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RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHBS #1580/01 3281400
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R 241400Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9730
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

Tuesday, 24 November 2009, 14:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001580 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR THE SECRETARY, EUR/WE, ISN, S/GC, AND AF/C 
EO 12958 DECL: 11/19/2019 
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, ECON, BE, AF 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH BELGIAN 
LEADERS DURING THE SECRETARY’S DECEMBER 3-4 VISIT TO BRUSSELS
REF: A. BRUSSELS 1498  B. BRUSSELS 1493  C. BRUSSELS 1552
Classified By: Ambassador Howard Gutman, reason 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Madame Secretary, Embassy Brussels welcomes your visit to Brussels on December 3-4 and your meetings with the in-coming Belgian Prime Minister, Yves Leterme, and the Foreign Minister, most likely Steven Vanackere. Your visit occurs at a moment when Belgians are poised to take a leading role in Europe -- their former Prime Minister, Herman Van Rompuy, has just been named as the first European Council President under the new circumstances of the Lisbon Treaty, and the Belgian government is preparing itself to hold the rotating presidency of the EU Council for the six months beginning July 1, 2010. Embassy Brussels believes that properly motivated, Belgium can be a leader in mobilizing Europe to assist the United States in meeting two of the key challenges faced by the Transatlantic community -- Afghanistan and Guantanamo. Hopefully, long-simmering tensions between the Flemish and francophone regions and linguistic communities will not distract Belgium from this opportunity. Other opportunities for cooperation exist on Africa policy, nuclear disarmament in Europe and Iran. The PM or Foreign Minister may try to promote the candidacy of former Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel for the next President of the UN General Assembly and may again raise Belgium’s failure to be included as a participant or observer at the G-20 talks, despite being the 18th largest economy in the world. End Summary.
TAKING A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN EUROPE
---------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) For the past few months, Embassy Brussels has been working to set the stage for a change in Belgium’s self-concept as a small, meek country living in the shadow of France and Germany, to a country that can show leadership in Europe in spite of stretched financial and material resources, mainly by becoming more vocal on the need for Europe to assist in the closing of Guantanamo and on the need to support the new Afghanistan strategy. Your visit is a chance to foster and encourage this transformation. In fact, of course, the transformation began at home in Belgium in 2007 when a new government, made up of a motley coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals and Humanists from both sides of the linguistic border, came to power. The Prime Minister then, and now again with the departure of Van Rompuy to the EU, was Yves Leterme, a Flemish Christian Democrat. Formation of the government was delayed for nearly a year because of difficult issues of power-sharing between the French and Flemish communities, many of which still remain to be solved.
STEPPING UP IN AFGHANISTAN
-------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Nevertheless, the new Defense Minister, Pieter De Crem, with sometimes grudging support from Leterme and others in the cabinet, reoriented Belgium’s defense policy. Where his predecessor had promoted a mainly humanitarian, EU and UN support role for the Belgian military, De Crem sought to re-establish Belgium as a small but reliable NATO ally. As a result, Belgium’s troop commitment to NATO ISAF operations in Afghanistan has increased from about 250 troops to nearly 540, with further increases, perhaps to 680, in the offing. Belgians provide security for Kabul airport, operate and maintain six F-16’s in Kandahar, run one Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team in Kunduz with a second due to arrive in January, and participate in a German-run PRT. This increase has been achieved against a background of declining resources which have required a thoroughgoing restructuring of the armed forces and recall of peacekeeping troops in Kosovo and Lebanon. The government has also bucked critics inside and out of government who prefer a more pacifist, less NATO-oriented approach and are ever ready to make political hay out of possible casualties. Minister De Crem moreover has reacted positively to suggestions from the Ambassador that he become more vocal in his support as a way perhaps to help shore up the support of other partners. Belgium deserves your appreciation and praise for its efforts, and although further increases in military contrib SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH BELGIAN LEADERS DURING THESECRETARY’S DECEMBER 3-4 VISIT TO BRUSSELS
¶4. (C) On the other hand, Belgium’s contribuQions to civilian development in Afghanistan have not kept pace. In April 2009, the GOB announced that it was doubling its financial assistance to the country to 12 million euros a year. This figure is only about 0.75 percent of its global budget for official development assistance. The Ministry of Interior has been considering sending 2-4 police trainers to Afghanistan but has hesitated over concerns for their security. Your unambiguous urging of more civilian assistance to Afghanistan with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister can help to increase resources devoted to Afghanistan.
