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Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE404, NETHERLANDS: WHA PDAS KELLY'S JUNE 25, 2009
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09THEHAGUE404 | 2009-07-07 13:01 | 2011-01-25 17:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXRO5216
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTC #0404/01 1881350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071350Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2995
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000404
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS: PREL NL BL NU CU VE
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: WHA PDAS KELLY'S JUNE 25, 2009
MEETING AT THE DUTCH MFA
THE HAGUE 00000404 001.2 OF 002
...
215474
2009-07-07
09THEHAGUE404
Embassy The Hague
CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000404
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS: PREL NL BL NU CU VE
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: WHA PDAS KELLY'S JUNE 25, 2009
MEETING AT THE DUTCH MFA
THE HAGUE 00000404 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Political Deputy Eric Falls for reasons 1.5 (b,d)
¶1. (U) June 25, 2009; 8:45 am; The Hague, Netherlands.
¶2. (U) Participants:
United States
-------------
Craig Kelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, WHA
Eric Falls (Embassy notetaker)
Netherlands
-----------
Laurent Stokvis, MFA Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Peter Potman, Chief, North American Affairs
Walter Oostelbos, Chief, South American Affairs
Jan Jaap Groenemeijer, Senior Policy Advisor
¶3. (U) Summary: In a cordial, 45 minute meeting, WHA
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Kelly and the Dutch MFA
Director Stokvis discussed Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia,
Venezuela, and other issues. The Dutch emphasized their
support for recent American efforts to expand dialogue with
Latin America.
Cuba
----
¶4. (C) PDAS Kelly noted the President,s message that there
exists a moment of opportunity for improving relations in the
Western hemisphere. The President has announced several
steps related to Cuba, and Cuba and the United States will
resume migration talks on July 14 in New York, the first such
talks in five years.
¶5. (C) Stokvis praised U.S. policy developments, noting it
was very important for the U.S. position in the hemisphere.
He added that the Helms-Burton Act creates a horrible
situation for companies facing EU action if they don't
participate in Cuba trade, and U.S. penalties if they do.
¶6. (C) Stokvis emphasized the EU,s strong support for
dialogue. In accordance with EU policy, the Dutch are trying
to have a dialogue, but Cuba wants a guarantee that there
will be no meetings between GONL officials and Cuban NGOs.
Again in accordance with EU policy, the Netherlands cannot
accept this precondition. Therefore, the bilateral dialogue
is blocked. Cuba is treated as a political issue -- human
rights is the primary thing for us -- as the Dutch do not
hold substantial economic interests in Cuba. Northern Europe
takes the same position as the Netherlands, but the Swedes
will have a difficult time managing diverging EU opinions
when they take on the EU presidency in July. In Cuba, policy
is unlikely to change while Fidel remains in power, and there
are unlikely to be any results on political prisoners.
Nicaragua
---------
¶7. (C) Kelly stated the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) follows established governance indicators, and the MCC
cut support to Nicaragua due to the problems with the
municipal elections. President Ortega is following President
Chavez,s playbook of blaming the United States for various
internal problems. As a result, U.S. embassies in a few
countries are trying to engage with all sectors despite host
government pressure to self-censor and avoid a whole range
of normal activities.
¶8. (C) Stokvis said that while the Netherlands has been a
long-time donor in Nicaragua, the Dutch cut budget support to
the GON after the recent voting fraud and FM Santos,s
refusal to offer guarantees to support democratic reform.
The Dutch froze 6 million euros in budget support in 2008,
and 12 million euros in 2009. The Dutch are concerned that
while they have worked to move the EU to cut budget support,
international financial institutions continue to assist the
GON. However, Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation
Koenders does not intend to raise this issue publicly, but
will instead push the issue quietly in order to maintain
influence in Nicaragua.
