VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #1015/01 1511217
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 311217Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2022
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0089
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1642
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

S E C R E T SANAA 001015 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:MBLONG 
RIYADH FOR ASTEINFELD 
BAGHDAD FOR LGURIAN 

EO 12958 DECL: 05/30/2019 
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, YM 
SUBJECT: SALEH SEES FOREIGN HAND BEHIND YEMEN,S INTERNAL 
WOES

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary. During a 40-minute meeting at his residence in Taiz, President Saleh confirmed to D/D CIA Kappes his intention to permit Yemenis to enter the Saudi rehab program upon their release from Guantanamo, an issue that he said he will discuss King Abdullah during a visit to Riyadh on May 31. Saleh also ranked the threats to Yemen’s security in the following order: AQAP, the Houthi rebellion, and the Southern Movement, all of which he suggested were being driven by external forces. End Summary.

¶2. (S) D/D Kappes and his traveling party, accompanied by the Ambassador and PolMil chief, flew on May 28 to Taiz, some 200 km south of Sana’a, in a Yemeni Air Force M-171 helicopter, to meet with President Saleh at his quarters there. Saleh appeared relaxed, greeting his visitors in an open-collar white shirt and dark trousers. (Note: over Saleh’s left eye were visible the traces of a cut he suffered mid-May in a fall on the deck of the swimming pool at the Presidential Palace in Sana’a. End note.) After opening pleasantries, Saleh referred to the ongoing debate in the U.S. regarding the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, especially criticism of the plan to transfer some detainees into U.S. prisons, noting that “we have agreed to send Yemenis to Saudi Arabia.” Kappes said he understood POTUS was very grateful for Saleh’s support in this matter, and added that details of the prisoner transfer to Saudi Arabia were being worked out. Saleh said that he would discuss the issue with King Abdullah when he travelled to Riyadh on May 31. (Note: We understand that GCC foreign ministers also will meet in Riyadh next week and that, on the margins of that meeting, they will convene a separate session on Yemen, to which Foreign Minister Qirbi has been invited. End Note.)

¶3. (S) Saleh then noted what he characterized as an “agreement” by the Bush Administration to finance construction of an extremist rehabilitation facility in Yemen, the estimated cost of which is $11M. Saleh expressed his understanding that the Yemeni detainees would be placed first in the Saudi rehab program and then transferred home once the facility here was built and ready to receive them. Saleh also mentioned his “appointment with President Obama,” which he said the two had discussed during their recent phone call. As to the timing of this visit, Kappes suggested it was most likely that the invitation would be extended once the transfer of Yemeni detainees to KSA was underway. Saleh replied: “Send them all to Saudi Arabia now. They already have a facility.”

¶4. (S) Turning to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Kappes praised cooperation between U.S. and Yemeni intelligence agencies. He noted that the USG remains as determined as ever to destroy AQ worldwide, to which Saleh replied, “I hope this campaign continues and succeeds. We’re doing the same here. Our position is unshakable.” Kappes expressed concern that AQAP was targeting Saleh himself, a point Saleh agreed with, asserting that ROYG security services had recently arrested an individual they believe was going to fire a surface-to-air missile at the Presidential plane during a recent trip to Aden. (Comment. We hadn’t heard of this incident previously, although there were reports of plans to attack Saleh’s plane in a similar manner earlier this year as he prepared to depart Sana’a for Kuwait.  End Comment.)

¶5. (S) On current unrest in the south, Saleh asserted that “we are not that worried. This is not new. These are the same people who tried to break away in 1994. Then, even with an army and an air force, they failed. They will fail again without external assistance.” He noted that one difference now is that the secessionists are exploiting international media such as Arabic-language satellite channels Al Jazeera and Al Hurra. (Note: Saleh was referring to an interview with Haidar al-Attas, a former southern leader, that Al-Hurra aired earlier this month. End Note.) Kappes noted that U.S. policy in support of Yemen’s unity remains unchanged, and Saleh said that such support was “most important.” He asked that the U.S. pressure other countries to do the same, referring to the U.K. which, he said, is housing the movement’s leaders and providing them media access. “Leave the internal situation to us,” Saleh said. “We’ll handle it.” Asserting that the military option was a last resort, he said that the ROYG strategy will rally the voices of
southerners in support of unity, which he described as the majority of the population, as a counterweight to the minority in favor of independence. He also sought USG support for ROYG efforts to persuade GCC countries to permit Yemenis to enter their labor markets. “Our young people need jobs,” he said, especially if they are to be immunized against the lure of extremist ideology. (Comment. At a dinner for Kappes on Wednesday night, the Saudi Ambassador said that his embassy has issued 36,000 visas to Yemenis seeking work in KSA in the last two and one-half months. End Comment.)

¶6. (S) Kappes said that the latest economic figures from Yemen must be a cause for concern, a point Saleh didn’t dispute, characterizing the current economic situation as “very bad.” Kappes then asked Saleh to rank-order the threats to Yemen’s security, noting a conversation last fall when discussion focused on Al-Qaeda, the Houthi rebellion and southern unrest. Saleh initially said that all three were “on the same level,” then corrected himself to prioritize AQAP as the most severe threat, followed by the Houthis and then the situation in the south. “Even if we told the south tomorrow, ‘You are free to separate,’ they would turn around the next day and start to fight with each other,” he said, adding that such a lack of internal cohesion greatly diminished the risk to Yemen’s security. On the other hand, he said, AQAP terrorists prepared to detonate explosive vests pose a much greater risk to internal security, as does the Houthi rebellion, given the external support the ROYG insists it receives from Iran and Hizballah.

¶7. (S) Comment. Saleh’s decision to reverse himself and characterize AQAP as the most serious threat facing Yemen was almost certainly taken with his USG interlocutors in mind, as was, one suspects, his dismissal of the risk posed to his regime by the increasingly militant southern-independence movement. Nor was it coincidental that Saleh was quick to blame foreign powers for the nation’s woes. From the U.K., Qatar and Libya aiding the southerners, to Iran and Hizballah engineering the Houthi rebellion in the north, to an international terrorist conspiracy fueling AQAP’s growth, the implication is that Yemen is beset by forces that it will be hard-pressed to repel without substantial external support. This argument is, of course, also tailored to Saleh’s USG audience, and meant to elicit the necessary level of political, economic and military assistance to forestall Yemen’s collapse, and the negative effects it would have on regional stability and security. End Comment. SECHE