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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0559/01 2571036
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141036Z SEP 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4755
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL PRIORITY
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA PRIORITY 0142
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUEHKG/USDAO KINGSTON JM PRIORITY

S E C R E T HAVANA 000559 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2029 
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S. 
OFFER OF POST-HURRICANE ASSISTANCE 

REF: HAVANA 500 & 511 

Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIAMS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: On 3 September 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard 
Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the U.S. 
Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba, engaged in a 
candid conversation with a Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MINREX) official who provided insight into the possible 
Government of Cuba (GOC) response to any USG offers of 
post-hurricane assistance to the GOC. End Summary. 

¶2. (S/NF) A MINREX officer ("officer") in the Ministry's 
North American Division, Rodney, who attends repatriations 
somewhat infrequently (DIS has had contact with this official 
on approximately 5 occasions- USINT consular officers have 
also met this officer on other occasions while attending 
repatriations), exchanged pleasantries with the DIS at the 
outset of the repatriation. During the boat ride to the 
receiving pier, the officer almost immediately directed the 
conversation towards what seemed to be a pre-planned 
discussion. Offering up the usual &in my personal opinion8 
while placing a firm hand on his chest and gesturing towards 
himself, the officer stated: "I have been reading a lot of 
U.S. press reports about possible U.S. hurricane assistance 
and I think the GOC would be willing to accept that 
assistance." DIS stated to the officer that that approach 
would be different than last year's GOC response to the 
multiple USG offers of post-hurricane assistance. The 
officer went on to say that "(political) conditions this year 
are very different than they were last year this time," an 
apparent reference to the recent re-establishment of USINT 
access to MINREX (reftels). 

¶3. (S/NF) DIS stated to the officer that it was common and 
prudent practice to offer a disaster assistance response team 
(DART) to locations following natural disasters to assess the 
damage and the necessary level and type of assistance. The 
officer responded by saying that: "the level of damage to 
Cuba during last year's hurricane season was evident and the 
team was a precondition to providing post-hurricane 
assistance to Cuba; the U.S. should not impose preconditions 
and should allow the GOC to determine how assistance is 
used." In turn, the DIS responded that the USG is not in the 
business of writing blank checks to foreign governments to 
which the officer seemed to be at a loss for words. The 
officer and the DIS cordially agreed that this was an 
ideological difference between both nations, and agreed that 
while neither of us wanted to see any hurricane affect Cuba, 
should the opportunity arise for the USG to offer hurricane 
assistance to the GOC, it would be interesting to see how the 
scenario unfolds. 

¶4. (S/NF) This officer is a young (29 years old), cordial, 
well-spoken MINREX officer who utilizes repatriations as an 
opportunity to practice what might already be considered 
polished English. He studied economics, is well versed in 
international political ideology, and appears to be a 
voracious reader. Like his more senior MINREX counterparts, 
he makes a point during each repatriation to discuss recent 
U.S. press reporting relative to U.S.-Cuba relations, and 
uses each repatriation as an opportunity to elicit a response 
from the DIS on a wide scope of U.S.-Cuban matters, always 
under the guise of being a personal opinion or interest. He 
does not balk when given the chance to prop-up and support 
the tenets of the Cuban revolution, and especially, in his 
government's opinion, the harsh treatment the USG has 
afforded the Cuban people throughout the course of the 
revolution. He is able to support and speak to the major GOC 
talking points (i.e. the embargo, Cuban-Americans, etc.), and 
is likely to rise in the GOC. 

¶5. (S/NF) Comment: Yet again, MINREX has utilized the DIS and 
the repatriation process as a forum to air out a current GOC 

focus, and float the idea by a U.S. officer who the GOC is 
aware works in the political-economic section at USINT. The 
typical "this is my opinion" approach from this MINREX 
officer is an opening gesture, whereafter he and each MINREX 
officer then communicates a willingness, need, or current 
focus of the GOC that they have decided to communicate to the 
Mission and USG at large. This may well be a concerted 
effort on the part of MINREX to engage in one-on-one 
communication, at a relatively low-level, as a circuitous 
approach to GOC-U.S. communications in lieu of direct or 
over-publicized talks. By communicating in this manner, the 
GOC can communicate with the USG, in this case over the issue 
of hurricane assistance, and still maintain its public image 
and propaganda campaign that lambaste the USG for its 
approach towards Cuba. Interestingly, DIS cannot recall any 
recent press reporting having to do with possible 
post-hurricane assistance to Cuba. 

(S/NF) Further Comment: DIS was extremely surprised by the 
hurricane assistance-related comments made by the MINREX 
officer. Having spent a significant amount of time working 
and traveling with Cuban MININT and MINREX officers over the 
past year, Cubans are extremely proud people, and almost 
never admit that there is a flaw in their system, even when 
the flaw is a glaring one. For a MINREX officer to admit 
that his country may be willing to accept assistance from the 
U.S. should a hurricane ravage this island again, ventures 
well beyond the perceived pride level of GOC officials. More 
than anything, the GOC does not like to be embarrassed, and 
taking handouts from the USG may well be a point of 
embarrassment for the GOC should they choose to accept. As 
such, any genuine post-hurricane assistance offer should be 
extended quietly; however, the USG should be wary that the 
GOC may be expecting a blank check, not a calculated offer of 
pragmatic post-hurricane assistance. End Comment. 
WILLIAMS