Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 5422 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YM YI YE

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 10BRASILIA59, BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH MRE UNDER SECRETARIES FOR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BRASILIA59.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BRASILIA59 2010-02-19 22:10 2010-12-23 07:07 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #0059/01 0502239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 192239Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0519
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0014
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0001
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000059 

SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/19 
TAGS: PREL KNNP IR CH BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH MRE UNDER SECRETARIES FOR 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS 

REF: STATE 12108 

CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas A. Shannon, Ambassador, State, Embassy 
Brasilia; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 

1. (C) Summary. In separate meetings with Ambassador Shannon 
February 9, MRE Under Secretaries for Political Affairs I Vera 
Machado and Political Affairs II Roberto Jaguaribe both focused on 
concerns that Iranian domestic issues would make a solution to the 
nuclear issues difficult to achieve. Machado, who covers relations 
with the United States, among other issues, said the GOB is looking 
forward to a visit by Secretary Clinton and focused the discussion 
on South America regional issues. Jaguaribe, who is responsible for 
East, Central, and South Asia and Iran, spoke at length about 
Brazil's views on Iran, relations with China, and the upcoming BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) summit in Brasilia. End 
summary. 

Iran and Nuclear Issues 

2. (C) Consistent with his message in previous engagements, 
Jaguaribe offered broad praise for President Obama's efforts to 
"interface with Iran in a more comprehensive way," and emphasized 
that Iran's eventual acceptance of the core P5+1 proposal is the 
only plausible solution to the crisis. Jaguaribe expressed doubts 
that Iran would accept the solution in its current political 
climate, and suggested that the strong anti-Iranian positions taken 
in the United States and the European Union have conditioned the 
Iranian government and people to think that any offer made by the 
United States cannot be acceptable. Jaguaribe called Iran's 
nuclear program an expression of national identity, a symbol 
galvanizing popular support for the regime. Likewise he viewed any 
sanctions as automatically strengthening the position of hard-line 
elements in the Iranian government. He strongly encouraged more 
engagement with Iran before considering sanctions in the UN. 
Jaguaribe said that third-party engagement - including Turkey, but 
"not necessarily Brazil" - would be a key to success given Iranian 
skepticism of the United States and Europe as primary messengers. 
He expressed interest in continuing discussion with U.S. officials 
concerning Iran. For her part, Machado, who also covers 
non-proliferation and UNSC issues, reiterated the GOB view that 
Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear power, but expressed concern 
about how the situation with Iran was developing. She suggested a 
"new path" was needed, but like Jaguaribe, she worried that 
multiple centers of power within Iran would make it difficult to 
find a way forward. 

Iran and Human Rights 

3. (C) When pressed about human rights in Iran, Jaguaribe 
acknowledged a negative and worsening situation but also asked why 
we were singling out Iran when several of its neighbors are less 
democratic with worse human rights performance. The Ambassador 
laid out the concerns in reftel, including our objections to Iran's 
potential bid for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council. 
Jaguaribe had no immediate response to the demarche points but 
emphasized that Brazil has registered its human rights concerns 
with Iran several times, particularly concerning treatment of the 
Baha'i. He added that Iran's increased use of paramilitaries in 
order to maintain order is a sign of the regime's weakness. 
Jaguaribe acknowledged the Brazilian's Embassy lack of capacity to 
assess popular support for the government but still spoke of Iran's 
government as essentially stable and capable of reaching and 
honoring agreements. 

Regional Stability 

4. (C) Machado said the GOB would welcome a visit by Secretary 
Clinton and discussed a number of Brazil's neighbors with the 
Ambassador. She said that Brazil is watching the situation in 
Venezuela carefully, noting that Chavez faces a number of internal 
problems. She thought that there was a chance for improvement 
following the September 2010 legislative elections because there 
were a number of "lesser known" political figures who may emerge 
with more influence. Machado believed that the situation in 
Bolivia had stabilized but remained concerned about connections 
between the government and coca growers. She acknowledged the 
threat to the region of drug trafficking but identified the primary 
source of the problem as consumption in rich countries. 


Building with BRICs 

5. (C) Recently returned from a trip to China in preparation for 
the April 15-16 BRIC summit in Brasilia, Jaguaribe spoke candidly 
about the difficulties in developing an agenda and an overall 
mission for BRIC. China, he felt, presented a particular challenge 
to Brazil given different perceptions by the Chinese about what a 
group like BRIC would mean. Jaguaribe emphasized that China is 
very cautious not to make BRIC look like a group opposing the 
interests of established powers and as a result works to make the 
agenda less than fully precise. China is also especially sensitive 
to concerns from developing nations that don't want BRIC to purport 
to speak as the voice for developing countries. The Under 
Secretary also spoke about the difficulty of organizing a group 
agenda under these circumstances, commenting, "This is a very 
heterogeneous group of countries with different goals, but the 
interest is there." 

China: The "Communist Dynasty" 

6. (C) Jaguaribe joked that the Chinese government would one day 
be referred to as the "Communist Dynasty," and expressed minor 
exasperation about the difficulty of finding the right person in 
the government to talk with about major issues. Ambassador Shannon 
noted that China's capacity to engage successfully in South America 
has evolved rapidly. What began as a commercial and trade-based 
relationship is now gaining a political component. The Chinese, he 
noted, are constantly evaluating their performance and improving 
their game. He told Jaguaribe, "China will be a tough competitor, 
for the United States and Brazil." 
SHANNON