SPURRING ON CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO
--------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) The Embassy has been encouraging Belgium to take a leadership role in Europe in the closure of the Guantanamo detention center. In October, Belgium resettled one detainee, whose successful integration should be reassuring to Belgian officials. We are discussing the transfer of two Tunisian detainees who have already been convicted of crimes in Belgium, not as part of the “placement” of detainees, but instead as part of our Department of Justice working with the Belgian Ministry of Justice (our hope is that that process will make it easier for Belgian society to accept the return, and also allow us to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs separately to take others). We have also begun to suggest the possibility of Belgium stepping forward from the chorus line and up to the footlights on Guantanamo. Helping solve the USG’s -- and Europe’s -- problem with Guantanamo is a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe. There are signs that Belgium’s reticence is beginning to chafe its leadership. Complaints about Belgium’s exclusion from G-20 membership, and opposition to perceived influence of a “directoire” of large countries in the EU are examples. It is a matter of convincing Belgium that not only does it have self-interest in a more assertive role, but it also has a uniquely trusted character within Europe that permits it to be effective. Embassy Brussels suggests the time is right to ask Belgium to take more than a handful of detainees and ask in coordination with others (as led by Belgium), so that Guantanamo -- which Europeans always so roundly condemned -- is closed once and for all.
POLITICAL PITFALLS IN REGIONAL TENSIONS
--------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) With three regions, three linguistic communities, seven parliaments and a myriad of political parties, domestic politics and the division of powers in Belgium require a complicated and delicate series of compromises. Herman Van Rompuy, though Flemish, was one politician who seemed able to gain the confidence and trust of both Flemish and francophone Belgians. His most likely successor, Yves Leterme, is more identifiably Flemish and does not share that reputation. One difficult issue, Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, or BHV, symbolizes the divisions and carries unusual emotional power in Belgium (ref A). In essence, it is a question of whether residents of the Brussels suburbs should live and vote under Flemish control or have special francophone voting and social rights.  The issue impeded formation of a government after the 2007 elections and was kicked down the road ever since. A special effort will have to be made before March 2010 to either once again delay a solution or reach a final compromise. Failure to do so could threaten Leterme’s coalition in the first part of the year. The fact that all Belgian politicians dearly want to avoid embarrassment during Belgium’s EU presidency will motivate them to find the necessary compromises, but there is no guarantee they can.
INTEREST IN ENHANCED AFRICA COOPERATION
--------------------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Central Africa is a special interest of Belgium, as the former colonial power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi. As such, the GOB is eager to cooperate with the United States on encouraging security sector reform in the DRC, consolidating peace in the Eastern DRC, promoting regional economic integration and cooperation among states in the region on security issues. In particular, Belgium is as interested in preventing sexual violence as we are. It would like us to encourage continued cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC to take a firmer hand with rebel groups that operate in Eastern Congo and far too often commit atrocities. When you met Belgium’s former
BRUSSELS 00001580 002 OF 003
¶4. (C) On the other hand, Belgium’s contributions to civilian development in Afghanistan have not kept pace. In April 2009, the GOB announced that it was doubling its financial assistance to the country to 12 million euros a year. This figure is only about 0.75 percent of its global budget for official development assistance. The Ministry of Interior has been considering sending 2-4 police trainers to Afghanistan but has hesitated over concerns for their security. Your unambiguous urging of more civilian assistance to Afghanistan with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister can help to increase resources devoted to Afghanistan.
