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RR RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
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R 071356Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6641
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0219
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0074

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020 
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL ASEC JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN: REGIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT - AFGHANISTAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U)  This cable is part 1 of 5 in a series on Jordan's 
regional security contributions and military support. 
 
¶2.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Jordan has been exceptionally responsive 
to USG requests for military contributions in support of 
regional and international security priorities.  In 
Afghanistan, Jordan has responded with significant ground and 
Special Operations Forces (SOF).  These forces are now 
engaged in combat and security operations alongside Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) units.  Deployments of this magnitude 
are a first for Jordan.  While the financial requirements of 
sustaining large numbers of forces abroad could hamper 
Jordan's ability to maintain its contributions, Jordan is 
otherwise prepared to continue its deployments and seek new 
ways to support the planned surge of U.S. forces.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
Force Deployments in Afghanistan 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  In July 2009, Jordan deployed a 720 person infantry 
battalion to Logar Province, Afghanistan, for an expected six 
month deployment.  The battalion, named Task Force 222 
(TF222), conducted security operations with U.S. Task Force 
Spartan (3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division).  Originally 
deployed to support elections in the province, the battalion 
now conducts routine security operations.  Jordan's Chief of 
Defense has approved a second rotation (TF222-Bravo) which is 
scheduled to deploy on January 9, 2010.  TF 222-Bravo will be 
partnered with the 173d Airborne Brigade at Forward Operating 
Base Shank. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Jordan included two rotary-wing aviators from the 
Prince Hashim Royal Brigade with their TF222 deployment to 
observe U.S. rotary-wing aviation missions.  The goal of this 
deployment is to build Jordan's capacity for air support of 
forces with an emphasis on enhancing interoperability with 
U.S. forces.  In September 2009, Jordan deployed a second 
round of rotary-wing aviators, with the intent to establish 
routine rotations. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Jordanian Special Operations Forces deployed Task 
Force 111 (TF111), a 111-person unit, in May 2009 to conduct 
combat operations with the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group, 
near Qalat, Afghanistan.  TF111 redeployed in late August.  A 
second iteration of the SOF unit, TF111-Bravo, deployed to 
Afghanistan on October 1, 2009, for an expected deployment of 
6 months, establishing consistent Jordanian SOF presence in 
Afghanistan.  Coordination is underway for the deployment of 
its replacement, TF111-Charlie, which will deploy to 
Afghanistan on February 11, 2010. 
 
 
Other Contributions for Afghanistan 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Other contributions to security goals in Afghanistan 
include: 
 
  --  Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) operates a military field 
hospital in Qalat, Afghanistan.  Since 2003 the hospital has 
treated over 750,000 patients. 
 
  --  In 2003, Jordan was one of the first countries to send 
demining teams to Afghanistan. 
 
  --  Jordan trained a 50-man cadre of the Afghanistan 
National Army Counter Terrorism force. 
 
 
Pay Entitlements Break the Bank 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Although Jordan has been an eager partner in 
Afghanistan, limited resources are a significant constraint. 
TF111 and TF222 deployments have been made possible only 
through U.S. support, such as pre-deployment training, 
airlift, equipment, and billeting. 
 
¶8.  (C)  A central issue is the requirement under Jordanian 
law that forces deployed abroad are paid a combat premium of 
approximately 1600 USD per month.  (Note:  These so-called 
pay entitlements have been consistently paid during Jordan's 
 
AMMAN 00000091  002 OF 002 
 
 
19-year history in UN Peacekeeping operations (PKO).  Pay 
entitlements for PKOs were funded through the UN system. 
However, there is no similar mechanism when Jordan deploys 
independently or with coalition partners, forcing Jordan to 
make these payments on its own to its forces deployed in 
Afghanistan.  End Note.) 
 
¶9.  (C)  Pay entitlements are a significant element in the 
JAF's growing budget deficit, now estimated to be 
approximately 150 million USD.  The pay entitlements issue 
nearly derailed the original deployment of TF222 and could 
limit the sustainability of future rotations of TF111 and 
TF222. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Jordan has repeatedly requested assistance from the 
U.S. to fund its pay entitlements, a request the USG cannot 
fulfill.  Jordan has also requested assistance from the 
United Arab Emirates, but so far funds have not been 
forthcoming. 
 
 
Jordan Wants to Do More 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  In meetings Jordanian officials have indicated 
their interest in doing more to support the mission in 
Afghanistan and the planned surge of U.S. forces there.  In 
particular, both the Chairman of Defense and King Abdullah II 
have said that Jordan stands ready to contribute additional 
forces, especially if the pay entitlements issue can be 
solved.  In addition, the King has offered to contribute two 
Blackhawk helicopters for special operations, an offer which 
is currently under review by CENTCOM. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Jordan's Afghanistan deployments are a significant 
expression of support from a key Arab ally for the mission in 
Afghanistan.  In addition, Jordan's forces are showing 
results.  Feedback from the field indicates that the 
Jordanian military presence is yielding valuable engagement 
with key leaders in rural areas in Afghanistan, giving these 
leaders a promising alternative to Taliban affiliation.  In 
addition, the deployments are helping Jordan acquire 
experience and skills in a combat situation -- a critical 
need for a national military that has not deployed in combat 
in over a generation -- and improving interoperability with 
U.S. forces.  It is clear that Jordan could do more. 
However, with its pay entitlements problem and military 
budget shortfall, financing remains a barrier. 
 
Beecroft