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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI823, Crisis in Coalition Government
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09NAIROBI823 | 2009-04-27 15:03 | 2011-03-02 22:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi |
VZCZCXRO9962
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #0823/01 1171531
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271531Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9325
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6513
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0116
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000823
SIPDIS
AF/E for SDriano
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KE
SUBJECT: Crisis in Coalition Government
REF: (A) Nairobi 744 (B) Nairobi 785
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHAEL E. RANNEBERGER REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) Summary: Although in mid-April meetings between President
Kibaki, Prime Minister Odinga, and their teams held out prospects to
resolve differences which had troubled the coalition, another serious
crisis threatens its existence. The crisis developed at the end of
last week when Prime Minister Raila Odinga objected to President
Kibaki's appointment of Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka as leader of
government business in the recently re-opened parliament. The
situation was exacerbated when Musyoka submitted a list of members of
Parliament to serve on the House Business Committee which sets
parliament's agenda, nominating himself as Chair. Odinga feels that
his position as equal partner in the Grand Coalition government
entitles him to both positions. This is a winner-take-all type of
fight because both positions are both highly symbolic and important.
I met with Speaker of Parliament Marende on April 27, and he said
that he will likely make a ruling that will not take the side of
either party. He will likely constitute the parliamentary business
committee, and let Parliament elect the head of the committee
(possibly Marende himself), and will avoid the question of who is
leader of government business. (The leader of government business
does not need to be the head of the parliamentary business
committee.) This will keep Parliament functioning while providing
more time for the two sides to work out the issue of who will be
leader of government business. I spoke to Kofi Annan on April 26,
and he is weighing in with Kibaki and Odinga to urge them to work
this out, and calling Marende to express support for this likely
ruling. Marende asked me to request Annan to urge Kibaki and Odinga
to respect whatever ruling Marende makes, and I am doing so. We will
be poised, along with other members of the international community,
to express support for the Speaker's likely ruling. Growing domestic
pressure on Kibaki and Odinga to sort out their differences, coupled
with encouragement from Annan, us, and others, will probably keep the
coalition together. That said, the two sides have demonstrated a
propensity to miscalculate, so the possibility of a walkout from
Parliament by either side cannot be ruled out. It is also possible
that, if the two sides do not pull back, the crisis could slide
toward the holding of new elections or a unilateral (but still
constitutionally legitimate) government involving only Kibaki, his
Party of National Unity, and Vice President Musyoka (who has a party
with only 14 Members of Parliament). Neither are viable options for
stable democratic government, so we must continue to keep the
coalition together while pressing for implementation of the reform
agenda. End summary.
¶2. (C) Ref A reported on the troubled state of the coalition
government and prospects for the reform process. Pressure on
President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga from the U.S., Kofi Annan,
and others in the international community coupled with growing
domestic Kenyan pressure influenced the two leaders to try and sort
out the coalition government issues. The Secretary's letter and the
earlier comments on Kenya by the President were crucial in
influencing the coalition partners (ref B). Kibaki, Odinga, and
their teams met in mid-April to work out a way forward. That meeting
seemed to lay the basis for a more effective working relationship
between the coalition partners. Kibaki and Odinga issued a joint
statement emphasizing the need for unity in the coalition government
and said all contentious issues were discussed. They indicated that
the terms and modalities of a recently formed coalition management
committee were agreed to. The statement further indicated that Kibaki
and Odinga had instructed their teams to prepare for their
consideration a draft document dealing with the contentious issues
(everything from consultation regarding executive appointments, to
the full range of the reform agenda). It was also agreed that each
ministry would be tasked with providing a status report on their
efforts to implement the reform agenda. Documents prepared for and
as a result of the meeting which we obtained indicate that there was
a frank discussion, including on the need to counter the "culture of
impunity," and regarding the two sides' differing interpretations of
the national accord which constituted the coalition government.
