2009 
 
REF: STATE 13023 
 
Classified By: RSO JON MOODY FOR REASONS 1.4 (C) AND (D) 
 
------------------ 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
------------------ 
 
I.  (C) Demonstrations 
 
A.  (C) There is a religious community of Muslims, some of 
whom might harbor anti-American sentiments.  The community 
numbers approximately 800 individuals and is comprised mostly 
of European Muslims.  In the past 12 months there have been 
no known anti-American demonstrations led by the Muslim 
community. 
 
i.  (SBU) Yes, there have been two anti-American 
demonstrations in the past 12 months. 
 
ii.  (SBU) Both demonstrations occurred in front of the 
Chancery and CMR.  (NOTE: The Chancery and CMR are co-located 
at 21 and 23 Laufasvegur. END NOTE) 
 
iii.  (SBU) One demonstration drew 30-40 protesters. 
Approximately 400 demonstrators participated in the second 
demonstration. 
 
iv.  (SBU) The two anti-American protests in this SEPQ period 
occurred in December 2008 and January 2009.  Both were 
related to Israeli military action in Gaza. 
 
B.  (SBU) Demonstrations are generally peaceful. 
 
i.  (SBU) There have been no violent demonstrations resulting 
in damage or loss of USG property. 
 
ii.  (SBU) No demonstrations have penetrated our perimeter 
security. 
 
C.  (SBU) There has been a dramatic increase in 
demonstrations against the Icelandic government since Post's 
last SEPQ response.  The primary cause is the current 
domestic economic crisis.  Demonstrations have also been 
organized to protest military action, environmental issues, 
salary/benefit disputes, soaring gas prices, and a NATO 
conference. 
 
i.  (SBU) The majority of demonstrations occur in front of 
the Prime Minister's office (approximately 700 meters from 
the Embassy) and the Althingi Parliament Building 
(approximately 550 meters from the Embassy).  Since Post,s 
last SEPQ response there have been approximately 57 
demonstrations against the Government of Iceland.   Most were 
peaceful, some were heated, and a small number of protesters 
were arrested.  Several police officers were injured by 
throwing rocks, none seriously. 
 
ii.  (SBU) The anti-government protests were huge compared to 
previously seen protests.  Since October Saturday 
demonstrations have drawn between 3000-4000 participants. 
The largest gathering was estimated at 10000 demonstrators 
(approximately 3 percent of Iceland's population). 
Non-economic protests were usually drew 30-50 persons (one 
protest had 1 participant - an anti-NATO demonstrator man 
banging a gong outside the Hilton.  He was issued a traffic 
citation for parking illegally.) 
 
iii.  (C) All demonstrations have been peaceful, to date. 
The protests regarding the economic crisis have occasionally 
become heated resulting in minor injuries and  arrests.  None 
got out of hand and most of the damage and injuries were 
caused by a small group of miscreants well-known to the 
police and rumored to be in a  turf war, with the police. 
 
iv.  (SBU) No demonstrations have resulted in damage to USG 
property. 
 
II  (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions 
 
A.  (SBU) Iceland is not involved in an interstate or 
intrastate conflict. 
 
B.  (SBU) Iceland is not involved in an intrastate conflict. 
 
C.  (SBU) Iceland is not involved in an interstate or 
intrastate conflict.  The only US diplomatic mission is in 
Reykjavik. 
 
 
D.  (SBU) Iceland is not involved in an intrastate conflict. 
 
III.  (S/NF) Host Country Capabilities 
 
A.  (C) The police (Logreglan) are well-trained and 
professional.  All police attend the national police academy 
with a comprehensive curriculum.  The  current number of 
police officers in Iceland is 780 (1 police officer for every 
409 citizens).  A newspaper article on 12 February 2009 
claims the Metropolitan Police (Reykjavik) is in dire 
financial straits.  Costs relating to the demonstrations are 
piling up with no funds to cover them in the budget.  The 
Police Commissioner is fearful that police officer positions 
will be cut to offset those expenses.  Such a cut will be 
detrimental to a police force that has only 20-25 officers on 
patrol during any shift. 
 
B.  (SBU) Icelandic police have been trained by US agencies 
in various areas including customs/border/port security, 
cyber security and computer crimes, hostage negotiation, 
crisis management, and several others.  The training has been 
effective.  The RSO notes evidence of the training in his 
interactions with the police.  There has been no training 
since Post,s last SEPQ response. 
 
