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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 096550 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2014 
TAGS: EZ MARR PREL
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: POTUS EUROPEAN-BASED MISSILE 
DEFENSE DECISION (CORRECTED COPY OF STATE 96519) 
 
REF: STATE 96526 
 
Classified By: T U/S Ellen O. Tauscher for Reasons 1.4 a,b,and d. 
 
¶1. (U) (THIS CORRECTED COPY PROPERLY REFERENCES STATE 96526.) 
 This is an ACTION REQUEST.  Please see paragraph 3.  ALL 
MATERIALS IN THIS CABLE ARE TO BE EMBARGOED FROM DELIVERY TO 
HOST GOVERNMENTS UNTIL 25 MINUTES PRIOR TO A PRESIDENTIAL 
STATEMENT RELEASED ON SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 AT 9:55 A.M. 
(EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME - WASHINGTON, D.C.). 
 
¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The White House is expected to announce 
a Presidential decision at approximately 9:55 
a.m.(Washington, D.C.) on September 17 regarding a U.S. 
European-based BMD adaptive regional architecture, which is 
significantly different from the Bush Administration's plan 
to deploy 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and a BMD 
tracking radar in the Czech Republic. END BACKGROUND. 
 
¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Addressee Posts are instructed to 
deliver the talking points to Host Governments in paragraph 4 
on Thursday, September 17, as a non-paper, but no earlier 
than 9:30 a.m. (Easter Daylight Time - Washington, D.C.). 
USNATO, Embassies in NATO Capitals (except for Embassies 
Warsaw and Prague), Embassy Tokyo, Embassy Moscow, and 
Embassies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates) are instructed also to deliver the tailored talking 
points for NATO, Japan, Russia, and the GCC States in 
paragraphs 5-8. Action Request addressees should attempt to 
provide pre-notifications immediately prior to the public 
announcement of the Presidential decision but not before 9:30 
a.m. EDT; with the different time zones involved, Washington 
recognizes that some notifications may not occur until after 
the White House public announcement.  Posts may draw upon the 
Questions and Answers to be provided reftel for use with Host 
Governments on an "if asked" basis, or as Posts determine is 
appropriate.  The Questions and Answers in reftel may be 
drawn upon by Posts but should not/not be handed over to Host 
Governments.  Materials for public diplomacy (e.g., Fact 
Sheet, Questions and Answers, and POTUS Statement) will be 
provided to Posts septel.  Posts please notify the Department 
regarding date of delivery, recipients, and reaction, if any. 
 END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
¶4. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS: 
 
U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY - EUROPEAN DECISION 
 
- The White House announced that the President has approved 
Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's unanimous 
recommendation for improved missile defenses in Europe 
against the threat from Iran to our forces and families 
deployed to the region and to our Allies. 
 
- Iran already has hundreds of ballistic missiles that can 
threaten its neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey, and the 
Caucasus and it is actively developing and testing ballistic 
missiles that can reach more and more of Europe. 
-- Our concern regarding Iranian missile capabilities is 
further increased by the fact that our Intelligence Community 
continues to assess that Iran, at a minimum, is keeping open 
the option to develop nuclear weapons. 
 
- The new "Phased, Adaptive Approach" recommended by 
Secretary Gates updates and revises the previous program for 
missile defense in Europe based on two key findings of the 
DoD review: 
-- First, the threat from Iran's regional ballistic missiles 
has developed more rapidly than previously expected.  At the 
same time, the threat from potential Iranian intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has been slower to develop than we 
 
STATE 00096550  002 OF 006 
 
 
previously expected. 
-- Second, our missile defense capabilities and technologies 
have advanced significantly.  Improved interceptor 
capabilities, such as the currently deployed Standard 
Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and advanced variants that are 
already in development, permit a more flexible and capable 
architecture. 
 
- Therefore, the President has approved a Phased, Adaptive 
Approach that is responsive to the current threat, but also 
can incorporate new technologies quickly and cost-effectively 
to adapt as the threat and our technologies continue to 
change.  It will unfold in phases: 
-- The first phase will speed protection of U.S. deployed 
forces, civilians, and families and our Allies in Europe 
against the current threat from Iran by deploying proven 
systems by 2011 ) about six or seven years earlier than the 
previous program. 
-- Subsequent phases will add advanced variant sea- and 
land-based versions of the SM-3 and cover additional 
territory in Europe should the Iranian threat expand. 
-- In the fourth and final phase we will anticipate 
augmenting our existing capabilities to defend the United 
States against potential advances in Iran's ICBM capability 
with advanced versions of the SM-3.  This would be a similar 
capability to that provided in the program of record. 
 