¶3. (C) Barely a week after this constructive meeting, the opening of
Parliament on April 21 triggered a profound crisis which threatens to
tear the coalition apart. The issues which triggered the crisis are
who will become leader of government business in the Parliament, and
who will chair the House Business Committee (HBC) which sets
Parliament's agenda. Vice President Musyoka sent a letter to Speaker
of Parliament Marende designating himself as leader of government
business. While there is no legal requirement that both positions be
held by the same person, the vice president has traditionally served
as both chair of the HBC and leader of government business, although
at one point ex-President Moi rotated it among government ministers.
Odinga sent a counter letter to Marende designating himself as leader
NAIROBI 00000823 002 OF 003
of government business. However, Musyoka's attempt to submit a slate
of MPs for the House Business Committee without consultation, and
which named him as Chair, further inflamed the situation. The HBC
sets the Parliament's agenda and thus is an extremely important
position. Odinga objected to this as an attempt by Musyoka to demean
Odinga's position as equal partner in the Grand Coalition government.
On April 23 there was a furious debate in Parliament over the
question. Marende then adjourned Parliament until April 28, and said
he would make a ruling on that day regarding the issue of how to
constitute the HBC. (Note: Until the HBC is constituted, Parliament
cannot conduct business. Thus important issues, such as discussion
of a supplementary budget and forming the Independent Interim
Electoral Commission can not move forward. End Note.)
¶4. (C) Since then there has been a flurry of private meetings and
public statements, all of which make clear that both sides are dug
into their positions. This has created a sense of crisis, since the
fate of the coalition government itself is potentially at stake.
Following meetings with his team on April 25, Kibaki sent a letter to
Marende stating that it is his decision, per the constitution, to
designate the leader of government business, that his decision is
final, and that he will not engage in further consultations regarding
the issue. On April 26 Odinga held a large rally in Kibera, a Nairobi
slum which is a key base of his support, and stated that he will not
back down. He stated that he will leave the coalition government and
insist on new elections if the issue is not resolved in his favor.
Leaders of Kibaki's side also publicly stated that they would not
back down.
¶5. (C) Just as both sides are responsible for the troubled state of
the coalition, both are responsible for setting up the current
crisis. Kibaki and Musyoka did not consult Odinga and his side
before they sent the letter designating Musyoka. Although the vice
president has often been the leader of government business, nothing
in the constitution or law states that he must be, and Musyoka was
not a party to the national accord which established the coalition.
He has played the role of spoiler, as we have previously reported.
This serves the purposes of those on the President's side who seek to
frustrate Odinga and limit his authority as Prime Minister.
Although, as we have reported, Odinga has not played his hand
particularly well within the coalition government, he has legitimate
grievances that his authority as Prime Minister has not been
respected and that the coalition is not functioning based on
consultation and power-sharing. Given this mounting frustration,
Odinga has decided to make a decisive stand over the issue of who
will become the leader of govrnment business. As he is Kibaki's
coalition partner (and Musyoka was not part of the agreement), and he
has the mandate "to coordinate" government business in the newly
created position of prime minister, he has a strong argument that he
should be leader of government business in Parliament. Even though
the mid-April meeting between Kibaki, Odinga, and their teams opened
the way potentially to sort out the coalition government issues,
Odinga feels that the issue of who will become leader of government
business is so important that he cannot afford to ignore it.
Moreover, in his view he has chosen a battleground which plays to his
advantage: he has a parliamentary majority, the Speaker was elected
by Odinga's party and so he is unlikely to rule against him, and by
staking out this issue Odinga unifies his Orange Democratic Movement
(ODM), which was increasingly fractured. Similarly, Kibaki's side
believes they have the decisive advantage of holding the legal and
constitutional high ground, given Kibaki's position as head of
government.
¶6. (C) Apart from the political issues, there are a number of
technical and legal issues involved. The National Accord, which
Kibaki and Odinga signed, gives Odinga as Prime Minister
responsibility to "coordinate and supervise the functions of
government." Article 23 of the constitution states that "the
executive authority of the Government of Kenya shall vest in the
President and, subject to this Constitution (which now incorporates
the position of Prime Minister), may be exercised by him either
directly or through officers subordinate to him." Attorney General
Wako, who is an ex-officio Member of Parliament and pro-Kibaki, may
provide a legal interpretation that Kibaki as head of government is
the only person authorized to name the leader of government business.