C.  (C) No evidence of corruption has been observed or 
uncovered. 
 
D.  (S/NF) Iceland does not have an intelligence service. 
The National Security Unit (NSU) within the National 
Commissioner's Office handles threat information analysis. 
The NSU is comprised of three individuals.  The NSU is too 
small to undertake any type of intelligence gathering role 
and responds to threats as they arise, such as threats 
against Icelandic officials, demonstrations/protests, and 
"extremist" groups.  The NSU is not a tradecraft or covert 
group.  There are no terrorism-related examples, but the 
NSU's investigative and analytical capabilities have been 
demonstrated through operations in varying fields of law 
enforcement such as organized crime (OC), counterintelligence 
(CI), and counter-narcotics (CN).  GRPO maintains liaison 
with the NSU. 
 
E.  (SBU) Law enforcement agencies, including the NSU, have 
been very cooperative with US Embassy requests for 
information and support. 
 
F.  (U) N/A 
 
G.  (SBU) All planned requests for support were fully 
completed in a timely and thorough manner.  All impromptu 
requests for support were responded to within minutes. 
 
H.  (C) The overall assessment of security at the major 
airport in Iceland is excellent.  Screening is comparable to 
US standards and perimeter security is well-organized and 
implemented.  There are direct flights into and out of the 
US.  The Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) is 
closely involved with the security requirements/standards at 
Keflavik International Airport (KEF).  The Keflavik Airport 
Authority changed hands on 1 January 2009.  Security 
responsibilities are now handled by a private limited company 
owned by the government.  The current Director of Security 
was the Acting Airport Managing Director prior to the change. 
 
I.  (C) The customs and immigration controls at KEF are 
effective.  The Sudurnes Police District, the district 
responsible for the airport, has a high success rate of 
intercepting contraband and suspect travel documents.  The 
police monitor passenger manifests prior to aircraft arrival 
(Advanced Passenger Information - API) and compare the list 
against several databases, including Interpol and Europol. 
The police possess a fraudulent document lab at the airport 
that deals with the fraudulent travel documents.  Although 
the numbers of events and personnel are relatively low, their 
effectiveness is high.  As of 1 January 2009, the customs 
authority now falls under the Ministry of Finance but is 
currently still operationally-controlled by the Sudurnes 
Police Commissioner.  This change-over is a work in progress. 
Eventually the Commissioner will have no responsibility or 
oversight of Customs at Keflavik. 
 
J.  (C) Border patrol forces are effective.  Police and 
customs interdict narcotics on a somewhat regular basis.  The 
police do recognize the possibility that their borders could 
be infiltrated by rogue individuals using small seacraft and 
thus rely upon the Icelandic Coast Guard (ICG) for patrolling 
the waters.  The ICG has made severe cuts to their personnel 
and have limited their activities to rescue operations and 
training necessary to maintain proficiency operating their 
helicopters, aircraft and vessels. 
 
-------------------- 
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
-------------------- 
 
I.  (C) Anti-American Terrorist Groups 
 
A.  (C) There are no known indigenous anti-American terrorist 
groups. 
 
B.  (U) N/A 
 
C.  (U) N/A 
 
D.  (U) N/A 
 
E.  (U) N/A 
 
F.  (U) N/A 
 
G.  (U) N/A 
 
II.  (C) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups 
 
A.  (C) There are no known other indigenous terrorist groups 
in Iceland. 
 
B.  (U) N/A 
 
C.  (U) N/A 
 
D.  (U) N/A 
 
----------------------- 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
----------------------- 
 
I.  (S/NF)  Transnational Terrorism Indicators 
 
A.  (C) There are no known foreign terrorist groups in 
Iceland. 
 
B.  (U) N/A 
 
C.  (C) The host government is not sympathetic to foreign 
terrorism groups in general. 
 
D.  (C) Within the Muslim community and others outside the 
Muslim community, there might be a small number that support 
the actions of terrorism groups against the US.  The numbers 
or make-up of possible supporters are not known.  Any support 
to foreign terrorism groups is not overt. 
 
E.  (S/NF) The Russians and Chinese have established 
diplomatic missions in Reykjavik.  There are no indications 
that these two countries are actively pursuing intelligence 
operations against the USG.  It is believed that the Chinese 
are conducting industrial espionage in the areas of DNA 
decoding and medical research in Iceland. 
 
F.  (S/NF) There are no indications of hostile intelligence 
services in Iceland with the intent or aim to conduct 
potential anti-American attacks.  (NOTE: Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
Serbia, Sudan, etc. do not have diplomatic missions in 
Iceland.  The 14 declared, diplomatic missions in Iceland are 
the US, Danish, Swedish, French, German, Indian, British, 
Chinese, Russian, Polish, Canadian, Finnish, Japanese, and 
Norwegian.  END NOTE) 
 
G.  (S) There are no indications that weapons or explosives 
are readily available to potential hostile terrorist 
elements.  There are approximately 52,000 firearms registered 
with the National Commissioner,s Office. 
 
 
van Voorst