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INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7922

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 100957 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BR HO OAS CR
SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 22 MEETING CONVENED BY OAS SG INSULZA ON HONDURAS 
Classified By: WHA A/S Thomas A. Shannon. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) 

¶1. Classified by WHA A/S Thomas A. Shannon. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) 

¶2. (U) September 22, 2009; 16:00; New York, USA. 

¶3. (U) Participants: U.S. WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon USUN Special Advisor Ron Godard Barbara Rocha (Notetaker) Other OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim Brazilian Ambassador Antonio Patriota Representatives from Costa Rica, Mexico and other countries in the region 

¶4. (C) SUMMARY. OAS Secretary General Insulza convened a meeting at the Brazilian Mission to the UN to discuss the situation in Honduras. Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim summarized the previous day,s events around President Zelaya,s return to Honduras and refuge at the Brazilian embassy. He expressed concern about a potential invasion of the Brazilian embassy and asked for international support to deter this immediate threat to peace. Amorim said Zelaya,s return to Honduras was a new, important development that could &unblock8 the situation. Insulza called for an immediate international mission. END SUMMARY. 

--------------- Zelaya,s Return --------------- 

¶5. (C) Brazilian FM Amorim offered a recap of the previous day,s events, which he said the press had inaccurately portrayed. He said that between noon and 1:00 p.m., the Brazilian charge d,affaires in Tegucigalpa called and said that the Central American Parliament president had asked if the Embassy would receive Mrs. Zelaya. The charge was instructed by Brasilia to receive her. Shortly thereafter, the charge called again with the same question for Manuel Zelaya, and was instructed to receive him as well. 

¶6. (C) Amorim said Zelaya called him to say that he is committed to a peaceful approach and ask for permission to use the Brazilian embassy as a base for dialogue, which Amorim granted. Amorim relayed his call with Secretary Clinton, who insisted on the importance of Zelaya maintaining a peaceful approach. Amorim also relayed President Lula,s plea to Zelaya for calm and no provocations. Amorim said he had reviewed Zelaya,s statements in the press and the only phrase that could be seen as provocative was &patria, restitucion, o muerte.

8 ------------------------------------ Concerns about the Vienna Convention ------------------------------------ 

¶7. (C) The Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa received a note from the de facto government charging that Brazil would be &directly responsible8 for any violence that ensued as a result of provocation coming from the embassy. Brazil did not respond because it does not recognize the Micheletti government but is concerned about the tone of the note. Copies were distributed. 

¶8. (C) Amorim reported a rumor that the Honduran Supreme Court would hold a special session that evening to suspend the Vienna Convention, allowing the de factos to arrest Zelaya at the Brazilian embassy. He thanked the United States for our statement calling on the de facto government to uphold the Vienna Convention. While recognizing that the OAS remains the forum for political discussions on Honduras, Amorim said Brazil would call for a Security Council session to address this immediate threat to peace. He requested U.S. support as president of the Security Council. 

------------------------------ Current Conditions, Next Steps  ------------------------------ 

¶9. (C) A/S Shannon reported that Ambassador Llorens had already sent a message to Secretary Clinton describing the situation as worrisome. He said the Ambassador was engaging with de facto leaders to allow for food, water and electricity. A/S Shannon reported on his meeting with FM Patricia Rodas earlier that afternoon, during which he spoke to Zelaya by phone and confirmed that food and water had begun to arrive at the embassy. 

¶10. (C) OAS SYG Insulza stressed the need for an international mission immediately. A/S Shannon expressed support for a mission to facilitate dialogue and send a strong signal to the de facto government to comply with its international obligations to respect the inviolability of diplomatic premises and personnel. 

¶11. (C) The Costa Rican official noted that de facto officials complain the San Jose Accord does not have enough &teeth8 to restrain Zelaya upon his return to power. He suggested defining the verification commission and transition to power in detail would help advance a peaceful resolution. He also noted that Zelaya,s ongoing comments about the constituent assembly and extending his term to make up for lost days were unhelpful. 

¶12. (C) Amorim asserted that this crisis must be resolved quickly and peacefully, and while the issues raised by the Costa Rican official should be taken into account, they should not stall the process. Amorim said Zelaya,s return to Honduras was a new, important development that could &unblock8 the situation. All agreed to remain in close communication while monitoring the situation closely. 

CLINTON