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FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5078
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0018
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0007
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1506
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0844
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0966
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0909
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5617

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000602 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NEASA (CHARRIS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/27/2019 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL LY
SUBJECT: UN WRAPS UP HUMAN RIGHTS CONTACT GROUP WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT GAINS 

REF: A. TRIPOLI 34 B. 07 TRIPOLI 759 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) Summary: UN officials recently completed a series of five meetings with prominent quasi-nongovernmental organizations in Tripoli focused on raising awareness of basic human and civil rights while building capacity for the organizations. The organizations, all chaired by people close to the al-Qadhafi inner circle, have been key proponents of Libya's fitful politico-economic reform program. The organizations owe their existence to al-Qadhafi and are constrained by his "red lines", but some NGO-led attempts at fostering reform have met with failure due to lack of institutional expertise and capacity. UN officials see the successful completion of the series as an outcome in itself. They reported that participants concluded that awareness of human and civil rights was nearly non-existent in Libya and, critically, that the organizations had no government counterpart with whom to implement improvements. The nine-month contact group is unlikely to develop further in the short term: the UN is losing its two prime interlocutors to new postings and the role of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi -- a key enabler of civil society organizations -- is less certain than when the group formed in September 2008. End Summary.

CHARITY ORGANIZATIONS DOMINATED BY REGIME INSIDERS

2.(C) xxxxxxxxxxxx Charity groups -- the regime-approved nomenclature for NGOs -- require direct approval by the Prime Minister-equivalent to form. As such, they are led by people close to the al-Qadhafi inner circle: al-Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam chairs the Qadhafi Development Foundation; Aisha al-Qadhafi, the Leader's daughter, chairs the Waatesimu Foundation; Mohammad Kusa, brother of Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, runs the Organization of Youth for Voluntary Works; and Khaled al-Humeidi, director of the International Organization for Peace, Care, and Relief, serves as a personal aide to al-Qadhafi and is reportedly close with both Saif and Muatassim al-Qadhafi. These groups were joined by Hosni al-Waheish from the General People's Congress' Human Rights Committee and representatives from the World Islamic Call Society at the roundtable discussions that were held quietly without press or diplomatic observers.

3.(C) xxxxxxxxxxxx reported that all members of the group agreed that implementing human rights programming and dialogue between the GOL and actors like the US and EU would be hampered in the short term by a general lack of awareness of human rights issues by both GOL officials and the Libyan public. Representatives reportedly complained that several initiatives had been stalled by a lack of government interlocutors to establish modalities for implementing humanitarian and reform programs. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, the groups' closeness to the regime affords them more space to carry out "benign" programs and provides the government assurance that so-called "red lines" outlined in ref B -- Islamic traditions, Libya's security and stability, territorial integrity, and the primacy Muammar al-Qadhafi -- are not threatened.

4.(C) According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, organizing the group and developing the high-level contacts through sustained dialogue is seen as a successful outcome in itself. However, other goals such as delineating areas of responsibility between different charity groups and normalizing interaction between international non-governmental organizations and the GOL remain outstanding. While the UN hopes to continue the dialogue, xxxxxxxxxxxx recognized that their measured success had been based on the personal relationships that xxxxxxxxxxxx had leveraged to begin the conversation. xxxxxxxxxxxx He predicted that Libya would frustrate Western interlocutors because Libya is only prepared to engage at the symbolic level but noted that passing symbolic milestones before attempting broader talks was a necessary exercise with Libyan officials.

5.(C) Comment: xxxxxxxxxxxx were able to develop excellent contacts within Libya's small but growing civil society community in part due to their organizational affiliation. The UN is viewed by the GOL as less threatening than bilateral engagement and is able to build relationships by implementing programs with the proto-NGOs as side-by-side TRIPOLI 00000602 002 OF 002 partnerships vice the contracted partner model Western governments prefer. Their limited success, however, is more evidence that some dissention remains between hard-line regime members and more reform-minded actors as to how open Libya should be with the West, particularly in sensitive issues like political reform and human rights. With xxxxxxxxxxxx departing post, the UN is left without leaders with political saavy and understanding of the strictures of the Jamahiriya and will likely see a slowing of direct engagement on human rights. End Comment. CRETZ