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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI191, EASTERN LIBYANS FAVOR WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND ABOLISHING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI191 2009-02-27 12:12 2011-01-31 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO4810
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0191/01 0581254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 271254Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4555
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1017
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0703
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5081
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/26/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENRG LY
SUBJECT: EASTERN LIBYANS FAVOR WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND ABOLISHING 
GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES 
 
REF: A) TRIPOLI 186, B) 08 TRIPOLI 227 TRIPOLI 00000191 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) Summary: Consideration of a draft constitution was on the agenda for the recently-concluded session of the Basic People's Congresses (BPC), but was apparently dropped out of concern that including it could undermine efforts to gain support for controversial wealth distribution and government re-structuring reforms proposed by Muammar al-Qadhafi. Western Libyan contacts were united in their concern that the hazily-formulated reforms could prompt economic problems and threaten the limited reform initiatives already underway; however, xxxxxxxxxxxx told us that the majority of BPCs in eastern Libya xxxxxxxxxxxx had recommended that the General People's Congress adopt wealth distribution and government re-structuring. He argued that eastern Libyans, frustrated by years of calculated neglect by the regime, believed they stood a better chance of getting a more equal share of oil revenues and having less corrupt government if they adopted al-Qadhafi's proposed reforms. In addition, eastern Libyan politicians and leaders viewed the reforms as a means by which to devolve resource allocation decisions and, to a limited extent, political authority away from the central government and toward provincial leaders, potentially facilitating their long-term goal of a return to the federal system of government that existed before the 1969 al-Fateh Revolution/coup. The fact that the majority of BPCs in eastern Libya, a region not known for its love of Muammar al-Qadhafi or his regime, have reportedly supported al-Qadhafi's proposals is best understood as a reflection of the extent of their frustration with the extant political system rather than an endorsement of the ideas themselves. End summary. CONSTITUTION DROPPED FROM AGENDA AMID CONCERNS ABOUT FOCUS ON OTHER PROPOSED REFORMS

2.(C) As reported ref A, Libya's 468 Basic People's Congresses (BPCs) convened February 18-23 to consider direct distribution of Libya's oil wealth to its citizens and government re-structuring that would involve dismantling most existing ministry-equivalents, proposals first posited by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March (ref B). xxxxxxxxxxxx said the preliminary draft agenda for the BPCs included reviewing the draft constitution prepared by a committee under the auspices of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, with the expectation that it would be put forward to the upcoming General People's Congress (GPC) in early March for consideration and (presumably) ratification. In the end, the constitution was dropped from the BPCs final agenda and was not/not considered.

3.(C) xxxxxxxxxxxx said concerns at the General People's Committee level (cabinet-equivalent) about apparent opposition to the core issues of wealth distribution and government re-structuring prompted the decision to drop the constitution from the agenda. The regime's concern was to ensure that BPCs ultimately recommended to the General People's Congress that it adopt wealth distribution and government re-structuring; given sensitivities about adopting a constitution (Libya currently does not have one), it was feared that considering that issue as well would dilute the BPCs focus. xxxxxxxxxxxx said the constitution was on the BPCs' agenda as recently as February 14, when Muammar al-Qadhafi hotly responded to dissent within the General People's Committee about the proposed reforms, urging BPC members and regime officials to move ahead with wealth distribution and re-structuring. Criticizing the poor performance of the General People's Committee system xxxxxxxxxxxx characterized the changes as part of an effort to combat endemic corruption in and underperformance by the GPCs. It is unclear whether the constitution will be considered at the upcoming session of the General People's Congress. The constitution is reportedly being reviewed by the General Peoples Committee and may be put forward by it to the General Peoples Congress, possibly a workaround devised after it was removed from the BPCs' agenda (further details septel). MAJORITY OF EASTERN LIBYAN BPCS ENDORSE AL-QADHAFI'S PROPOSED REFORMS ...

4.(C) With respect to wealth distribution and re-structuring, xxxxxxxxxxxx put forward the recommendation that both proposals be considered and adopted by the General People's Congress. xxxxxxxxxxxx Citing conversations on Feb 23-24 with secretaries of other BPCs, he said it appeared that the majority of BPCs in eastern Libya had made similar recommendations. Wealth distribution, an idea that has sparked the imagination of many ordinary Libyans, dominated most of the proceedings. Little attention was focused on the potentially more critical issue of government re-structuring. He conceded that his BPCs' recommendations contained few specific details about how to successfully implement the initiatives. He said the Sha'abiyat and General People's Congress were responsible for coming up with such ideas. (Comment: Given the performance of xxxxxxxxxxxx representatives in their meeting with the Ambassador on February 23, this does not give cause for much hope. End comment.) ... BUT FOR REASONS THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH LOYALTY TO THE REGIME

5.(C) Acknowledging the lack of clarity about how wealth distribution and re-structuring would be implemented, xxxxxxxxxxxx stressed that his constituents were disappointed enough with the Jamahiriya's performance to give the relatively radical proposals a try. Eastern Libya had suffered until very recently from a lack of investment and government resources, part of a campaign by the al-Qadhafi regime to keep the area poor and, theoretically, less likely to develop as a viable alternative locus of power to Tripoli. Despite a recent surge in government projects in and around Benghazi (further details septel), eastern Libyans had generally not benefited from limited economic reform to the extent that those in the western province of Tripolitania had.

6.(C) xxxxxxxxxxxx argued that eastern Libyans calculated that they stood a better chance of getting a more equal share of oil revenues and having less corrupt government if they adopted al-Qadhafi's proposed reforms. In addition, eastern Libyan politicians and leaders viewed the reforms as a means by which to devolve resource allocation decisions and, to a limited extent, political authority away from the central government and toward provincial leaders. xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that a long-term goal of most eastern Libyans was to effect a return to something akin to the federal system of government that existed before the 1969 al-Fateh Revolution/coup, in which the provinces enjoyed greater autonomy. The government re-structuring advocated by al-Qadhafi would theoretically entail dismantling the existing system of General People's Committees, potentially creating a vacuum into which provincial leaders could move.

7.(C) Comment: As reported ref A and previous, the consensus among contacts in and around Tripoli since al-Qadhafi first proposed wealth distribution and re-structuring last March was concern that the hazily-formulated scheme could prompt serious macro-economic distortions (hyperinflation among them) and that nascent reforms already underway would be hurt, jeopardizing the increased availability of consumer goods and other recent improvements in the standard of living for ordinary Libyans. Of particular concern to western Libyans was the proposal to scrap government support for education and health care. The Executive Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation said as recently as February 22 that the weight of opinion at the BPC level appeared to be against supporting wealth distribution. The fact that the majority of BPCs in eastern Libya, a region not known for its love of Muammar al-Qadhafi or his regime, have reportedly supported al-Qadhafi's proposals is best understood as a reflection of the extent of their frustration with the extant political system rather than an endorsement of the ideas themselves. As such, it underscores the lack of cohesion and lingering mistrust between the three major regions that comprise modern Libya: Tripolitania (western Libya); Cyrenaica (eastern Libya); and the Fezzan (southern Libya). End comment. CRETZ