VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0172/01 0761536
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 171536Z MAR 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4249
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
INFO RUWDHDP/OBLA LOS ANGELES CA PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM CMD CTR MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T HAVANA 000172 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2029 
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: CUBAN MININT'S THOUGHTS ON TRAVEL, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, AND INTEL SHARING 

Classified By: com jonathan farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 

¶1. (S) Summary: On 9 March 2009, the United States Coast 
Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) stationed at the 
United States Interests Section in Havana, Cuba (USINT) 
attended a routine working meeting with Cuban Ministry of 
Interior (MININT) officers, including one Cuban Border Guard 
Colonel (COL) and two officers from the MININT Directorate of 
International Relations (one Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) and a 
Major (MAJ)). All three officers are regular DIS contacts 
with whom he has met approximately thirty times since the 
DIS's arrival in country in August 2008, including two 
multi-day law enforcement-related excursions. Topics 
discussed on 9 March included a recent marijuana wash-up in 
Holguin Province, and suspected migrant smugglers currently 
being detained by the Government of Cuba (GOC). 

¶2. (S) On 9 March, the DIS received four requests for 
information from MININT. Of note was a request on forty-five 
subjects suspected of being involved in organized Cuban 
migrant smuggling and currently being detained in Cuba, and a 
recent marijuana wash-up on Cuba's north coast in Holguin 
Province. Following the working portion of the meeting, the 
DIS was asked by the MININT MAJ whether he believed the 
proposed legislation in the U.S. congress that would permit 
Cuban Americans to travel to Cuba more frequently would pass. 
Attempting to gauge the current readiness level of the Cuban 
economy for increased tourism, DIS in-turn asked the officers 
whether Cuba was ready for an increased flow of American 
tourists, to which the COL responded that Cuba was never 
averse to Americans traveling to Cuba; rather, it was a 
policy initiated and brought on by the United States, not 
Cuba. The meeting ended a few moments later, and the DIS 
departed the MININT protocol house. 

¶3. (S) After departing, DIS, LTCOL, and MAJ initiated a 
side-bar conversation and the DIS once again asked (and 
clarified his earlier travel-related question) whether or not 
Cuba was prepared for a significant influx of American 
tourists should policy permit such a change. The MAJ was 
quick to respond in the negative and pointed out that Cuban 
airports were not prepared to accommodate a large influx. 
The LTCOL stated that should maritime ports be utilized for 
ferries or cruises, they too are not prepared or equipped to 
handle an increase in passengers and the logistics that 
accompany them. Both agreed that this will require a 
significant amount of time to rectify. While the LTCOL 
appeared optimistic that this issue was one that would be 
improved, the MAJ was visibly frustrated with the issue; he 
stated that Cuba has previously prepared for an increased 
flow of Americans only to have the United States government 
turn around and prohibit travel to the island. 

¶4. (S) DIS told both officers that an increase in American 
travel to Cuba would bring about a litany of issues, 
including matters that will have to be handled by USINT's 
American Citizen Services section as well as Cuban and US law 
enforcement agencies. DIS stated that the GOC may have to 
work more closely with such agencies as the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. 
Marshals Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Immediately following this statement, the MAJ stated, in an 
agreeable fashion, that the GOC will also have to work with 
the Central Intelligence Agency on matters related to 
terrorism. 

¶5. (S) DIS used this line of conversation as a segue to 
float the idea of greater USINT Regional Security Officer 
(RSO) involvement in law enforcement issues as opposed to the 
DIS handling nearly all exchanges. Both MININT officers 
were amenable to the idea and stated that they are willing to 
work with the current USINT RSO on law enforcement-related 
matters. The MAJ stated that increased law enforcement 
cooperation outside the bounds of the existing MININT-DIS 
relationship will inevitably push both sides into a position 
where they are forced to work together on mutually-concerning 

issues, thereby opening the door to other forms of 
collaboration. 

¶6. (S) DIS asked what it would take to setup a meeting 
among MININT, DIS, and RSO, and the MAJ stated that a 
diplomatic note should be sent to the Cuban Ministry of 
Foreign Relations (MINREX) to request said meeting. The 
side-bar concluded after approximately thirty minutes. 

¶7. (S) Comment: MININT and MINREX (during Cuban migrant 
repatriations) continue to bombard the DIS with statements 
encouraging the United States to cooperate on matters related 
to law enforcement, specifically counternarcotics and illegal 
migration. Most, if not all, migrant repatriations bring the 
DIS into direct contact with an official from MINREX's North 
American Division. MINREX officers inevitably raise the need 
for greater dialogue between the United States and Cuba, and 
seem to believe that counternarcotics and migration issues 
are a viable, potential conduit for increased U.S.-Cuba 
collaboration. DIS believes this continued LE cooperation 
message from the GOC to the DIS is part of a concerted effort 
to increase dialogue with the United States via an already 
established working-level relationship. 

FARRAR