SPURRING ON CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO
--------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) The Embassy has been encouraging Belgium to take a leadership role in Europe in the closure of the Guantanamo detention center. In October, Belgium resettled one detainee, whose successful integration should be reassuring to Belgian officials. We are discussing the transfer of two Tunisian detainees who have already been convicted of crimes in Belgium, not as part of the “placement” of detainees, but instead as part of our Department of Justice working with the Belgian Ministry of Justice (our hope is that that process will make it easier for Belgian society to accept the return, and also allow us to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs separately to take others). We have also begun to suggest the possibility of Belgium stepping forward from the chorus line and up to the footlights on Guantanamo. Helping solve the USG’s -- and Europe’s -- problem with Guantanamo is a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe. There are signs that Belgium’s reticence is beginning to chafe its leadership. Complaints about Belgium’s exclusion from G-20 membership, and opposition to perceived influence of a “directoire” of large countries in the EU are examples. It is a matter of convincing Belgium that not only does it have self-interest in a more assertive role, but it also has a uniquely trusted character within Europe that permits it to be effective. Embassy Brussels suggests the time is right to ask Belgium to take more than a handful of detainees and ask in coordination with others (as led by Belgium), so that Guantanamo -- which Europeans always so roundly condemned -- is closed once and for all.
POLITICAL PITFALLS IN REGIONAL TENSIONS
--------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) With three regions, three linguistic communities, seven parliaments and a myriad of political parties, domestic politics and the division of powers in Belgium require a complicated and delicate series of compromises. Herman Van Rompuy, though Flemish, was one politician who seemed able to gain the confidence and trust of both Flemish and francophone Belgians. His most likely successor, Yves Leterme, is more identifiably Flemish and does not share that reputation. One difficult issue, Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, or BHV, symbolizes the divisions and carries unusual emotional power in Belgium (ref A). In essence, it is a question of whether residents of the Brussels suburbs should live and vote under Flemish control or have special francophone voting and social rights.  The issue impeded formation of a government after the 2007 elections and was kicked down the road ever since. A special effort will have to be made before March 2010 to either once again delay a solution or reach a final compromise. Failure to do so could threaten Leterme’s coalition in the first part of the year. The fact that all Belgian politicians dearly want to avoid embarrassment during Belgium’s EU presidency will motivate them to find the necessary compromises, but there is no guarantee they can.
INTEREST IN ENHANCED AFRICA COOPERATION
--------------------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Central Africa is a special interest of Belgium, as the former colonial power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi. As such, the GOB is eager to cooperate with the United States on encouraging security sector reform in the DRC, consolidating peace in the Eastern DRC, promoting regional economic integration and cooperation among states in the region on security issues. In particular, Belgium is as interested in preventing sexual violence as we are. It would like us to encourage continued cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC to take a firmer hand with rebel groups that operate in Eastern Congo and far too often commit atrocities. When you met Belgium’s former
BRUSSELS 00001580 003 OF 003
foreign minister, Karel De Gucht, last February, you discussed naming a bilateral task force to meet in Washington to discuss security sector reform in the DRC. This has not yet occurred, because the Belgians opted to wait until the new USG Africa team was in place. We are now ready to move ahead with this. In November, Belgium announced an increase in assistance to Burundi, making it the largest bilateral donor to that country. It plans to do the same for the DRC.
MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT
--------------------------------------------- 
¶8. (S) Belgium has a special interest in nuclear non-proliferation issues because it participates in NATO’s nuclear forces at the Kleine Brogel air force base. It rejected a recent overture from Germany to join with the Netherlands, Italy and Germany to propose to the rest of NATO that nuclear weapons be removed from those countries (ref B).  However, Belgian MOD and MFA officials apparently had to rein in then-Foreign Minister Leterme when he initially responded too positively to the idea. Belgium’s official policy rejects a unilateral approach to disarmament and insists that the issue must be discussed among all NATO members at one time, with due regard for U.S.-Russian bilateral discussions and the NPT. The government is also opposing a proposal from the floor of the Belgian parliament to ban nuclear weapons from Belgian soil.
IRAN SANCTIONS IF NECESSARY
--------------------------- 
¶9. (C) Belgium shares our concern about Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear capability. It supports strengthened sanctions in the EU and UN if necessary. In that case, at least at first, it prefers to see existing sanctions made more effective, rather than extending them into entirely new areas, with the possible exception of a conventional arms embargo.
FORMER FM LOUIS MICHEL’S CANDIDACY FOR UNGA PRESIDENT
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶10. (C) One issue the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister may raise is a request for support for the candidacy of former Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel for President of the UN General Assembly (ref C). As you know, we do not discuss our voting intentions for such posts. They have already discussed this issue with Assistant Secretary Gordon and with Ambassador Gutman. .