- This improved approach removes the need for a Ground Based 
Interceptor field in Poland and features a distributed 
interceptor and sensor architecture that does not require the 
single large, fixed radar originally planned to be located in 
the Czech Republic. 
-- Under the new approach, land- and sea-based missile 
defense interceptors and sensors offer some flexibility to be 
redeployed as the regional ballistic missile threat dictates. 
 This distributed network approach also will increase the 
survivability of the system and provide more opportunities 
for collaboration with Allies and partners. 
-- We are beginning consultations with Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and other Allies on the new approach, and will work 
with our NATO Allies on determining locations for the sensors 
and interceptors, and on integrating the Phased, Adaptive 
Approach with their missile defense capabilities and with the 
emerging NATO command and control network. 
 
- Strong missile defenses will strengthen our efforts to find 
a solution that brings Iran into compliance with its 
international obligations: the more we can diminish the 
coercive value of Iran's missiles, the less Iran stands to 
gain by continuing to develop these destabilizing 
capabilities. 
 
- This set of recommendations comes from an ongoing 
Congressionally-mandated review that is taking a 
comprehensive examination of our global approach to missile 
defense and is consistent with the Defense Department's 
budget choices for fiscal year 2010: 
-- For example, we added additional funding to field more 
systems such as Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 interceptors. 
 
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS. 
 
¶5. (S/REL NATO) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR USNATO AND 
EMBASSIES IN NATO CAPITALS (TALKING POINTS BELOW SHOULD BE 
USED FOR ALL NATO CAPITALS EXCEPT FOR POLAND AND THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC; WARSAW AND PRAGUE WILL RECEIVE SEPARATE TAILORED 
TALKING POINTS TO BE DELIVERED ON SEPTEMBER 17 BY THE 
FLOURNOY-TAUSCHER DELEGATION): 
 
GENERAL 
 
- NATO leaders have all agreed that ballistic missile 
proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, 
territory, and populations. 
 
- As a result, NATO has noted the significant contribution to 
Alliance security by those Allies who possess, or are 
 
STATE 00096550  003 OF 006 
 
 
acquiring, missile defense capabilities. 
 
- At the 2008 Summit, NATO leaders agreed to consider options 
for a NATO missile defense system that would cover all 
remaining areas of Allied populations and territory.  To 
date, those efforts have focused on missile defense systems 
to protect deployed forces from shorter-range ballistic 
missile threats. 
 
- At the 2009 NATO summit, Heads of State and Government 
tasked experts to examine the potential expansion of the 
ALTBMD program ) which is designed to be the command and 
control "backbone" for theater missile defense for deployed 
forces. 
 
- The United States now proposes a "Phased Adaptive 
Approach," which will reinforce and strengthen on-going NATO 
efforts.  Specifically, we believe that the Phased Adaptive 
Approach is fully supportive of the decision to pursue 
options for a complementary NATO-wide multi-layered BMD 
architecture, which currently is envisioned to use NATO's 
command and control backbone architecture.  This is a 
flexible and cost-effective approach that leverages proven 
technologies against a known threat. 
 
- Most importantly, the Phased Adaptive Approach is designed 
to work in concert with Allied efforts to provide protection 
against ballistic missile attack for all NATO Allies, 
reflecting the Alliance principle of indivisibility of 
security. 
 
- The Phased Adaptive Approach will provide our most proven 
and operational missile defense capabilities in the 
near-term, defending Allied territory sooner against the 
current Iranian threat. 
 
- U.S. missile defense efforts will of course be fully 
interoperable with those of NATO. 
 
- We propose that -- subsequent to Alliance discussions and 
follow-on briefings in greater detail -- the Alliance examine 
how we can integrate the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach with 
NATO missile defense.  This can be discussed further at the 
upcoming defense ministerial in Bratislava. 
 
- The Phased Adaptive Approach would serve to greatly 
strengthen NATO's missile defense capabilities in the face of 
a growing threat to Alliance security. 
 
- We look forward to engaging the Alliance in political and 
technical discussions in the weeks ahead. 
 
FINANCING (if raised) 
- We will work closely with Allies to examine broader 
resourcing requirements for defense of Allied forces, 
territories and populations, including the integration of our 
Phased Adaptive Approach. 
 