The Speaker, however, is not required to make his ruling based on the
Attorney General's opinion.
¶7. (C) Marende is on the hot seat. Since last year he has shown
himself to be a man of principle who has run Parliament in an
objective, non-partisan manner. Kibaki, Musyoka, and Odinga have set
up the crisis as a winner-take-all outcome, so there is little room
for compromise. Some are trying to persuade Musyoka to withdraw his
name as leader of government business in order to end the crisis, but
that seems unlikely. Some in the ODM see Odinga's move as designed
NAIROBI 00000823 003 OF 003
to force compromise on other issues; i.e. he backs off this issue in
return for Kibaki agreeing that Odinga can name a new commissioner of
police, or new judicial hierarchy, but this seems unlikely. Odinga
is taking a strong stand due both to the symbolic and actual
importance of the position of leader of government business.
¶8. (C) I met with Speaker Marende April 27 to discuss the way
forward. Marende said that, when the crisis developed at the end of
last week, he sought meetings with Kibaki and Odinga to try to work
out a compromise. Marende said that he would only meet with them
together. Odinga was willing to attend a tripartite meeting and
negotiate, but Kibaki refused. Marende said that, while he has not
made a final decision regarding his ruling to be given on April 28,
he will be guided by several considerations. First, the coalition
government must speak with one voice; he will indicate that it has
not done so. Second, his paramount consideration is to keep
Parliament functioning given the urgent need to implement the reform
agenda (as the Speaker declared in his opening address to Parliament,
per septel). Third, he will strike a balance between the two sides
in an effort to give them more time to work out a compromise.
Marende pointed out that he can constitute the business committee
while side-stepping the question of who is leader of government
business, since the head of the committee need not be the leader of
government business. It can be left to Parliament to choose the
leader of the business committee (roughly equivalent to the House
Rules Committee in the U.S. Congress). The Parliament could, he
indicated, choose to elect him, because both sides respect him as
impartial in running the Parliament and, per the Parliament's
standing orders, he is ex-officio head of all committees anyway. I
told Marende that this approach sounds reasonable. I said that we
would support him publicly if he rules along these lines, coordinate
with key diplomatic colleagues to do the same, and publicly and
privately urge both sides to respect it (and avoid a walkout by
either side).
¶9. (C) I spoke with Kofi Annan on April 26 to review the state of
play. Annan blamed both sides for provoking the crisis, although he
commented that "ODM is not wrong to think that in some cases they
have been short-changed with respect to the spirit and letter of the
accord." Annan said that he would try to talk with Kibaki and
Odinga, and I urged him to call Marende to help fortify the Speaker
to make a courageous and difficult ruling along the lines laid out
above. When I met Marende April 27, he asked me to request Annan to
call Kibaki and Odinga to urge them, in general terms, to support and
be prepared to cooperate with whatever ruling the Speaker makes,
given that both sides know that he (the Speaker) has the interests of
the nation at heart. I have conveyed this message to Annan. The
most constructive approach we can adopt at this point is to support
the Speaker's likely ruling, coordinate closely with Annan and the
international community to express support for it, and weigh in with
both sides to accept it. That approach will buy time and space for
the two sides to negotiate further regarding the leader of government
business. There is strong pressure coming from the Kenyan people for
Kibaki and Odinga to work out their differences, and we will
encourage and urge them to do so.
¶10. (C) Given that both sides have repeatedly demonstrated a
propensity to miscalculate, a walkout from Parliament by either side
cannot be ruled out. A walkout would paralyze business and heighten
a sense of crisis. That would undoubtedly increase calls for a new
election, which is not a viable option at this time given the lack of
electoral machinery and the continuing high ethnic tensions.
Ultimately, the parliamentarians do not want to risk their newly
gained seats and suffer the expense of a new election. A new
election thus seems unlikely, but again nothing should be ruled out