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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI874,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI874 | 2009-11-01 13:01 | 2011-01-31 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
VZCZCXRO5650
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0874/01 3051308
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 011308Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5426
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0167
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0181
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5975
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000874
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/C, AND S/USSES E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2019
TAGS: PREL CD SU LY
BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa expressed pleasure with U.S.-Libyan cooperation on the Darfur crisis and encouraged Special Envoy Gration to apply pressure to dis-unified factions of the Sudan Liberation Army. He cautioned that without increased pressure from international actors, rebel leaders in Addis Ababa, Tripoli, and other capitals would grow comfortable in "five-star hotels" and seek to enhance their personal image at the expense of unification and peace talks. Kusa agreed with SE Gration's assessment that the humanitarian situation and the upcoming national elections added urgency to the resolution of the Darfur issue and that returns and reconstruction would be impossible without lasting security. Kusa characterized Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil Ibrahim as a Turabist and pledged Libya's continued support for "capable and competent" nations' -- like the U.S. -- initiatives for peace in Sudan. End Summary.
KUSA ENCOURAGES INCREASED PRESSURE FOR UNIFICATION
2.(C) In an October 8 meeting with Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa, SE Gration outlined his overall strategy for Sudan and thanked Kusa for Libya's interventions to find a political resolution to the Chad-Sudan conflict and to unify splintered factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). He said he appreciated Kusa's assistance in facilitating the travel of Addis Ababa-based SLA leaders to Tripoli in an effort to promote their unification in advance of the re-launch of the Doha process slated for October 28 (Note: This date has since slipped to mid-November as the Joint-Chief Mediator announced that he needed to be present at the African Union's Peace and Security Council Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria schedule for the end of October. End note.). Gration said his purpose in Libya was three-fold: to ensure that Libya and the U.S. presented a united position to the rebels, to work on facilitating the rebels' participation in a unification conference, and to make sure no new factions were created as a byproduct of SLA unification.
3.(C) Kusa expressed gratitude for SE Gration's attention to the Darfur issue and his consultations with Libyan officials handling the portfolio. As a neighboring country, Libya "feels the depth" of the suffering caused by the Darfur conflict, and appreciates the seriousness with which the U.S. has approached the crisis. Other international actors, Kusa said, lacked the capacity and the knowledge to achieve results. Kusa encouraged SE Gration to push the "apathetic" faction leaders to quickly resolve the conflict with Khartoum. He said that some, including Ahmed Abdel Shafi, sought international sympathy and attention and were more interested in staying in "five-star hotels" and being shuttled from capital to capital. Unification and peace talks, Kusa said, would end the benefits that some rebel leaders have come to enjoy.
4.(C) Kusa expressed concern about the effect of Darfur's lingering IDP and refugee problems on regional security, calling for greater international monitoring and reporting. Without internal security in Darfur, Kusa saw little opportunity for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees to return to their homes and resume their lives. This, in turn, exacerbated regional security concerns and compounded the challenge of humanitarian relief. Kusa was particularly concerned with the smuggling, arms traffic, and extremism that was fed by the instability in Darfur. Characterizing the the janjaweed as Islamic extremists, Kusa reported that the Libyan External Security Organization had interdicted several smuggling groups with ties to Islamist groups in Algeria.
5.(C) SE Gration agreed that more attention needed to be paid to the situation in IDP camps and preparations made for eventual returns and reconstruction. Laying out the timetable of important events -- the renewal of Doha talks and the November start of voter registration in preparation for the national elections in the spring of 2010 -- Gration cautioned that any gains would be fragile. He asked that Libya continue to apply pressure on JEM, Abdul Wahid Nur, and "anyone with technicals and guns" to prevent spoilers from affecting the unification process. Gration argued that the conditions were ripe for quick unification: Sudan seemed increasingly serious about peace talks while Chad President Idriss Deby was growing tired of JEM's tactics. The unique window of opportunity, however, should not lead to a rushed pact between groups that had no roots and would dissolve before serious negotiations with Khartoum could take place.
6.(C) Kusa and SE Gration agreed that Khalil Ibrahim had designs of national leadership and would attempt to disrupt any push for unity among SLA factions. Kusa assessed that Khalil had the same mentality as Turabi and was essentially a member of TRIPOLI 00000874 002.2 OF 002 the Muslim Brotherhood. xxxxxxxxxxxx Saying that Libya had to give Khalil some aid to ensure he would continue his relationship with the GOL, he said both Libya and Deby would need to pressure him to cooperate.
7.(C) Kusa closed the meeting by reiterating Libya's gratitude for the productive relationship with the U.S. on the Sudan conflict. Kusa said he hoped to establish a broader dialogue with the U.S. on a range of African issues, and would welcome visits from other U.S. officials in this regard.
8.(U) SE Gration cleared this message. CRETZ