ROLE FOR NATO MEMBERS 
- We have already consulted with the two Allies that had 
agreed to host missile defense assets under the previous 
plan.  I want to reiterate that we are deeply appreciative of 
their readiness to take difficult political decisions to 
respond to the need to better protect allied territories and 
populations against the threat of ballistic missiles. 
 
- We intend to engage in active consultations at NATO on the 
best way forward. 
 
- The "Phased Adaptive Approach" is flexible and could be 
integrated into a NATO territorial missile defense system. 
There will be a requirement for Allies to host the sensors 
and interceptors to be included in the Phased Adaptive 
Approach.   There are many possibilities, and we look forward 
to continuing our NATO consultations. 
 
- If pressed:  At this time, I would prefer not to get into 
 
STATE 00096550  004 OF 006 
 
 
specific issues related to potential Host Nations.    We have 
many options in this flexible architecture ) sea- and 
land-based, northern and southern Europe.  We intend to 
engage soon at NATO with Allies on those questions. 
 
- We expect that Allied national systems or current NATO 
systems will be able to integrate well with the overall 
phased approach. 
 
- Allied contributions can be interoperable with the Phased 
Approach missile defense architecture to ensure they form a 
cost-effective and comprehensive architecture. 
 
GROUND BASED INTERCEPTORS 
- If needed:  The U.S. will continue to develop the GBI 
technology for CONUS defense because domestically it remains 
a cost-effective option. However, we have no plans to pursue 
GBIs in Europe given the promise and track record of SM-3 
technology. 
 
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR NATO. 
 
¶6. (C/REL RUSSIA)  BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR RUSSIA: 
 
- The President's missile defense in Europe decision will 
publicly be announced at 10:00 a.m. Washington, D.C. time. 
The  National Security Advisor, General Jones, will be 
delivering a similar message to Ambassador Kislyak before the 
announcement. 
 
- The decision is the result of a long review process; new 
information on the Iranian ballistic missile program drove 
the decision. 
 
- Iran has made more progress on short-range and medium-range 
ballistic missiles, and less progress on ICBMs than 
anticipated. Now the threat is greater to the Middle East and 
to Europe, with a less immediate threat to the United States. 
 
- We do not plan to deploy GBIs in Poland and we will not 
base the European Mid-Course radar in the Czech Republic. 
Instead, there will be an adaptive, phased approach. 
 
- We believe that Iran plans to deploy hundreds of these 
short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles.  Our old 
plan was designed to intercept only small numbers of ICBMs. 
 
- There is no doubt that Iran is developing these missiles to 
arm them with a nuclear warhead.  There is NO OTHER REASON to 
spend so much time and effort into developing these missiles. 
 They are not useful weapons if only armed with a 
conventional warhead. 
 
- The new plan for European missile defense is better 
designed to protect Europe from this Iranian threat that is 
emerging.  We intend to deploy the SM-3 interceptor which is 
what we are deploying in the Middle East as well.  SM-3s do 
not have the capability to threaten Russian ICBMs. 
 
- In the first stages of deployment, we also are seeking to 
place these interceptors closer to Iran (from what I 
understand, this is exactly the idea that President Putin 
proposed to President Bush during their July 2007 meeting at 
Kennebunkport, Maine). 
 
- The new plan calls for radars and detection systems to be 
deployed closer to Iran.  These radars will not have the 
capacity to track Russian ICBMs. 
 
- With this decision behind us, we now want to move 
aggressively to launch serious cooperation on missile defense 
with Russia. 
 
- As the President said during his meeting with President 
Medvedev in April, we want to begin by standing up the Joint 
Data Exchange Center (JDEC).  The hope is to share data from 
our respective early-warning systems. 
 
STATE 00096550  005 OF 006 
 
 
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR RUSSIA. 
 
¶7. (C/REL JAPAN) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR JAPAN: 
 
- The U.S. greatly appreciates Japan's partnership in BMD; we 
remain deeply committed to strengthening regional BMD 
capabilities including operational cooperation, joint 
research, and co-development. 
 
- Recent North Korean provocations serve as a reminder of the 
importance of our cooperative missile defense efforts, which 
help underpin a strong U.S.-Japan Alliance and contribute to 
regional stability. 
 
- We remain committed to an effective defense of the U.S. and 
our Allies against rogue ballistic missile threats, including 
North Korea and, if it continues down its current path, Iran. 
 
