Cable Viewer

The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BUJUMBURA378.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09BUJUMBURA378	2009-08-07 14:02	2011-02-01 21:09	SECRET	Embassy Bujumbura

VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJB #0378 2191419
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 071419Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1635
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000378 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/WMDT AND PM/ISO/PMAT; LONDON, PARIS, PLEASE 
PASS TO AFRICA WATCHERS, ADDIS PLEASE PASS TO AU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2019 
TAGS: ASEC KCRM KNNP MNUC PARM PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: A. STATE 75013 B. BUJUMBURA 00302 Classified By: CDA Charles Twining for reasons 1.4 (b) (d).

1.(S/NF) Summary: Per reference A, Post has coordinated with relevant Department of Defense (DoD) entities to determine the nature of suspected nuclear material in Burundi. The DoD Technical Collection Team (TCT) completed its survey on 8/6/2009 and determined there were no radiological emanations from the suspect container, but were unable to open it to determine its actual contents. Following the survey, the Burundian Intelligence Service (SNR) refused to turn over the container, contradicting their original agreement to do so.

¶2. (S/NF) The TCT used an "ORTEC EX Identifinder," a high-purity germanium and silicon detector, and a "Thermo-Scientific identiFINDER," a hand-held gamma spectrometer, for the detection of radiological emanations from the container. A "Niton Alloy Analyzer" was used to characterize the container. The TCT did not identify any radiological spectra emanating from the container. The Niton identified the container as steel.

¶3. (S/NF) The TCT attempted to access the top of the container, but was unable to remove the sealant covering the opening. Due to the unknown nature of any contents, the team chose not to cut or otherwise force open the canister on-site. Therefore, the TCT was unable to determine its actual contents, if any.

¶3. (S/NF) Following the assessment, the SNR refused to relinquish the container. This refusal contradicts the SNR's written request for assistance in the matter, which states the SNR is prepared to turn the object over for disposal. Post will continue to press the SNR to release the container to US authorities.

3.(SBU) Current action officer at Post for this matter is DAO OPSCO CMSgt Tom Moriarty, at IVG 472-7209. Twining

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Viewing cable 09BUJUMBURA378, NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: A. STATE 75013 B. BUJUMBURA 00302 Classified By: CDA Charles Twining for reasons 1.4 (b) (d).