Bolivia
-------
¶9. (C) Stokvis said that the Dutch give 42 million euros
Q9. (C) Stokvis said that the Dutch give 42 million euros
annually toward Bolivian development, with total, lifetime
contributions near 1 billion euros. However, while they have
good relations with Bolivia, it does not mean that they are
able to influence President Morales. Regarding U.S.
THE HAGUE 00000404 002.2 OF 002
relations, the Dutch support recent U.S. overtures to Bolivia
as the (best) way forward. The GOB MFA Director General
told the Dutch he was not happy being at loggerheads with the
Americans, but the Dutch believe nonetheless that there is
deep GOB resistance to closer bilateral relations.
Regarding counterdrug efforts, the Dutch believe DEA can be
heavy-handed, but the EU cannot and does not want to replace
U.S. programs. Stokvis urged the return of a U.S. ambassador
to Bolivia, though the United States should move slowly and
carefully.
¶10. (C) Kelly responded that the United States would welcome
Brazil-EU-U.S. cooperation on this issue. Brazil is keenly
interested in Bolivia to ensure gas supplies for Sao Paolo
and limit drug trafficking. There will be a private USG-GOB
dialogue on June 29-30. (Note: The meeting was subsequently
pushed back. End note.) It is positive that President
Morales appears uneasy about growing drug trafficking in
Bolivia and does not appear to want to lead a narco-state.
More troubling is the fact that Mexican cartels may be moving
south. (Note: Oostelbos agreed, noting that he had heard
from Peruvian officials that they are concerned about the
presence of Mexican cartels. End note.) Kelly encouraged EU
messages of concern about the drug trafficking.
Venezuela
---------
¶11. (C) Stokvis began stating, we look carefully at
Venezuela because it is a neighboring country to the
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, which are part of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands. Venezuela sees the Netherlands Antilles
as an unsinkable U.S. aircraft carrier. The Dutch
regularly explain to the GOV that U.S. ship visits to Curacao
are not a threat, but there still exists a certain suspicion
from time to time. (Note: Stokvis added that the Dutch
look carefully at U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier clearances,
but otherwise offer automatic clearance to U.S. ships. End
Note.) As a general rule, the Dutch want to maintain good
relations. For example, the Dutch have ongoing contracts to
upgrade the Curacao oil refinery, which is leased by
Venezuela,s petroleum company, PVDSA. Good relations are
also important for tourism -- for example, visitors to
Willemstad buy Venezuelan goods. There is practical
cooperation between the GONL and GOV on counternarcotics.
Nonetheless, it is proving to be exceptionally difficult to
get into discussions with the GOV. Within Venezuela, the
economic difficulties are getting worse, particularly with
ongoing nationalizations. Poverty and medical care are so
problematic that even the basic care provided by Cuban
doctors is well received. It is clear Chavez is becoming
more autocratic and will stay a long time, although human
rights in Venezuela are not bad. Although the Dutch have
increasing worries about Venezuela, they continue to seek
opportunities for dialogue.
¶12. (C) Kelly responded that Washington will send Ambassador
Duddy back to Caracas, and that Washington was also looking
for opportunities for dialogue. At the same time, we will
make our principles clear, for example on freedom of
expression. The opposition party Mayor of Caracas has been
completely undercut by Chavez, who has restricted the
mayor,s authority so that he cannot even manage the city,s
firefighters. The mayor said that the U.S. statements on
freedom of the press were well received.
Other Issues
------------
¶13. (C) Stokvis said the GONL-USG agreements on Forward
Operating Locations in the Caribbean will be extended,
QOperating Locations in the Caribbean will be extended,
although the MFA prefers to leave the renewal process as it
is because parliament will otherwise ask questions and raise
tensions with Venezuela.
¶14. (C) Stokvis requested that the United States share
information on the pathways to prosperity initiative, and
Kelly promised to follow up. Kelly added the United States
intends to host a fall event on female entrepreneurs in Latin
America and would like to get the EU involved.
¶15. (U) This cable was cleared by PDAS Kelly.
GALLAGHER