 
- As you are aware, the BMD Review has undertaken a 
comprehensive examination of our approach to missile 
defenses, including an in-depth look at our approach to 
European missile defense and in other regions around the 
world. 
-- USG discussions with the MOD and MOFA over the last 
several months made clear that you have particular interest 
in the European missile defense analysis -- we understand 
these strategic decisions have an impact in the Asia-Pacific 
region and want to make sure you are fully informed of our 
results. 
-- Throughout the review process the U.S. recognized and 
factored in Japanese concerns/equities especially those 
related to our on-going discussions with the Russian 
Federation. 
 
- Although the BMD Review report is not due to Congress until 
this January, we have already reached some important 
conclusions.  We have decided to move forward with discussing 
results now so we do not delay deploying improved defenses 
for ourselves or our allies. 
 
OTHER CONSULTATIONS 
 
- We would like to explain the President's decision to you 
before our public announcement and before we speak with 
Russia.  We are discussing this new European approach with 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and NATO, as we speak. 
-- As a close and trusted ally, we consider it important to 
share this information with you.  However, in light of past 
problems with information security, we must insist that you 
take every precaution to ensure that this information will 
not be leaked.  Any leaks would have significant implications 
for our European missile defense approach, and would be 
damaging to our bilateral relationship.  Should there be a 
security breach elsewhere, it is important that our 
governments not officially confirm leaked information if it 
appears in the media before official release by the U.S. 
Government. 
 
THE PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH 
 
- As you have seen, the new plan for European missile defense 
will use the SM-3 interceptor, both land- and sea-based, 
rather than GBIs included in the previous program. 
 
- In many ways, your leadership and partnership in the 
development of the SM-3 and in operational coordination have 
been critical to our development of this new approach to 
Europe.  Just as we have cooperatively deployed proven and 
transportable missile defenses to help defend against 
ballistic missile threats in the Asia-Pacific region, we will 
deploy those same technologies and capabilities in Europe. 
 
- At this time, the new European approach is based on 
U.S.-owned SM-3s.  However, we will want to look at future 
missile defense opportunities with NATO and our European 
 
STATE 00096550  006 OF 006 
 
 
allies that could include potential sales of a number of 
missile defense capabilities.  We would very much like to 
work with Japan to make strategic decisions about whether and 
how our jointly developed missile (i.e., the SM-3 Block IIA) 
could be part of that future, and perhaps part of a future 
networked global system of regional missile defense 
architectures. 
 
- We look forward to continuing our strong partnership on 
missile defense and growing our cooperative activities. 
 
BMD FOR JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 
 
- As mentioned previously, the phased approach in Europe is 
in many ways similar to the approach we have taken with you. 
We believe that our current approach in the Asia- Pacific 
region is sound and forms a model that we can draw upon 
elsewhere.  Naturally, we will re-engage with you soon on the 
full findings of our BMD Review. 
 
IF ASKED ABOUT BURDEN SHARING AT NATO: 
 
- As you well know, this type of approach creates 
opportunities for participation ) for example, in command 
and control, sensors, and interceptors ) and enhanced 
cooperation, similar to the type that we already enjoy.  We 
look forward to engaging with NATO soon about how our new 
approach contributes to common defenses and how we can share 
responsibilities in that effort. 
 
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR JAPAN. 
 
¶8. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR GULF COOPERATION 
COUNCIL STATES (BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES): 
 
- The USG has adopted a phased adaptive approach for the 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) of Europe.  The approach in 
Europe complements the emerging BMD architecture in the Gulf, 
which is currently defending against potential Iranian air 
and missile threats to our partners and U.S. forces in the 
Gulf region. 
-- We are working to optimize limited assets to ensure that 
programs in Europe will not be executed at the expense of our 
friends and commitment to the defense of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. 
-- BMD programs in Europe will not require a diversion of 
U.S. assets from the Gulf. 
 
- The United States has deployed BMD systems to the Middle 
East to protect against the Iranian missile threat, including 
AEGIS BMD presence in the Persian Gulf and two PATRIOT 
batteries each in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. 
-- These U.S. systems complement the indigenous BMD systems 
in the region including PAC-II capability in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, and Shared Early Warning capability with the UAE. 
-- The USG is exploring the possibility of providing 
additional BMD coverage to Gulf Cooperation Council nations 
if the circumstances warrant. 
-- The USG will continue to work with its Gulf partners to 
develop regional, integrated air and missile defense systems. 
 
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR GCC STATES. 
CLINTON